

ESSENTIALS OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY


[FOR THREE-YEAR DEGREE COURSE]

(PASS & HONOURS)

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P R E F A C E

This book seeks to present a comprehensive idea of **Western Philosophy** and meet adequately the needs of the students preparing for the B. A. Pass and Honours Examinations of the different Universities. I have systematically inserted the questions, most of which were set in University Examinations. I have tried my best to make the answers to the questions simple, concise and readily intelligible to the average students.

With a view to maintaining the proper standard of the Honours course I have thankfully quoted some selected lines from the philosophy books written by popular authors including Dr. S. C. Chatterjee, Dr. D. M. Datta, Prof. H. M. Bhattacharya, Dr. J. N. Sinha, Prof. P. B. Chatterjee and Prof. S. P. Chakravarty.

—R. C. M.

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PHILOSOPHY AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER SUBJECTS

Q.1. Explain the nature of Philosophy and indicate its scope or subject-matter.

Nature of Philosophy :—Philosophy is an attempt at a rational conception of the universe as a comprehensive whole including matter, life, mind and God. Professor Weber rightly says that philosophy is 'the search for a comprehensive view of nature, an attempt at a universal explanation of things'. It systematically enquires into the nature of all things of the universe including matter, time, space, causality, life, mind, human soul and God, and their relation to one another, and thus seeks to give a rational account of the reality as a whole.

Every object of the world has two aspects—one is the external or sensible aspect called appearance or phenomenon and the other the internal or super-sensuous aspect called reality or noumenon which underlies the sensuous aspect. Philosophy discusses both the aspects—the external manifestation as well as the inner reality of the thing. Philosophy studies both the phenomena and noumena, appearance and reality of all things and beings and seeks rational knowledge of them and their mutual relation. The aim of philosophy is to acquire knowledge of the reality based upon the knowledge of the appearance of things or the sensuous phenomena. It seeks to penetrate beneath the surface show of things and find the ultimate meaning and essence. Philosophy seeks to ascertain by logical thought

and rational reflection whether the universe is ultimately material or spiritual or both,¹ whether the world-process is mechanical or purposive, whether human mind or soul is mortal or immortal, whether truth, beauty and goodness are subjective ideals, mere figments of imagination or objective values rooted in reality. The questions that philosophy seeks to answer are—What is the nature of the Self or 'I' and the not-self or the external world? Has the world any reality independent of the Self or 'I'? If it has an independent existence, then how is the self or man related to it? Is there any supreme Self or God governing the world and man? The matters relating to the world, man and God are the fundamental questions of philosophy, and it is philosophy which tries to answer them through rational and critical analysis of experience.

It is however, not true to say that philosophy gives a direct experience of reality. Reality, being non-sensuous, can be apprehended only by non-sensuous experience i. e., through intuition or mystic experience. The function of philosophy is simply to rationalise the non-sensuous experience of reality. "It is an intellectual attempt to interpret and understand the universe in the light of our intuitive or mystical experience of reality. Although men as spiritual beings may, in one way or other, be in communion with the super-sensuous reality, yet they are not, strictly speaking, all philosophers and metaphysicians. Philosophers are men who have the experience of the super-sensuous and make an intellectual attempt to rationalise it so as to enable us to understand the world of ordinary experience and solve the ultimate problems of our

life. Philosophy is thus the rationalisation of our experiences of super-sensuous reality or the intellectual attempt to understand the world in the light of those experiences." (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee—"The Problems of Philosophy")

Scope of Philosophy :—Now the question is—what do we mean by the scope of philosophy? In answer to this it can be generally said that the entire universe and the whole of human experience come within the scope or province of philosophy. "There is no province of human experience, there is nothing in the whole realm of reality, which lies beyond the ~~domain~~ of philosophy or to which philosophical investigation does not extend." (John Caird). The supreme self (God), human self, matter, nature, intellect, mind, senses, life, subtle and gross bodies—all these fall within the scope of philosophical investigation. The scope of philosophy embraces the entire system of things. Philosophy divides itself into three branches—(1) Philosophy of Nature, (2) Philosophy of Mind, and (3) Philosophy of God or the Absolute. It studies both the aspects of a thing—appearance and reality, phenomena and noumena. In other words, it interprets the phenomenal aspect by reference to the real. The scope of philosophy also covers morality, religion, education, society, science, art, war and peace, and violence and non-violence. In one word, philosophy tries to explain the surface show of things by unveiling the nature of the ultimate reality of the entire universe and give us the knowledge of the fundamental unity underlying the diversities of things and events.

Of course, it should be mentioned in this connection that though the entire universe and total human experience

constitute the subject-matter of philosophy, yet it is not the task of philosophy to give us detailed knowledge of all things. It is science which gives us detailed knowledge of the different departments of the world. The function of philosophy is to collect different data and material information from different sciences and systematize and co-ordinate them into one organized whole. In one word, it gives us a comprehensive view of the entire system of things. It also examines the validity of the fundamental principles and presuppositions of different sciences and determines their values by reference to the standard of ultimate truth and reality. As philosophy investigates the nature of reality underlying the surface show of things, it includes within its scope metaphysics which enquires into the nature of supersensuous reality or the essences underlying phenomena.

Moreover, philosophy must ascertain whether the knowledge of the ultimate reality is possible or not, before it proceeds to investigate the nature of reality ; if such knowledge is possible, then it must consider the conditions and means of attaining knowledge, It is the task of epistemology to enquire into the nature, origin, conditions and limit of knowledge. So epistemology is an indispensable part of philosophy and has a dominant place in philosophy.

Besides the matters relating to knowledge, philosophy also takes into consideration the problems regarding the nature and test of truth. Again, philosophy embraces within its scope axiology or the science of value as philosophy deals with the nature of values and determines whether they are subjective or objective. In other words,

philosophy with the help of axiology as one of its branches, ascertains the nature of the supreme values—truth, beauty and goodness, and in the light of these values it interprets the nature of the world and experience.

Q 2. (a) Distinguish between Science and Philosophy. According to some, science is partially unified knowledge, while philosophy is completely unified knowledge. Do you agree ?

(b) What is the relation of Philosophy to Science ? “Philosophy is the synthesis of the sciences.” Discuss.

(a) Difference between Science and Philosophy :—Science is a systematic study of a particular department of mind or nature. It aims at discovering laws that are accurate, certain and general in character. Science collects, arranges and classifies objects or facts of a definite section of the material or mental world and thus gives us unified or organized knowledge of that particular section. The aim of science is to explain the different objects and facts of a particular department of the world by discovering their connections, unity and harmony. The conclusions of science are arrived at by reason, so they become certain and they are universally accepted. Like science philosophy also ascertains truths with the help of judgment and reason and gives us organized, universal and exact knowledge. In this respect, science and philosophy are similar to each other, and they differ from common-sense which instead of discovering unity and inter-relation of the different facts or objects of experience gives us only unrelated and disjointed view of things. Common-sense is concerned with particular and isolated facts and it does

not arrive at universal laws which govern and unify them. Thus unlike science and philosophy common-sense is uncertain, inaccurate, unsystematic and based upon random and casual perception and unreliable authority. But science and philosophy discover unity in the diversities of facts and events and seek to give systematic and organized view of things.

If we consider the subject-matters and methods of science and philosophy, we notice the following points of difference :—

(i) **Science is partial knowledge ; while philosophy is complete and comprehensive knowledge.** Each science deals with only one particular section of the universe ; the entire world taken comprehensively does not constitute the subject-matter of any science. As there are various departments of the world, so there are different sciences, each dealing with only one particular department. For examples, Physics as a science discusses material bodies and their force and motion, biology discusses life and has nothing to do with matter and mind. The subject-matter of philosophy, on the other hand, comprises the whole universe including matter, life, mind and God. Philosophy takes a comprehensive view of the universe and seeks to give complete and unified knowledge of the whole universe. Secondly, when science deals with the nature of thing, it simply dicusses the phenomenal aspect i. e. the surface-show of it which is presented to sense-experience, it does not discuss the nature of the ultimate reality or inner substance which is super-sensuous and beyond the external forms. So science ~~is~~ a partial or sectional study. On the

other hand, philosophy discusses both the aspects—the external manifestation as well as the inner reality of the thing. It studies both the phenomena and noumena, appearance and reality of all things and beings. In other words, philosophy seeks to explain the surface-show of things by unveiling the nature of the ultimate reality i.e. it interprets the phenomenal aspect by reference to the real. If philosophy be confined to the study of the phenomenal aspect and the criticism of merely sensuous experience, then it will not be philosophy in the proper sense of the term. It must penetrate into the super-sensuous reality and enables us to understand the world of ordinary experience in the light of the knowledge of the super-sensuous reality. Science cannot give us the knowledge of the real nature of space, time, substance, causality etc., it simply presupposes them ; but philosophy can explain their real nature with the help of metaphysical speculation. Science can explain *how* a thing undergoes change, but it cannot answer the question, why the thing changes. It is philosophy which can properly answer this question by determining the real nature and purpose of the world and life. Science is silent in regard to our religious, moral and aesthetic experiences, but philosophy can furnish proper accounts of them. Philosophy interprets all possible experiences (sensuous and spiritual), and gives us a rational view of the whole universe. So the scope of philosophy is much wider than that of science.

(ii) Science and philosophy also differ in their methods. All sciences make use of observation and experiment by which they collect facts of experience, and ultimately they

rise to inductive generalisations from experience of particular facts. Thus the method of science is empirical and inductive. Philosophy, on the other hand, recognises the contribution of both experience and reason in order to arrive at a rational conception of the reality as a whole. It reflects upon the facts of experience and interprets them by rational hypothesis. Philosophy discovers the ultimate reality by reason and speculation. It of course starts with facts of experience and rises to inductive generalisations as sciences do, but the main task of philosophy is to confirm scientific generalisations by deductions of further conclusions from the ultimate reality. Thus philosophy makes use of both induction and deduction, experience and reason. Moreover, philosophy has to resort to intuition or contemplation for the realisation of the absolute reality.

(b) Relation between Science and Philosophy :—Though science and philosophy differ in respect of their method and subject-matter, yet they greatly resemble each other and are closely connected. Both are based upon the facts of experience and both seek to give systematic and unified knowledge of their subjects. Both discuss their respective subjects with the help of reason and judgment. Like science philosophy also starts with the world of objects familiar to us. Even, those philosophers who deny the reality of the world begin their philosophical thoughts from the world of facts and experience. Again, both science and philosophy are occupied in the quest of truth. Patrick has rightly said, "They have the same spirit and the same purpose—the honest and laborious search for truth."

While discussing the relation between science and philosophy, some have said that philosophy is the sum-total or synthesis of the sciences. The function of philosophy is simply to give complete and comprehensive knowledge about the world and experience by collecting and co-ordinating the partial cognitions furnished by different sciences. It simply unifies the results of the different sciences in order to arrive at a consistent and comprehensive view of the world-system. The philosophers like Comte, Paulsen, Wundt, Spencer etc. hold that philosophy is the sum-total of all sciences. Thus Comte says, "Philosophy is the science of sciences—i. e. it is the attempt to co-ordinate the results of the sciences." Paulsen says, "Philosophy is the sum-total of all scientific knowledge." Wundt says, "Philosophy is the universal science which has to unite the cognitions attained by the particular sciences into a consistent system." Herbert spencer says, "Science is partially unified knowledge, philosophy completely unified knowledge ; the generalisations of philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalisations of science, philosophy is the knowledge of the highest degree of generality." In the recent philosophy the realists like Russell, Alexander etc. also hold that Philosophy is the universal form in which the conclusions of different sciences are unified and synthesised. The scientific method is the only method of philosophy, because philosophy like science has its basis in experience. So Alexander says, "The more comprehensive a science becomes the closer it comes to philosophy so that it may become difficult to say where science leaves off and philosophy begins."

We cannot but admit that philosophy extremely depends upon science, because it interprets the world and life by collecting various necessary materials from the different sciences. It is philosophy which unifies and systematises the results of different sciences and thus coordinates and harmonises them. Indeed, philosophy would be an empty abstraction if it does not start from the collection of materials furnished by science. Philosophical discussion of the nature of matter, life and mind is possible only on the basis of the conclusions of the different sciences. But though philosophy is so much dependent on science, we must not accept the view that philosophy is a mere synthesis of the sciences. Philosophy proper is concerned with a view of the world as a comprehensive whole including both the phenomenal and noumenal aspects.

A total, synoptic view of the universe which philosophy seeks to attain cannot be attained by the scientific method of observation and experiment i.e. by merely putting together the results of all sciences which deal only with phenomena; it requires imaginative or intuitive insight which philosophy makes use of unlike science. Again, as it is not possible for a philosopher to have detailed knowledge of all the sciences, a synthesis of all the sciences is an impossible task. Lastly, the truths and discoveries of science are changeable. Now, if philosophy be a synthesis of the sciences, then philosophy would be merely 'a growing science' and in that case philosophy would fail to give a completely unified knowledge of the world as a whole.

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Lastly, as philosophy has to derive necessary materials from science and thus depends upon it, so science also is dependent on philosophy, because it presupposes certain ideas without proof and it is philosophy which examines the nature and validity of these pre-suppositions of science. Science simply takes for granted such concepts as space, time, substance, causality etc. and it is philosophy which critically examines these fundamental assumptions of science and determines whether they are subjective or objective, whether they are merely forms of knowledge or have reality independent of knowing mind. Thus science and philosophy are so related to each other that one is a supplement to the other. The phenomenal knowledge based upon which philosophy penetrates the heart of reality is supplied by science ; on the other hand, the knowledge of reality which is not found in science is supplied by philosophy. In this way one fulfils the want and need of the other ; and the two taken together give us complete satisfaction. For this reason philosophy is called the criticism of experience or the rational interpretation of scientific knowledge. In this connection Weber has rightly said, "The sciences, without philosophy, are an aggregate without unity, a body without any soul ; philosophy, without the sciences, is a soul without a body, differing in nothing from poetry and its dreams, Science is the indispensable foundation and the matter, as it were, of philosophy ; it is, to use an Aristotelian phrase, potential philosophy. Philosophy, in turn, is science in actu, ... the supreme satisfaction of the scientific spirit and its natural tendency to comprehend everything into a unity."

Q. 3. What is Metaphysics ? How is it related to Philosophy ?

Metaphysics is a study of the nature and relation of the realities underlying phenomena. It aims at understanding 'what lies beyond the natural or physical phenomena'. In other words, it seeks to go beyond phenomena or manifestations and understand the nature of inner essence or ultimate reality. It attempts to answer the questions—What is the nature of matter underlying external shapes or forms ? What is the nature of soul underlying the changing states and processes of mind ? What is the nature of God or the Absolute Reality ? How is God or the Absolute related to matter and soul ? Metaphysics is also called 'Ontology' which means the 'Theory of being' or the science of pure being or reality as such. It is the task of metaphysics or ontology to introduce and discuss the questions—What do we mean by the real world ? Is the world of sense-experience the sole sphere of existence or is there any unchangeable reality behind the changing appearance of things ? Is there any creative and regulative principle of the universe ? Is there any ultimate, eternal and immutable being underlying the changeable and perceptible things ?

Thus metaphysics is limited to the study of the ultimate reality or realities underlying phenomena or manifestations. In this respect metaphysics or ontology is a vital part of philosophy. Plato has gone so far as to identify philosophy with metaphysics, because, according to him, the ideal world or the world of reality or substance alone has true existence, and the phenomenal world or the world of sense-

experience is a mere copy of the real world, so it has no real existence. On the other hand, the empiricists like Hume hold that there is no reality underlying or beyond the world of sense-experience; so metaphysics is not possible, philosophy is confined to the study of phenomena only.

We should, however, maintain that philosophy should not leave out metaphysics from its scope nor should it be identified with metaphysics. In fact, philosophy must include within its scope the study of both appearance and reality as two correlative aspects of the same being. Thus philosophy includes both phenomenology and ontology or sciences and metaphysics and combines the results of both sciences and metaphysics into a connected system. In other words, philosophy combines the empirical investigations of sciences with metaphysics or the theory of reality and offers a rational explanation of the mutual relation of appearance and reality.

Q. 4. How is Metaphysics or Philosophy related to Epistemology ?

It is the main task of metaphysics or philosophy to determine the real nature of the world and life and their ultimate values. But before metaphysics or philosophy should proceed to investigate the real nature of things and their ultimate values it must measure the capacity of human mind for such investigations. We cannot proceed to investigate the nature of the ultimate reality unless we are sure that we are capable of knowing it. John Caird truly points out, "Before we admit the pretensions of reason to treat thus of all things in heaven and earth, to regard

nothing as too high or sacred to be subjected to its inquiries, must we not, as a preliminary condition, ask it to give us satisfactory proof of its capacity to deal with them? Without a prior criticism of the organ of knowledge, can we tell whether in any given case it may not be entering on forbidden ground?"

Now, the science which measures the capacity of human knowledge for metaphysical investigations is called epistemology which as a theory of knowing critically deals with organ of knowledge and determines whether knowledge of reality is possible or not. 'Episteme' means knowledge, and 'Logia' means science or theory. So epistemology literally means the science or theory of knowledge. It enquires into the nature, origin, conditions and limits of knowledge. It seeks to answer the questions—What is the nature of knowledge? What are the conditions under which knowledge becomes possible? What is the origin or source of knowledge? Is knowledge of reality attainable at all? If so, to what extent is it possible? In other words, epistemology deals with the nature, origin and possibility of knowledge and determines how far our knowledge extends.

Thus epistemology by dealing with the nature, conditions and limits of genuine knowledge enables metaphysics or philosophy to ascertain its competence to investigate the nature of reality which transcends the world of appearance and to justify its claim that it has adequate means of knowing. Hence epistemology must be a necessary part and fundamental basis of metaphysics or philosophy. In any case epistemology should be the preliminary phase of true

philosophy. If epistemology be not taken as a necessary introduction to metaphysical or philosophical investigations, then philosophy cannot justify itself, it becomes altogether blind and dogmatic. So philosophy must start with epistemology which is proper criticism of knowledge. "If philosophy wants to know the world as a whole, it must see that the means and methods it employs for knowing are valid. Philosophy is satisfied not with mere knowing but with knowing rightly. So right or valid knowledge is one of the main objects of philosophy. In one word, all acceptable philosophy must include epistemology as its integral part". (Prof. H.M. Bhattacharya : The Principles of Philosophy).

In ancient times almost all philosophers uncritically accepted certain ultimate principles without examining the possibility of knowledge. They dogmatically assumed a reality or realities beyond question or without any proof or critical estimate. Epistemology was altogether absent from the first philosophies of Greece and also from the medieval European philosophy. The ancient Greek philosophers began by a naive faith in reality and assumed certain truths or principles without examining the competence to know reality. The medieval European philosophers also accepted the versions of the Bible without any criticism. Epistemological enquiry appeared only when there arose some contradictions and doubts at the conflicting theories of reality dogmatically professed by different thinkers. It was gradually felt necessary to critically enquire into the conditions of knowledge and to base philosophical conclusions on such analysis of knowledge-situation. So in modern

philosophy Locke held that epistemology should be a necessary preliminary to philosophy and so we should enquire into the epistemological questions of the origin, nature and validity of knowledge as the fundamental basis and groundwork of philosophy or metaphysics. In the philosophy of Kant epistemology was so important that he made it almost identical with philosophy, because to him 'philosophy is the science and criticism of cognition (knowledge).' The post-kantian idealistic thinkers also recognised that epistemology necessarily leads to the apprehension of reality ; a particular theory of being presupposes a particular theory of knowing.

But the modern realistic philosophers attempt to omit epistemology from philosophy, because, in their view, the criticism of knowledge is not at all necessary to our knowledge of reality ; our consciousness can have a direct contact with reality in our act of knowing them. The modern realists assert that "metaphysics is by right free and independent of epistemology and should at once proceed to emancipate itself entirely from the dominion of this science."

We should, however, hold that philosophy should be neither identical with epistemology nor entirely independent of it, but there must be a very close relation between the two. Epistemology must be regarded as a necessary branch of philosophy ; it must be treated as a foundation based upon which philosophy should plunge into metaphysical investigations.

Q. 5. How is Philosophy or Metaphysics related to Logic ?

Philosophy or Metaphysics enquires into the nature of the ultimate reality of the world ; it makes a distinction between appearance and reality or between phenomena and noumena, and determines the status of every fact of experience with reference to the standard of the ultimate reality. Logic, on the other hand, deals with facts of experience with which our thoughts must agree in order to be valid ; Logic, instead of being concerned with the real nature of things about which we think, simply lays down the universal conditions which make our thoughts valid. Thus Logic which deals with thought and Metaphysics which deals with the nature of the ultimate reality appear to be independent of each other having distinct provinces of their own. Superficially viewed, the metaphysical discussion of the ultimate nature of reality does not throw any light on the problems of Logic nor can logical enquiry help metaphysical speculation. Eaton emphasises the mutual independence of Logic and Metaphysics by saying that 'Logic cannot solve all the problems of philosophy nor can these general philosophical enquiries solve the problems of Logic.'

But though Logic and Metaphysics are ordinarily supposed to be independent of each other as Logic deals with thoughts in separation from things, yet a close examination will reveal their mutual dependence. Logic depends upon Metaphysics on the ground that we cannot discuss the general nature of the connections of thoughts without taking into consideration the ultimate nature of things to

which our thoughts have their necessary reference. Joseph rightly says, "We cannot understand thought without considering in general what thought is of. And consequently Logic, just because it studies our thought about things, is concerned with questions about the general nature of things. Logic is dependent on Philosophy or Metaphysics in another respect. Sciences take for granted without any proof the reality of matter, mind and certain other fundamental principles. It is philosophy or Metaphysics that helps the sciences by proving the validity of their presuppositions. Similarly, Logic as a science takes for granted certain fundamental principles. The world has a real existence, the real nature of things is knowable, there are certain fundamental laws of thought,—these are the presuppositions of Logic. It is Philosophy or Metaphysics that seeks to determine the ultimate validity of these necessary assumptions of Logic. As Metaphysics examines the grounds of Logic, it is sometimes regarded as 'the higher Logic.'

Again, metaphysical reasonings, in order to be correct, must follow the general laws of correct thinking, and so Metaphysics, in its turn, depends upon Logic, because it is Logic which can determine whether the metaphysical conclusions are valid or not. Moreover, if any sceptic cherishes any doubt about the propositions or conclusions of Philosophy or Metaphysics, then it is only with the help of logical arguments that we can refute that sceptical doubt or objection. So Logic is necessary for the confirmation and support of the metaphysical conclusions. "Logic may not directly solve metaphysical problems but its analysis

of a proposition into subject and predicate, of relations, classes, the different forms of the relation of implication between propositions and its treatment of the different conditions under which something can be validly affirmed, have bearing on certain important problems and can help in their solution to a certain extent. Thus if Logic requires certain metaphysical presuppositions it also makes some contribution to the solution of certain metaphysical problems" (Dr. K. C. Gupta—Studies in Philosophy)


It should be noted in this connection that, according to Hegel, an idealistic thinker, Logic and Metaphysics are identical because thought which is the subject-matter of Logic is, according to him, identical with reality which is the subject-matter of Metaphysics—"thought and reality" being the reproductions of one and same Supreme Reason. Thus the study of the universal forms of thought with which Logic is concerned is ultimately the same as the study of the universal forms of reality with which Metaphysics is concerned. But we can not fully accept this view of Hegel, because the identity of thought with reality has not been satisfactorily established. In fact, thought falls short of reality though the former necessarily refers to the latter. Moreover, Logic deals with the ideal of Truth alone, but Philosophy or Metaphysics deals with all the three highest values—Truth, Beauty and Goodness. Hence Philosophy or Metaphysics is wider than Logic.

Q. 6. Explain the relation between Philosophy or Metaphysics and Psychology.

Formerly, Psychology was regarded as a branch of philosophy or Metaphysics, because the study of the subs-

tance of mind was one of the functions of psychology. But in modern times psychology is no longer looked upon as a branch of philosophy or Metaphysics ; it is now treated as a natural science, because the function of Psychology is confined merely to the study of the phenomena of mind. Thus the modern psychologists define psychology as a science of mind which without making any hypothesis regarding the ultimate nature of the substance of mind simply analyses and classifies the mental phenomena and explains them by discovering their laws, causes and consequences. So in modern times psychology has become wholly independent of Metaphysics. Moreover, the experimental method recently introduced in the field of psychology has made psychology completely separated from Metaphysics. A modern psychologist is not at all concerned with the metaphysical questions concerning the ultimate nature of mind and the mind-body relation ; his attention is confined to the observable mental phenomena alone.

But deeply considered, Psychology cannot remain thoroughly independent of Metaphysics. Psychology as a science has to start with certain assumptions regarding the subject-matter of its study. It is Metaphysics which examines the ultimate validity of its assumptions ; "it is Metaphysics which can undertake to examine the hypothesis or notions concerning mind and to test the ultimate validity of the assumptions made in connection with its nature and activities." (Dr. K. C. Gupta : Studies in Philosophy). Thus Psychology must depend on Metaphysics. Moreover, a careful examination will reveal that



Psychology is related to Metaphysics in a special manner. "We are directly acquainted with mind in a way in which we can never be acquainted with other things. I am not the tree or the river which I perceive but I am my mind. I can therefore claim with greater cogency than in the case of material objects that I know in a sense what the mind really is, that is, I have metaphysical knowledge, however, imperfect, of mind. I have at least this much knowledge of my mind, that is, of myself, viz. That I am a subject of experience and a concrete personality, that I can distinguish myself from the objects presented to me, that I have a real history, that I can direct my own activities towards ends which are supposed to have value." (Dr. K. C. Gupta, *Studies in Philosophy*). Hence Psychology is nearer to Metaphysics or Philosophy than any material science. Stout has rightly remarked 'that no one has succeeded or can succeed in dealing with mental states and processes without reference to some conscious individual, some 'I' or 'self' to whom these belong. Thus Psychology cannot avoid reference to Metaphysics. As psychology is dependent on Metaphysics in this sense, Metaphysics in its turn depends on psychology which helps it by supplying necessary materials regarding mental phenomena. In other words, Philosophy or Metaphysics can ascertain the ultimate nature of mind only on the basis of the knowledge of how mind appears or behaves, and in this respect psychology can greatly help Philosophy or Metaphysics.

METHODS OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE.

Q. 1. Explain very briefly (a) Dogmatism, (b) Scepticism and (c) Criticism as theories of the methods and limits of philosophical knowledge.

In order to discuss a certain subject properly it is necessary to proceed methodically and to make a critical analysis. We can discuss a subject only when we know what our object is and what our method should be for the attainment of the object. Hence before we discuss the philosophical truths and principles we are required to discuss what the methods and limits of philosophical knowledge should be. In history of philosophy there are different theories of the philosophical methods and limits of philosophical knowledge of which (a) **Dogmatism**, (b) **Scepticism** and (c) **Criticism** deserve special mention.

(a) **Dogmatism** :—"Dogmatism is the positive procedure of reason without previous criticism of its own faculty." It plunges into metaphysical speculations without a prior criticism of the knowing faculty or without any critical investigation into the capacity of human mind to know the realities. It starts with a number of assumptions and dogmas without any critical enquiry into rational faculty. It takes for granted the truths of certain fundamental principles without any proof or rational explanation and then deduces conclusions from those unproved premises without enquiring into the nature and conditions of valid knowledge. In other words, dogmatism gives us metaphysics

without epistemology as its basis. It does not at all deal with the epistemological questions as to the conditions, limits, possibility and validity of knowledge, but simply asserts without any rational justification that knowledge of reality is possible. So the dogmatic philosophers uncritically assume some fundamental principles, and on the basis of these blind assumptions and without any critical analysis they have explained the nature of the world and life. Most of the ancient Greek philosophers dogmatically assumed the possibility of the knowledge of reality and propounded different conflicting views of the ultimate nature of things without a prior criticism of knowledge.

Thus dogmatism is a theory without any rational basis, it is simply guided by blind faith, prejudices, religious bigotry and extreme reliance upon the precepts and scriptures (sastras). Hence the fundamental principles and ultimate realities which the dogmatists simply assume without any rational analysis and critical investigation cannot be accepted as valid unless these are proved to be true through the touchstone of reasoned judgments. It is desirable to base the philosophical or metaphysical views upon the rock of epistemological reflections. So dogmatism cannot satisfy our reason, and it has very little contributions to the solution of philosophical problems. In fact, the dogmatic philosophers have made the philosophical problems extremely complicated by presenting different conflicting views of reality.

(b) **Scepticism** :—Scepticism as a philosophical method arises as a reaction against dogmatism. Dogmatism means assuming the possibility of the knowledge of reality ; while

scepticism means doubting or denying the possibility of the knowledge of reality. The different conflicting and contradictory views of reality propounded by different dogmatic systems inevitably lead to scepticism, because doubt and hopelessness naturally arise regarding the competence of human mind to know reality due to the fact that different dogmatic philosophers arrive at different contradictory conclusions. So people begin to doubt the possibility of knowledge of the ultimate nature of things and think that 'whatever can be asserted may with equal reason be denied.' It is difficult to ascertain which of the contradictory dogmatic conclusions is valid and as a result an utter confusion or perplexity prevails regarding philosophical knowledge of reality. Hence the sceptic philosophers express the view that man can never attain knowledge of reality.

It should be mentioned in this connection that just as the dogmatists assume without any proof or critical analysis that the knowledge of the ultimate reality is possible, so the sceptics also assert without any prior criticism of knowledge or any rational justification that it is not possible for man to attain valid and certain knowledge of the existence and nature of the ultimate reality, because there can be no truth which can be uniformly and universally accepted without any doubt. The sceptics are of the view that human knowledge is confined only to sense-experience; it cannot be extended beyond the range of sense-impressions. The material substance, Soul, God etc cannot be perceived in our sense-experience; so these have no objective existence, these are mere figments of imagination.

We, however, cannot support the sceptic views as these are not based upon any epistemological reflections. Scepticism is another name of dogmatism, because to doubt anything without a prior criticism of knowledge is the same as to accept everything without any rational justification. Doubt may be the preliminary stage of philosophical investigation, but no tith ultimate end. Scepticism is not only impracticable but suicidal as it fosters an attitude of universal doubt and disbelief.

(C) Criticism :—As scepticism is the inevitable outcome of dogmatism, so criticism necessarily arises from the defects of scepticism. Criticism is an enquiry into the faculty of knowledge. It does not jump into metaphysical investigations without prior enquiry into the capacity of human mind to know the reality. So criticism is a philosophical method which bases the metaphysical investigations upon epistemological reflections. Criticism lays stress upon the critical analysis of the knowledge-situation and enquires into the origin, conditions, possibility, limits and validity of knowledge before plunging into metaphysical investigations. In modern times it is Kant who has introduced criticism or critical method by basing his philosophy upon the critical analysis of knowledge. Critical reflection, according to him, is the key-note of true philosophical enquiry.

Kant has shown: through his critical analysis that knowledge involves two factors—one is matter and the other is form. The matter of knowledge comprises the discrete and unconnected manifold of sensations derived from sense-experience; while the form of knowledge

includes space, time, substance, causality, etc. supplied by reason from within the mind itself, these forms remain inherent in human reason prior to sense-experience. When our reason by applying the a priori forms of knowledge to the discrete materials of sense-impressions can organize and interpret them, then we can have knowledge. In one word, knowledge is formed by combining both the matter and form—the matter derived from sense-experience and form supplied by reason. The sense-impressions which are derived from experience do not alone constitute knowledge proper nor mere forms of space, time, substance, causality, etc. lying a priori *i. e.* before experience can give us philosophic knowledge. The matter and form—each is an indispensable part of knowledge, and knowledge is really a combination of matter and form *i. e.* an organic whole of sense and reason. Thus Kant advocates empirico-rational method of philosophy and recognises the partial contributions of both sense-experience and reason to the question of the origin of knowledge. According to him, form without matter *i. e.* reason without sensations is empty ; while matter without form *i. e.* sensation without reason is blind and disorganized.

Thus Kant with the help of his critical method has tried to reconcile dogmatism and scepticism or rationalism and empiricism by removing the defects of each of these systems. Empiricism or scepticism gives us an account of knowledge where we get bare matter without any form ; on the other hand, pure rationalism or dogmatism gives us an account of knowledge where we get bare form without any matter. Again, as Kant points out, sense-experience can,

no doubt, give us new information about particular facts and thus ensure the progress of knowledge, but it fails to guarantee universality and necessity in knowledge ; on the other hand, the a priori forms and ideas inherent in the nature and constitutions of human reason have their own universality and necessity as they are true for all minds and at all times ; but they cannot give us any new information about the particular facts of experience. But, in the opinion of Kant, the philosophic knowledge requires universality and necessity as well as new information and progress. So Kant has rightly said that the true philosophical method must include both reason and sense-experience. "Experience supplies the data or materials of knowledge in the form of sensations. These are interpreted by the mind through the application of the a priori forms and categories of space, time, substance, causality, etc. It is in this way that we get knowledge of the world as a system of things and events, existing in space and time, and being the same for all minds. But the world which we know cannot be regarded as real in the strict sense. It is, rather a world which we construct out the materials supplied by sensations and by application of the forms and categories supplied by mind. What we know is not reality as it is in itself, but as it appears through our senses and the categories of our mind or understanding. We cannot know anything except through sense-intuition and the categories. Therefore, we can never know reality or things-in-themselves, although the Reason in us may be under the necessity of thinking of them. If we had the capacity of a non-sensuous or intellectual intuition, then possibly we

could know reality. Since, however, we have no such capacity, reality remains for us unknown and unknowable. Our knowledge is limited to the world of phenomena or appearances, although that world is objective in the sense that it is universal and necessary for all minds. Beyond phenomena there is no doubt the reality in which they are grounded. But neither science nor philosophy enables us to know what it is." (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee : The Problems of Philosophy) Thus Kant's criticism of knowledge lands into agnosticism, according to which, though there is reality as the ground of our sensations, yet it is unknown and unknowable.

Q. 2. Give a critical account of Dogmatism as a method of philosophy.

"Dogmatism is the positive procedure of reason without previous criticism of its own faculty." It plunges into metaphysical speculations without a prior criticism of the knowing faculty or without any critical investigation into the capacity of human mind to know the realities. It starts with a number of assumptions and dogmas without any critical enquiry into rational faculty. It takes for granted truths of certain fundamental principles without any proof or rational explanation and then deduces conclusions from those unproved premises without enquiring into the nature and conditions of valid knowledge. In other words, dogmatism gives us metaphysics without epistemology as its basis. It does not at all deal with the epistemological questions as to the conditions, limits, possibility and validity of knowledge, but simply asserts without any rational justification that knowledge of reality is possible.

So the dogmatic philosophers uncritically assume some fundamental principles, and on the basis of these blind assumptions and without any critical analysis they have explained the nature of the world and life. Most of the ancient Greek philosophers dogmatically assumed the possibility of the knowledge of reality and propounded different conflicting views of the ultimate nature of things without a prior criticism of knowledge.

If we discuss the history of philosophy, we find that the dogmatic philosophy has been created in two ways. There are some dogmatic systems which have blindly accepted the teachings of some saints or some scriptural dogmas as axiomatic or self-evident truths and explained the world with the help of these. It is found that in medieval Europe different schools of thought appeared on the basis of the interpretation of the same Bible ; in India also different philosophical systems were established centring round the same scripture (the Vedas). Again, some dogmatic philosophers have accepted certain principles without any proof and formed different philosophical views. If philosophy be based upon blind faith, then there is every possibility of the emergence of different philosophical views, because every dogmatic philosopher forms his own individual view according to his own personal belief. Thus by accepting the same definition of substance without any proof or rational explanation Descartes and Locke advocated dualism, Spinoza monism and Leibniz pluralism. On the other hand, many philosophers have created their dogmatic philosophy by accepting certain method as 'the only method of philosophy. Thus the empiricists have

without any critical analysis of knowledge—situation accepted sense—experience as the only source of knowledge ; the rationalists have without any critical analysis accepted reason as the only source of knowledge. In this manner both the empiricists and the rationalists have made their philosophy dogmatic.

Thus dogmatism is a theory without any rational basis ; it is simply guided by blind and uncritical faith, prejudices, religious bigotry and extreme reliance upon the precepts and scriptures (Sastras). Hence the fundamental principles and ultimate realities which the dogmatists simply assume without any rational analysis and critical investigation cannot be accepted as valid unless these are proved to be true through the touchstone of reasoned judgments. It is desirable to base the philosophical or metaphysical views upon the rock of epistemological reflections. So dogmatism cannot satisfy our reason, and it has very little contributions to the solution of philosophical problems. In fact, the dogmatic philosophers have made the philosophical problems extremely complicated by presenting different conflicting views of reality.

Q. 3. Give a critical account of Scepticism as method of philosophy.

Scepticism as a philosophical method arises as a reaction against dogmatism . Dogmatism means assuming the possibility of the knowledge of reality ; while scepticism means doubting or denying the possibility of the knowledge of reality. The different conflicting and contradictory views of reality propounded by different dogmatic systems inevitably lead to scepticism, because doubt and hope-

lessness naturally arise regarding the competence of human mind to know reality due to the fact that different dogmatic philosophers arrive at different contradictory conclusions. So people begin to doubt the possibility of knowledge of the ultimate nature of things and think that "whatever can be asserted may with equal reason be denied." So it is difficult to ascertain which of the contradictory dogmatic conclusions is valid and as a result an utter confusion or perplexity prevails regarding philosophical knowledge of reality. Hence the sceptic philosophers express the view that man can never attain knowledge of reality.

It should be mentioned in this connection that just as the dogmatists assume without any proof or critical analysis that the knowledge of the ultimate reality is possible, so the sceptics also assert without any prior criticism of knowledge or any rational justification that it is not possible for man to attain valid and certain knowledge of the existence and nature of the ultimate reality, because there can be no truth which can be uniformly and universally accepted without any doubt. The sceptics are of the view that human knowledge is confined only to sense-experience ; it cannot be extended beyond the range of sense-impressions. The material substance, Soul, God, etc. cannot be perceived in our sense-experience, so these have no objective existence, these are mere figments of imagination.

In the history of philosophy we generally find three kinds of scepticism as noted below :—

(a) **Doubt for the sake of doubt :—**The Sophists of

ancient Greece advanced their philosophical arguments by accepting the attitude of doubt for the sake of doubt. In their sceptic view, there is no ultimate or eternal truth which can be universally accepted, because, every concept can be shown to have its contradictory which is equally tenable. According to Protagoras, the Sophist, "Man is the measure of all things. i. e. each individual man is the standard of what is true to himself ; there is no objective truth ; there can be no truth independent of the individual subject ; truth is nothing but subjective sensations and impressions. So Protagoras declared that knowledge of objective truth or reality is impossible, for what is true or valid to one may be false or invalid to another.

(b) Methodological Doubt :—This spirit of doubt is found in the philosophy of Descartes. Descartes did not doubt for the sake of doubt ; he adopted the sceptic doubt as a method or means for the attainment of the ultimate and self-evident truths. He noticed the defects and false beliefs inherent in the thoughts of the previous philosophers ; so he began to doubt all their philosophical concepts. He was not prepared to accept anything on trust. He even doubted the testimony of sense-experience. But one thing seemed certain to Descartes that doubting or thinking cannot be doubted or denied. Through logical reasoning he realised that doubt implies a doubter, thinking a thinker ; "I think, therefore, I exist." In this way through the method of doubt Descartes arrived at the self-evident truth of his own existence on the basis of which he gradually established the existence of God, the world, etc. Thus Descartes was not a thorough-going sceptic, because his

doubt was a temporary refraining from any decision, positive or negative, so long as there was no sufficient evidence. His doubt is simply a preliminary to the acquisition of certain knowledge. He never doubted the possibility of knowledge. His doubt or scepticism was initial, not final.

(C) **Hume's Scepticism** ;—This is, properly speaking, a philosophical theory. Hume was an empirical philosopher. Like Locke he accepted sense-experience as the only means or source of the acquisition of knowledge. What we acquire in our sense-experience are some discrete and disconnected sensations and impressions. So, according to Hume, only sense-impressions exist ; and what is not subject to our sense-perception does not exist. God, soul, material substance—all these are beyond our sense-experience ; so their entities cannot be admitted. Thus Hume's scepticism denies the realities of the super-sensuous, eternal and universal truths and confines human knowledge within the limits of sense-impressions.

We, however, cannot accept scepticism as a method of philosophical enquiry. The sceptic views cannot be supported, because these are not based upon any epistemological reflections. Scepticism is another name of dogmatism, because to doubt anything without a prior criticism of knowledge is the same as to accept everything without any rational justification. Doubt may be the preliminary stage of philosophical investigation (as is found in the philosophy of scartes), but not its ultimate end. Man cannot permanently adhere to the spirit of universal doubt and disbelief. Scepticism is not only impracticable, but

suicidal as it fosters an attitude of the utter denial of truths.

Q. 4. Explain the critical method or Criticism and show how it overcomes the defects of Dogmatism and Scepticism.

Criticism is a philosophical method which bases the metaphysical investigations upon epistemological reflections. It is an enquiry into the faculty of knowledge. It does not jump into metaphysical investigations without prior enquiry into the capacity of human mind to know the reality. Thus criticism lays stress upon the critical analysis of the knowledge-situation and enquires into the origin, conditions, possibility, limits and validity of knowledge before plunging into metaphysical investigations. In modern times it is Kant who has introduced criticism or critical method by basing his philosophy upon the critical analysis of knowledge. Critical reflection, according to him, is the key-note of true philosophical enquiry.

Kant in his early life was greatly influenced by the dogmatic views of Leibniz and Wolf. But subsequently he was roused from his dogmatic slumber by the scepticism of Hume. Kant has shown through his critical analysis that knowledge involves two factors—**One is matter and the other is form.** The matter of knowledge comprises the discrete and unconnected manifold of sensations derived from sense-experience; while the form of knowledge includes space, time, substance, causality, etc., Supplied by reason from within the mind itself, these forms remain inherent in human reason prior to sense-experience. When our reason by applying the a priori forms of knowledge to the discrete materials of sense-impressions can organize

and interpret them, then we can have knowledge. In one word, knowledge is formed by combining both matter and form—the matter derived from sense-experience and form supplied by reason. The sense-impressions which are derived from experience do not alone constitute knowledge proper nor mere forms of space, time, substance, causality, etc. lying a priori i.e. before experience can give us philosophic knowledge. The matter and form—each is an indispensable part of knowledge, and knowledge is really a combination of matter and form i.e. an organic whole of sense and reason. Thus Kant advocates empirico-rational method of philosophy and recognises the partial contributions of both sense-experience and reason to the question of the origin of knowledge. According to him, form without matter i.e. reason without sensations is empty; while matter without form i.e. sensation without reason is blind and disorganized.

Thus Kant with the help of his critical method has tried to reconcile dogmatism and scepticism or rationalism and empiricism by removing the defects of each of these systems. Empiricism or scepticism gives us an account of knowledge where we get bare matter without any form; on the other hand, pure rationalism or dogmatism gives us an account of knowledge where we get bare form without any matter. Again, as Kant points out, sense-experience can, no doubt, give us *now* information about particular facts and thus ensure the progress of knowledge but it fails to guarantee universality and necessity in knowledge; on the other hand, the a priori forms and ideas inherent in the nature and constitution of human reason

have their own universality and necessity as they are true for all minds and at all times, but they can not give us any new information about the particular facts of experience. But in the opinion of Kant, the philosophic knowledge requires universality and necessity as well as new information and progress. So Kant has rightly said that the true philosophic method must include both reason and sense-experience. "Experience supplies the data or materials of knowledge in the form of sensations. These are interpreted by the mind through the application of the priori forms and categories of space, time, substance, causality, etc. It is in this way that we get knowledge of the world as a system of things and events, existing in space and time, and being the same for all minds. But the world which we know can not be regarded as real in the strict sense. It is rather a world which we construct out of the materials supplied by sensations and by application of the forms and categories supplied by mind. What we know is not reality as it is itself, but as it appears through our senses and the categories of our mind or understanding. We can not know anything except through sense-intuition and the categories. Therefore, we can never know reality or things-in-themselves, although the Reason in us may be under the necessity of thinking of them. If we had the capacity of a non-sensuous or intellectual intuition then possibly we could know reality. Since, however, we have no such capacity, reality remains for us unknown and unknowable. Our knowledge is limited to the world of phenomena or appearances, although that world is objective in the sense that it is universal and necessary for all"

minds. 'Beyond phenomena there is no doubt the reality in which they are grounded. But neither science nor philosophy enables us to know what it is.' (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee : The Problems of Philosophy). Thus Kant's criticism of knowledge lands into agnosticism, according to which, though there is reality as the ground of our sensations, yet it is unknown and unknowable.

Q. 5. Explain the method of dialectic in philosophy.

The word 'dialectic' means the art of discussion or dialogue by questioning. In the history of philosophy Socrates was the first philosopher who used dialectic as a method of refutation of the views of the Sophists, his opponents. With the help of the dialectic method Socrates exposed the errors or self-contradictions involved in the opinions of his opponents, and thus by refuting their opinions he indirectly established his own views. Thus the dialectic method was used as a means of indirect proof. This may be called the negative or destructive dialectic. Kant also followed this negative or destructive form of dialectic and showed the contradictions involved in popular metaphysical views. With the help of dialectic Kant proved that whenever we proceed to grasp the real nature of the super-sensible things like the world, soul and God, we are involved in contradiction ; so, according to Kant, knowledge of reality or things-in-themselves is not possible.

It was Hegel who used dialectic in its positive and constructive form and applied it in a wider field including philosophy, science, society, history, religion, etc., He

used it as a process of reconciliation or unification of opposites. According to Hegel, thought and reality being at bottom identical, not only human thought but also reality itself proceeds and evolves dialectically through contradiction and reconciliation. In other words, both thought and reality develop 'through the opposition of thesis and antithesis and the reconciliation of it by synthesis'. "It was Hegel's conviction that the forms and categories through which our thought develops and seeks to know the nature of the experienced world are not confined to our mind but are realised in the nature and constitution of reality itself. There is a fixed order in the development of our thought through these categories. First, we affirm some idea or conception of a thing (i. e. a thesis). Then, finding its imperfection we are led to affirm the opposite idea or conception of it (i. e. its antithesis). But the opposite idea, in its turn, is found to be one-sided as the first. This leads us to affirm a higher and more comprehensive idea which includes and reconciles the first and its opposite (i. e. synthesis). Thus we first think of a thing as a group of qualities without any substance. Secondly, we think of it as a substance without qualities. But both of these ideas being one-sided and imperfect we are finally led to the idea of the thing as a substance which is manifested through its qualities. It is this dialectical process that governs the development of thought from the lowest or most inadequate category to the highest or the most perfect. Thus we pass from the idea of reality as mere 'Being' to the speculative conception of it as the 'Absolute Idea' or self-conscious spirit. The same dialectic process,

governs the development of the real, objective world existing in relation to our mind." (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee : The Problems of Philosophy). Thus, according to Hegel, thought and reality being identical in essence, there is a perfect coincidence or correspondence between the two, and both undergo perpetual movement in a dialectic process from unity through diversity to unity-in-diversity. In this way Hegel refuted Kant's agnostic view and showed that there can not be a gap between thought and reality ; there must be a perfect correspondence between the forms and categories of human thought and the forms and categories of reality. As, in Hegel's view, the real is rational and the rational is real, reality is nothing but a necessary process or development of thought, and so reality can be grasped only by thought through its dialectical process.

But the dialectic method of Hegel, in our view, is not quite adequate to give us a direct experience of reality ; it can at best give us an abstract idea or concept of it. We can have direct experience of reality by means of 'intellectual intuition' or spiritual insight or contemplation. In order to realise the absolute reality we have to transcend thought and attain higher intuition.

Q. 6. What do you mean by intuition ? How far does it help to acquire knowledge of reality ?

Intuition is a kind of immediate experience or direct realisation which enables us to identify ourselves fully with the object of knowledge and thereby to grasp its real nature. It is a kind of intellectual sympathy which enables the knower to enter into the heart of reality and realise its inner essence. In one word, it is a unique experience

or insight which directly feels the reality by completely abolishing the gap between the knower and the known. According to Bergson, a French philosopher, intuition is the immediate awareness of the basic reality ; it is a kind of sympathy or empathy in the sense of knowing something by being one with it in feeling.

There are several methods of philosophy. Of these methods intellect and intuition are the two main ones. Intellect or thought is not by itself adequate to give us direct experience of the reality ; it can at best give us an abstract idea or concept of it. Intellect or thought works with the forms and categories of space, time, substance, causality etc. which involve us in deadlocks and contradictions. Our intellectual categories can give descriptions of the world of sense-experience or phenomena under the forms of space, time, causality etc. but the real is beyond these. Reason also fails, though it takes us beyond understanding. There is always a gap between our ideas or concepts and the realities about which we form ideas or concepts. In order to realise the absolute reality we must have to transcend our intellect or thought and attain the specific experience called intuition. Intuition is a unique sort of experience or realisation in which we feel at one with the reality.

Of all the modern philosophers of the West, Bergson has emphasised most strongly the standpoint of intuition as a true method of philosophical knowledge. By intuition he means a direct approach to reality as opposed to the round-about way of approaching it with the help of intellect. He has defined intuition as "a kind of intellec-

tual sympathy by which we can enter into the heart of a thing and thereby coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible." Bergson is dissatisfied with the intellect, because it gives too general a picture, it does not pay sufficient attention to the individual details, it is analytical and therefore it can not give us the whole experience of reality. Reality, according to Bergson, is dynamic in nature, it is a life-force or vital impulse (*elan vital*) whose very nature is perpetual change or flow. We can not grasp the nature of such a reality through our sense experience and intellect which give us only static, fragmentary and distorted view of reality. It is only in intuition that we can feel the very life-force or vital impulse of the reality and thus get the true knowledge of it by directly participating in the ceaseless flow of the reality. Thus intuitive knowledge, according to Bergson, is a concrete and synthetic knowledge and enable us to enter into and appreciate the nature of reality as an indivisible whole.

The Upanisads also ask us to lay aside our pride of intellect and self-consciousness. The Upanisads declare—"Let a Brahmin renounce learning and become as a child." "Not by learning is the *atman* attained, nor by genius and much knowledge of books." It is attained by the mystics in their moments of illumination. It is direct knowledge or immediate insight i.e. intuition. The majority of Indian thinkers hold that Reality can be directly realised or experienced through intuition which is a kind of 'meditative self-integration of the knower with the known.'

But we should point that intuition, unaided by intellect or reason, will become a mere subjective experience which

will be a matter of individual preference and can not demand general acceptance. So intuition in order to be a true philosophical method must be confirmed or justified by our intellect or rational arguments ; the intuitive experience of reality must be properly rationalised by our intellect so that it may be capable of universal acceptance. Intuition as a philosophical method must in no case be non-intellectual or infra-rational, it should always be supplemented by intellect or reason, i.e. it must be supra-rational. In fact, a philosophy based on intuition need not negate intellect or reason, because intuitional insights will be blind and dumb without intellectual confirmation. Bergson himself recognises the importance of intellect which helps intuition, because intellect gives incentive to knowledge, without which intuition would remain a mere instinct. Indeed, intellect gives the push which converts instinct into intuition; intellect can also interrelate and systematise into a consistent system the glimpses of truth gained by intuition and thus supplement the work done by intuition.

NATURE OF JUDGMENT AND INFERENCE

Q. 1. What is Judgment ? Explain the relation ' between a Concept and a Judgment.

Or,

'Judgment is putting two ideas together'—Do you agree ?

Judgment :—Judgment is a purely mental act of recognising a relation between two ideas. We have in our mind the idea of 'man' and the idea of 'mortality'. If we mentally form a relation between these two ideas or concepts and conceive that 'man is mortal', it will be a case of judgment. It is essentially a product of our mental act and there must be a belief in the relation (affirmed or denied) between two ideas. A judgment expressed in language is called a proposition.

Judgment is the simplest form or the first act of thinking. Mere isolated sensuous impressions do not by themselves constitute knowledge. It is only when the sense-impressions are interpreted and organised into a system that we can have knowledge. Such interpretation and organisation always involve judgment. So judgment which is the interpretation of experience is the necessary element, the starting point of knowledge. Sensations themselves do not amount to knowledge. When their meanings are discerned through interpretation, they are raised to knowledge. It is judgment which interprets and discerns the meanings of sensations. Hence judgment is the unit of knowledge.

Knowledge which works and grows through perception, conception and reasoning always requires judgment as its necessary element. In other words, knowledge in any form or at any stage involves judgment for proper estimation and understanding. "Judgment is that mental act whereby the mind knows Reality under some qualifications or conditions. All our intellectual processes are directed towards the comprehension of Reality as a whole and judgment which is the standard and unit of these intellectual processes of comprehension, taken by itself, also aims at comprehending Reality in its own way."

Thus we find that thought cannot properly function without judgment. In other words, thought begins with judgment. Thought aims at the knowledge of reality, so it must take the form of judgment at all the stages of its development. Whenever we think about anything, we try to know the truth about it. Now in order to know the truth about it, we must make some assertion that the thing is or is not such-and-such. This assertion is nothing but judgment. So without judgment there cannot be any thought proper. In other words, it is only through judgment that we can ascertain truth and falsity.

Concept and Judgment :— If judgment be considered as an act of joining together two concepts or ideas or of separating one concept or idea from the other, then it follows that concepts or ideas must precede judgment. In other words, we must at first have two concepts or ideas as units which should later on compose a judgment. As judgment is built up of concepts or ideas, judgment instead of preceding concept rather follows it. So concept, and not judgment

ment, should be the starting point of knowledge. Thus traditional logic begins with concepts or terms and thereafter comes to consider judgment or proposition. In logic, we have first two full-grown concepts ; these are then put together in a judgment which must be more complex than the concepts. The judgment 'Grass is green' presupposes the existence of concepts of 'grass' and 'green'. "Thus ideation or conceiving as distinct from judging must be the starting point of knowledge. Locke and others held that judgment is the association of two ideas. Mind at first passively receives or apprehends and then perceives a relation of agreement or disagreement between them, which is judgment or knowledge. In the judgment, "The table is hard" we find that the concept "hardness" agrees with the concept "table". Thus judgment is made of ideas which are different from it." (S. P. Chakravarty : An Introduction to General Philosophy)

But it is not proper to regard judgment as made up of ideas or concepts which a. prior to it. Concepts itself involves a number of judgments ; it is only with the help of a series of judgments that we can form a concept, because concept is not a dead material, but living thought, and it is constantly growing with the addition of fresh judgments. So judgment precedes concept and is simpler than it. A concept really is the result of a number of judgments, For example, the concept 'man' is the result of the implicit judgments — 'man is an animal, 'man is rational, and so on. Thus concepts are formed by judgments.

We should, however, mention in this connection that concepts presuppose simple, vague, inarticulate, implicit

judgments; while judgments in their clear, deliberate, articulate, elaborate, and explicit forms presuppose concepts. Thus implicit judgment precedes concept, and explicit and deliberate judgment follows it.

Q. 2. Explain and illustrate the characteristics of judgment.

Judgment is a rational interpretation of reality. It is an intellectual process directed towards the comprehension of reality. So a judgment must have as its characteristics the following properties :—

(1) **Universality** :—All judgments claim universality. By universality we mean that a judgment is true for every one. Every correct judgment, whether universal or particular, must be accepted as true by all persons. When I form a judgment 'Man is mortal' or 'Some men are blind', it is not only true for my own mind, but for all minds. A judgment which claims to represent the real character of a thing must be true for all. It is not individual and momentary. It claims to express something for other persons as well as for me. There is another reason why judgment is universal. A judgment requires the interpretation of reality with the help of different modes or categories which themselves are universals. So judgment having these universal elements must itself be universal and ensures 'uniformity of standard and universality of knowledge avoiding scepticism on the one side and individualism on the other.'

(2) **Objectivity** :—All judgments have objective reference. Though a judgment is a mental process, yet it

is objective in the sense that it refers to facts as they are in their real nature. There must be some object which a judgment seeks to interpret. The very content of a judgment is based on reality and makes it objective. The subject-term of every judgment must be some real fact, otherwise judgment would be reduced to sheer subjective fancy.

(3) **Necessity** :—Judgment is necessary. By the necessity of judgment we mean that 'it is such that we cannot but think it. We feel obliged to think in a particular context in that way and in no other way.' When a person judges, he is not free to reach this conclusion or that conclusion at will. As a rational being, he must conform to an objective rational system and draw such conclusion as will necessarily follow from certain fixed data. In one word, our judgment which is a rational process of interpretation of reality is necessarily bound or coerced or conditioned by the object which it seeks to interpret. "There is another sense in which the term 'necessity' is used in this connection. Judgment is said to be necessary not in the sense that it is so by its own right, but the sense that it is connected with other facts known to be true. Now necessity taken in this sense becomes a derived one depending on other judgments. But we may naturally try to discover a direct or immediate necessity independent of other judgments. Our ordinary perceptual judgment cannot but be derivatively necessary, their necessity being dependent on consilience with other perceptual judgments. The only kind of judgment which can claim immediate or direct necessity

will be, therefore, those fundamental judgments which are independent of experience. In other words, the necessary truths or self-evident judgments which are a priori, can be said to have direct or 'immediate necessity.' (H. M. Bhattacharyya : The Principles of Philosophy).

(4) **Analysis and Synthesis** :—Every judgment involves the double process of analysis and synthesis. In a judgment things are analysed into parts and the parts again are synthesised into wholes. The two processes of analysis and synthesis, though opposed to each other when they occur in material things, have no such opposition between them when they go on in our minds. These two steps take place in our judgment not in succession, but simultaneously. In a judgment we mentally analyse the constituent ideas and at the same time synthesise and unite them in a systematic whole. Thus in every judgment analysis and synthesis go together and one has no meaning without the other. Of course, sometimes one is prominent, and some times the other.

(5) **System of knowledge** :—Judgment constructs a system of knowledge. Each judgment may be regarded as a step in building up a system of knowledge. It works both analytically and synthetically. It discovers new parts and distinctions and at the same time brings parts into their relations and thus constructs a system of knowledge. Judgments build up a unified system of knowledge by assimilating new facts to those already known and interrelating and combining facts of experience. Knowledge grows into a system when all facts are ultimately unified and integrated by a series of interconnected judgments. "In judging old

and new facts are arranged, related and systematized as members of one organic whole, where each is essential for others. No fact is allowed to stand by itself but each fact receives its value and meaning from its connection with other known facts or judgments which support it. Every new judgment has to find a place in the system of judgments already formed and by such coherence its truth can be determined. A judgment that contradicts the system of previous judgments is declared as false, and that which coheres with it is true." (S. P. Chakravarty : An Introduction to General Philosophy)

Q. 3. Explain the different types of Judgment.

Judgments can be classified from different standpoints.

(A) From the standpoint of the development of thought or intellect we find the following types of judgments. Here the lower forms of judgments gradually develop into the higher forms in accordance with the general law of evolution.

(1) **Judgments of Quality** :—The first effort of intelligence to understand the world takes the form of judgments of quality. At the first and simple stage of thought the child-mind is naturally attracted by the qualities of things. It is the nature of the child to perceive the greenness of grass, the blue colour of the sky, the fragrance of the rose, etc. At this stage the mind grasps the qualities of things ; it cannot discriminate the different parts and relations of objects nor bring any connection between the qualities and the substance to which they belong. So at this stage judgments are vague, indefinite and such judgments belong to a lower stage of thinking.

(2) **Judgments of Quantity** :—As the mind or intelligence develops, it gradually perceives not only the qualities of things, but also their quantities. Thought at this stage is

not satisfied with the idea of the general qualities of things but pushes further its work of analysis and construction. Our mind begins to compare the degree or intensity of qualities existing in different things. We notice that one flower is more fragrant than another. The element of comparison is involved in these judgments and forms the basis of quantitative determination.

(3) **Judgments of Causal Connection** :—This kind of judgments is found at a more developed stage of thought than the judgments of quality and quantity. With the progress of our knowledge we learn to realise that the things and events of the world are not discrete and isolated, they are rather inter-connected. At this stage we discover causal and necessary connections amongst the things or events. By relating things as causes and effects we can discern that the world is a system wherein the different facts are unified and interconnected. So judgments of causal connection promote higher unity and extension of knowledge.

(4) **Judgments of Individuality or Purpose** :—At the highest stage of thought or intelligence we discover the purpose underlying the things and events of the world and explain everything with reference to the inner purpose. Such judgments of purpose or individuality greatly reveal the organic unity and wholeness of things in which the different parts co-operate for a common end or purpose.

(B) From another standpoint judgments can be of two types—**Positive** and **Negative**. When in a judgment the predicate is affirmed of the subject (e. g. man is mortal), we get positive or affirmative judgment. On the other hand, when in a judgment the predicate is denied of the subject (e. g. man is not perfect), we get negative judgment.

(C) Again judgment can be classified into two types—

Judgment of fact and Judgment of Value. When in a judgment we find only description of facts and there is no determination of Value with reference to any ideal or standard (e. g. It is a rose), we get judgment of fact. On the other hand, when in a judgment we determine or appreciate the value or utility of a thing with reference to an ideal (e. g. The rose is beautiful), we get judgment of value.

Q. 4. (a) What is Inference ? (b) Distinguish it from Judgment.

(a) Nature of Inference :—Inference a mental process by which we pass from some given or known truths to what is not given or what is unknown. So every inference gives us new information. Thus our knowledge of fire in the hill through the medium of our perception of smoke on it is due to inference. Here fire is not directly perceived but inferred through the perception of smoke and with the help of the knowledge or assumption of universal and invariable relation between smoke and fire. "No inference can follow in the absence of perception." It is a knowledge which must be preceded by perception. It is only when an observer has perceived fire and smoke to be related to each other that he is able to infer the existence of the fire on the next occasion he perceives smoke. The given truth or proposition from which we start is called the premise, and the new truth or proposition which we draw by the process is called the conclusion. Inference comprises both the premise and the conclusion.

Inference may appear to be very simple and natural, but its procedure is very puzzling when closely examined. First, there is no inference unless the conclusion is different from the premise or data. But how are we justified in passing from the knowledge of one fact to the knowledge of

another altogether different from it ? How can we even pass from the known to the unknown if they are quite foreign to each other ? Again, the premise and the conclusion cannot be fully identical. This will involve the fallacy of circular reasoning or *petitio principii*. When we properly examine the nature of inference, we find that there is always a certain amount of identity between the conclusion and the premise and at the same time there is some difference between them. Thus there must be identity in difference. In other words, an inference must have the characteristics of necessity and novelty. "We have not got inference unless the conclusion (i) is necessary from the premises, and (ii) goes beyond the premises. To put the paradox quite roughly—we have not got inference unless the conclusion is (i) in the premises, and (ii) outside the premises." (Bosanquet)

(b) **Judgment and Inference** :— "Inference is simply a deep insight into the necessary connection of things. It is an act of thought which discovers the essential relations between things which at first sight appear to have no connection with one another. It is a reasoned judgment i. e. , a judgment which has become conscious of the reasons for the connections which it affirms." (Creighton and Smart) A judgment which is a single act of interpreting the environment contains within itself at least implicitly or vaguely the ground or reason on which it rests. When the judgment becomes conscious of its own ground or reason, it develops into an inference or reasoning. The task of an inference is to clearly exhibit the ground which is vaguely contained in a judgment. For example, we form a judgment 'It rained last night.' In support of this assertion we may refer to the wetness of the ground and cloudy sky. Here the grounds based upon which judgment is made are

clearly stated. As a result, we get inference. So when the ground or reason contained in a judgment implicitly becomes explicit, judgment expands into an inference. In other words, when the validity of a judgment is put to test, it develops into inference. Thus judgment and inference do not differ from each other fundamentally; inference is a mere complex form of judgment as what is implicit in judgment becomes explicit in inference. **Judgment is an implicit inference ; while inference is an explicit judgment.** In a simple judgment we make a statement on the basis of sense-perception, and it is the task of inference to show necessary connection of facts by discovering the inherent ground or premise on which such statement is made. So inference is nothing but a developed judgment. The task of constructing a system of knowledge already begun in judgment is pushed further by inference which connects one judgment with other judgments by a common link and holds together the different parts within a unified system by a common nature so that one can judge from some of them what the nature of the others may be. When we pass from judgment to inference, we get higher integration or deeper coherence among facts. So knowledge which has its starting point in judgment culminates in inference.

Q 5. Discuss the relation between Deduction and Induction.

Both deduction and induction are forms of inference, they both agree and differ in many respects. Viewed as methods, induction is analytical and deduction synthetical in nature ; but taken in their respective essences, the reverse is the case ; for induction combines particular facts under generalities by means of generalities, especially causation and uniformity, and is thus synthetic, while deduction applies generalities to particulars and is thus analytic.

Again, it is often asserted that while deduction proceeds from cause to effect, induction follows the reverse order and proceeds from effect to cause. But since in deduction the cause may as well be deduced from its effect, and in induction the effect may be ascertained from the observation of the operation of a given cause, it is reasonable to hold that both admit of any treatment that is called for. And herein both deduction and induction agree fundamentally. The primary case of divergence is that, while the essence of induction consists in generalization, that of deduction consists in particularisation. Induction involves a passage from the particular to the general or from the less general to the more. Deduction involves a passage from the more general to the less.

It is sometimes said that induction and deduction are converse processes, because induction proceeds from the particular to the universal, and deduction proceeds from the universal to the particular. Bacon regards induction as an ascending process and deduction as a descending process. Jevons regards induction as the 'inverse process' of deduction.

These are, however, misleading statements. The starting points of deduction and induction are, no doubt, different; in deduction we start with the universal, while in induction we start from the observation of particular facts. But in principle deduction and induction are the same, both of them are based on the principle of similarity and have the same end in view—i. e. to connect facts and laws (or the particular and the universal) into a system. "The essence of inference consists in the facts that it exhibits the manner in which particular facts are connected, together into a system or whole. And this end is achieved by both deduction and induction. In the

former case, the general law of connection—what we may call the nature of the system within which the particulars fall—is known, and we argue from this as to the nature and relations of the various parts falling within it. We have the common thread which unites the various facts in our hand, and following it out are able to show its application in determining the nature of events which have not yet come within the range of our experience. What the deductive inference shows us is the way in which a general principle or law of connection runs through a group of facts and constitutes them a real or organic whole. The same insight is reached by inductive inference, although the starting point is entirely different. Induction begins by observing that certain phenomena are frequently conjoined and attempts to discover some law or principle which will make the fact of their connection intelligible.” (Creighton & Smart)

Hence deduction and induction differ only in their starting points, but not in principle. Moreover, deduction and induction are connected and supplementary processes. The universal premise of deduction, provided it is not an axiom, is said to be arrived at by induction; again, in induction we require an application of deduction to very inductive generalization. Every case of induction, moreover, depends on the principle of uniformity and causation, which are universal truths, not discoverable by inductive reasoning. Every induction is, therefore, reducible to a syllogism with the law of uniformity of nature for its major premise. In this sense induction is dependent on deduction. Lastly, both these processes of reasoning are necessary for discovering and proving the laws of nature. Hence deduction and induction are inter-related.

THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE

Q. 1. Explain very briefly Rationalism and Empiricism and show how they are reconciled in criticism as advocated by Kant.

Or

Explain and examine the different theories of the origin of knowledge.

The problem of the origin of knowledge is a fundamental question of epistemology. There are different theories regarding the question how knowledge originates in human mind. Of these theories three are important—(a) *Rationalism* (b) *Empiricism* and (c) *Criticism*.

(a) **Rationalism**—According to this theory reason is the only source of true knowledge. Eternal, universal and necessary truths can be known by reason alone. The knowledge which is acquired through sense-experience cannot give us any real acquaintance with the underlying nature of things. Real knowledge and universal truths lie innate in the mind or reason. So knowledge is not acquired from experience; it is prior to experience. In other words, according to the rationalists, knowledge is not a posteriori, it is a priori. Mind with the help of intellect or reason actively produces real and certain knowledge out of the innate ideas lying inherent within it.

The rationalists point out that human mind does not remain altogether empty before experience; there are some self-evident and necessary fundamental ideas or concepts which lie ingrained in human mind before sense-experience; these are innate; these are a priori; these

are not derived from experience ; these are not a posteriori. There are such fundamental concepts or laws of thought (e.g. space, time, causality, etc) lying native or innate in the mind which cannot be acquired from sense-experience ; rather sense-experience presupposes them. If these innate ideas and self-evident truths are not presupposed beforehand, experience itself would not be possible.

The rationalists further say that all possible knowledge and truths can be gained through mathematical deduction or analysis from the fundamental and self-evident ideas which spring from reason. True and necessary knowledge can be deduced from the self-evident innate ideas as the geometrical propositions are deduced from the axioms. The rationalists emphasise that the mind is essentially active and rational, it actively produces knowledge out of its own innate ideas. "Socrates and Plato were the earliest accredited rationalistic philosophers in the west to make true knowledge originate in reason and to make the object of such knowledge whatever is real and eternal as distinct from the unreal or the phenomenal and the transient. The cardinal principle of rationalism was thus laid down by Socrates and Plato who pointed out that the self is an active reality that knows and knows through its own innate powers of reason. Sensation and feelings cannot give real knowledge and the so-called knowledge which they are supposed to give is only variable and contingent and is never necessary." (Prof. H. M. Bhattacharya. The Principles of Philosophy) Thus the rationalists maintain that knowledge derived from innate principles through the activity of reason is eternal and certain, necessary and universally true ; on the other hand, knowledge derived from sense-experience is limited to space and

time and so cannot be universal and necessary. Moreover, sense-perception cannot reveal the inner nature of things, so it cannot give us proper knowledge of the ultimate reality. But reason with the help of its own innate and native faculties can unfold the full knowledge of the inner essence of things. This is the main contention of rationalism.

We, however, cannot support the rationalistic view that the propositions which follow necessarily through deduction from the innate and a priori self-evident concepts can give us real knowledge. If reason be the source of real knowledge, then why do the rationalistic philosophers differ and arrive at different contradictory conclusions? Again, they do not agree on the question which of the ideas are self-evident. Moreover, the rationalists overlook the contributions made by sense-experience and lay emphasis only on reason. Thus they cannot explain the novelty and progress in knowledge. Lastly, reason cannot give us direct knowledge of facts which we acquire through sense-experience alone. The function of reason is to criticise or test the knowledge which we already have of things from direct experience. In this connection Kant has truly pointed out that reason cannot present the materials of knowledge, but simply interprets and organizes or co-ordinates the unconnected and discrete sensations by applying to them certain a priori forms and categories. So the rationalistic view that knowledge is constituted exclusively by reason is not tenable, because knowledge requires both the a priori or innate and a posteriori or empirical elements.

(b) **Empiricism** :—According to this theory knowledge is acquired from sense-experience, all our ideas and concepts spring from sensations and materials derived from

sensation. Sense-perceptions i.e. sensations and feelings alone are the sources of our knowledge, there is no other source of knowledge than sense-experience. The empiricists do not admit the existence of any innate or a priori ideas; no ideas can exist in the mind prior to sense-experience. At birth human mind is empty like a blank sheet or dark chamber, void of all characters. Hence no idea or knowledge can remain innate or ingrained in mind before experience. All kinds of knowledge can be acquired only from perception or observation. The entire knowledge comes through the two doors of experience-sensation and reflection; through Sensation the mind is furnished with sensible qualities, while through reflection or internal sense the mind is supplied with its own operations, such as perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, etc. The mind passively receives impressions from without, and out of these impressions it builds up all its ideas. "The first capacity of the human intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses by outward objects or by its own operations when it reflects on them..... The ideas, thus received, are simple ideas, which the mind has the power to repeat, compare, and unite, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas." Thus knowledge is confined within the actual and possible sensations. Even the universal and general principles, instead of being innate or a priori, become objects of our knowledge as a result of generalisation from sense-particulars with the help of induction. In this way the empiricists show that all our knowledge is ultimately derived from experience; there can be nothing in the mind or intellect which was not previously in the sense.

We, however, cannot support the empirical view that

there are no innate ideas. In fact, there are certain inborn and innate predispositions or tendencies lying inherent in the mind even before our sense-experience. Whenever we perceive any material object, we perceive it in space and time, the ideas of which already exist in the mind before experience at least in the form of dispositions or tendencies. Secondly, empiricism cannot account for the universality and necessity of knowledge, because, sense-experiences are extremely variable and strictly limited to the present, these can not give us knowledge of the past, distant and future. Sense-experiences can at best give us discrete and unconnected materials of knowledge, but unless these materials are interpreted and organized by reason through its application of some a priori forms and categories, we cannot get universal and necessary knowledge. The particular facts supplied by experience must be organized into a coherent system by the exercise of reason. So experience and reason, both must contribute to the formation of knowledge. Lastly, sense-experience cannot give us knowledge of reality, but it presents to us sensuous phenomena i. e. things which appear to our senses. Thus if philosophy be based entirely on sense-experience, it can no more be philosophy than a mere science. So philosophy must recognise non-sensuous or intellectual intuition on the basis of reason; this alone can help us realise the nature of ultimate reality underlying all things and beings.

(c) **Criticism (as advocated by Kant):**—In modern times Kant, a German philosopher, has introduced the theory of criticism by basing philosophy upon the critical analysis of knowledge. Kant has shown through his critical analysis that knowledge involves two factors—One is matter and the other is form. The matter of knowledge

comprises the discrete and unconnected manifold of sensations derived from sense-experience; while the form of knowledge includes space, time, substance, causality, etc. supplied by reason from within the mind itself, these forms remain inherent in human reason prior to sense-experience. When our reason by applying the a priori forms of knowledge to the discrete materials of sense-impressions can organize and interpret them, then we can have knowledge. In one word, knowledge is formed by combining both matter and form—the matter derived from sense-experience and the form supplied by reason. The sense-impressions which are derived from experience do not alone constitute knowledge proper nor mere forms of space, time substance, causality, etc. lying a priori (i. e. before experience) can give us philosophic knowledge. The matter and form—each is an indispensable part of knowledge, and knowledge is really a combination of matter and form i. e. it is an organic whole of sense and reason. Thus Kant recognises the partial contributions of both sense-experience and reason to the question of the origin of knowledge. According to him, form without matter i.e. reason without sensations is empty; while matter without form i. e. sensation without reason is blind and disorganized.

Thus Kant with the help of his theory of criticism has tried to reconcile rationalism and empiricism by removing the defects and imperfections of each of these systems. Empiricism gives us an account of knowledge where we get bare matter without any form; on the other hand, pure rationalism gives us an account of knowledge where we get bare form without any matter. Again, as Kant points out, sense-experience can, no doubt, give us new information about particular facts and thus ensure the progress of

knowledge, but it fails to guarantee universality and necessity in knowledge, on the other hand, the a priori forms and categories inherent in the nature and constitution of human reason have their own universality and necessity as they are true for all minds and at all times, but they can not give us any new information about the particular facts of experience. But, in the opinion of Kant, the philosophic knowledge requires universality and necessity as well as new information and progress. So Kant has rightly said that the true philosophic theory of the origin of knowledge must include the contributions of both reason and sense-experience. "Experience supplies the data or materials of knowledge in the form of sensations. These are interpreted by the mind through the application of the a priori forms and categories of space, time, substance, causality, etc. It is in this way that we get knowledge of the world as a system of things and events, existing in space and time, and being the same for all minds. But the world which we know can not be regarded as real in the strict sense. It is rather a world which we construct out of the materials supplied by sensations and by application of the forms and categories supplied by mind. What we know is not reality as it is in itself, but as it appears through our senses and the categories of our mind or understanding." (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee: The Problems of Philosophy) The nature of the reality or thing-in-itself is independent of our sense and understanding and so is unknown and unknowable.

Q. 2 Give in details a critical account of Empiricism as a theory of the origin of knowledge.

Or, 'There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses' Explain and examine.

Or, Give a critical estimate of the theory which asserts that all our knowledge has its origin in experience.

The problem of the origin of knowledge is a fundamental question of epistemology. There are different theories regarding the question how knowledge originates in human mind. Of these theories three are important :— **Rationalism, Empiricism and Criticism.** According to rationalism reason is the only source of true knowledge. Real knowledge and universal truths lie innate in the mind or reason. So knowledge is not acquired from experience; it is prior to experience. On the other hand, according to Empiricism all our knowledge is acquired from sense-experience; there are no innate ideas, The entire knowledge is derived from perception or observation. Lastly, according to the theory of criticism, knowledge requires the contribution of both reason and sense-experience, reason supplies the ^{form} of knowledge and experience supplies the matter of knowledge, knowledge is formed by the combination of form and matter. When the materials of sense-impressions derived from sense-experience are interpreted and organized by reason through the application of some a priori forms within the mind, we get knowledge. Thus the theory of criticism reconciles rationalism and empiricism.

Empiricism—a detailed account

As stated above, Empiricism is a theory which asserts that all our knowledge has its origin in sense-experience. All our ideas and concepts spring from sensations and materials derived from sensation. Sense-perceptions i.e. sensations and feelings alone are the sources of our knowledge, there is no other source than sense-experience. The empiricists do not admit the existence of any innate

or a priori ideas; no ideas can exist in the mind prior to sense-experience. At birth human mind is empty like a blank sheet or dark chamber void of any ideas. Hence no idea or knowledge can remain innate or ingrained in mind before experience. All kinds of knowledge can be acquired only from perception or observation. Thus the main contention of the theory of empiricism is that sense-experience or perception alone is the source of all possible knowledge.

If we study the history of the empirical school of philosophy, we find that the Atomists and Sophists of ancient Greece laid the foundation of empiricism. Potagoras, the Sophist, emphatically asserted that there can be no truth except the sensations and impressions of each man.

In the history of modern philosophy it was Bacon who gave a systematic form of empiricism. In his view the mind, freed from all prejudices and false notions, must turn to experience, derive the materials of knowledge from perception and attain the general knowledge of the laws or forms of things with the help of empirical or inductive method.

John Locke, the main advocate of the empirical philosophy of modern times, supplements the empiricism of Bacon by basing it on a psychologically developed theory of knowledge. According to Locke, there can be no knowledge a priori i. e. before experience. First, he tries to show that there can be nothing in the mind before experience begins. This is the negative aspect of his task. Then he proceeds to show how from experience we derive all the materials of knowledge. This is the positive aspect of his task.

We state below the most important arguments advanced by Locke against the theory of innate ideas and principles :—

Firstly, if there were innate ideas, they must have been equally present in all minds ; but in fact they do not exist in all minds. Children, savages, idiots and illiterate persons do not possess the innate ideas or principles as they are not at all conscious of them. To suppose that there are innate ideas in the mind and at the same time the mind is not conscious of them is self-contradictory. To be in the mind or in the understanding simply means to be understood or to be known ; no one can have an idea without being conscious of it.

Secondly, if there be innate ideas at all, they must have been the same in all minds. But the so-called innate ideas of God, morality etc are not cherished in the same form in different societies, in different countries and in different ages. The idea of God is not the same in all persons. So it cannot be innate. Again, the moral laws, too, cannot be innate, because they are not self-evident or universally recognised. Even if all mankind had the same notions of God, morality etc., it would not prove that they are innate. "The ideas of fire, the sun, heat or number are not proved to be innate because they are so universally received and known amongst mankind." In fact, these ideas universally present in all minds have been derived from sense-experience ; they are not innate. We do not discover these ideas when we first begin to use our reason ; we have often to wait for a long time before we can discover them. The so-called innate principles are general truths, inductions from particular facts of experience. They are generalizations abstracted from the particular facts of perception. "The child first learns from experience that sweet is sweet

and that sweet is not not bitter; then on the basis of such sense-experience he generalizes the Law of Identity and the Law of Contradiction. "The ideas first known are not general axioms and abstract concepts, but particular impressions of the senses." Hence no idea or knowledge can remain innate or ingrained in mind before experience.

"Locke's positive answer to the question concerning the origin of ideas is given in his second book. Ideas are not present in the understanding from the beginning, nor are they originated by the understanding, but received through sensation. The understanding is like a piece of white paper on which perception inscribes its characters. All knowledge arises in experience. This is of two kinds, derived either from the external senses or the internal sense. The perception of external objects is termed Sensation, that of internal phenomena (of the states of the mind itself) Reflection. External and internal perception are the only windows through which the light of ideas penetrates into the dark chamber of the understanding." (Falkenberg: History of Modern Philosophy) The entire knowledge comes through the two doors of experience—sensation and reflection; through sensation the mind is furnished with sensible qualities, while through reflection or internal sense the mind is supplied with its own operations, such as perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, etc. The mind passively receives impressions from without, and out of these impressions builds up all its ideas. "The first capacity of the human intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses by outward objects or by its own operations when it reflects on them. The ideas, thus received, are simple

ideas which the mind has the power to repeat, compare, and, unite even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at plasure new complex ideas." Thus knowledge is confined within the actual and possible sensations. In this way Locke explains his empirical dictum that all our knowledge is ultimately derived from experience ; there can be nothing in the mind or intellect which was not previously in the sense.

David Hume developed the empiricism of Locke into sensationism and septicism. All knowledge, according to him, is derived from impressions and ideas. Impressions are vivid and lively perceptions and ideas are faint copies of impressions. Knowledge is formed by the combination of the disconnected sense-impressions or ideas according to the laws of association. Hume does not recognise the existence of any innate ideas or a priori forms which may connect the impressions or ideas into a unified bond.

Criticism of the empirical theory :—We cannot support the empirical view that there are no innate idieas. In fact there are certain inborn and innate predispositions or tendencies lying inherent in the mind even before our sense-experience. Whenever we perceive any material object, we perceive it in space and time, the ideas of which already exist in the mind before experience at least in the form of dispositions or tendencies. Ideas may be present in our minds even though we are not conscious of them. These may be dormant in the minds even before our experience begins. In this connection Leibniz truly points outs that our mind is a world in miniature, containing a world of ideas in it though in an implicit or potential form and the mind becomes conscious of these inborn ideas only when these are made explicit in the course of experience. Secondly, empiricism can not account for the universality

and necessity of knowledge, because sense-experiences are extremely variable and strictly limited to the present, these cannot give us knowledge of the past, distant and future. Sense-experiences can at best give us discrete and unconnected materials of knowledge, but unless these materials are interpreted and organized by reason through its application of some a priori forms and categories, we cannot get universal and necessary knowledge. The particular facts supplied by experience must be organized into coherent system by the exercise of reason. So experience and reason, both must contribute to the formation of knowledge. Lastly sense-experience cannot give us knowledge of reality, but it presents to us sensuous phenomena i. e. things which appear to our senses. Thus if philosophy be based entirely upon sense-experience, it can no more be philosophy than a mere science. So philosophy must recognise non-sensuous or intellectual intuition on the basis of reason, this alone can help us to realise the nature of ultimate reality underlying all things and beings. But experience, according to empiricism, is restricted to sense-perception alone; the other types of experience like intuitive and mystic experience are not recognised by the empiricists.

Q. 3. Give in details a critical account of Rationalism as a theory of the origin of knowledge.

The problem of the origin of knowledge is a fundamental question of epistemology. There are different theories regarding the question how knowledge originates in human mind. Of these theories three are important—**Rationalism, Empiricism and Criticism**. According to rationalism, reason is the only source of true knowledge. Real knowledge or universal truths lie innate in the mind or reason. So knowledge is not acquired from sense-experience, it is

prior to it. On the other hand, according to empiricism, all our knowledge is acquired from sense-experience; there are no innate ideas. The entire knowledge is derived from perception or observation. Lastly, according to the theory of criticism, knowledge requires the contributions of both reason and sense-experience; reason supplies the form of knowledge and experience supplies the matter of knowledge; knowledge is formed by the combination of form and matter. When the materials of sense-impressions derived from sense-experience are interpreted and organized by reason through the application of some a priori forms from within the mind, we get knowledge. Thus the theory of criticism reconciles rationalism and empiricism.

Rationalism—a detailed account: According to rationalism, reason is the only source of true and genuine knowledge. Eternal, universal and necessary truths can be known by reason alone. The knowledge which is acquired through sense-experience cannot give us any real acquaintance with the underlying nature of things. Real knowledge and universal truths lie innate in the mind or reason. So knowledge is not acquired from experience; it is prior to experience. In other words, according to the rationalists, knowledge is not a posteriori, it is a priori. Mind with the help of intellect or reason actively produces real and certain knowledge out of the innate ideas lying inherent within it.

The rationalists point out that human mind does not remain altogether empty before experience; there are some self-evident and necessary fundamental ideas or concepts which lie ingrained in human mind before sense-experience; these are innate; these are a priori, these

are not derived from experience ; these are not a posteriori. There are such fundamental concepts or laws of thought (e. g. space, time, causality etc.) lying native or innate in the mind which cannot be acquired from sense-experience ; rather sense-experience presupposes them. If these innate ideas and self-evident truths are not presupposed beforehand, experience itself would not be possible.

The rationalists further say that all possible knowledge and truths can be gained through mathematical deduction or analysis from the fundamental and self-evident ideas which spring from reason. True and necessary knowledge can be deduced from the self-evident innate ideas as the geometrical propositions are deduced from the axioms. The rationalists emphasise that the mind is essentially active and rational, it actively produces knowledge out of its own innate ideas.

"Socrates and Plato were the earliest accredited rationalistic philosophers in the west to make true knowledge originate in reason and to make the object of such knowledge whatever is real and eternal as distinct from the unreal or the phenomenal and the transient. The cardinal principle of rationalism was thus laid down by Socrates and Plato who pointed out that the self is an active reality that knows and knows through its own innate powers of reason. Sensations and feelings cannot give real knowledge and the so-called knowledge which they are supposed to give is only variable and contingent and is never necessary." (Prof. H. M. Bhattacharya : The Principles of Philosophy) The Sophists destroyed all objective standards of truth by basing knowledge upon perception, but Socrates restored objectivity to truth by founding knowledge upon reason. Plato also emphatically asserted that real knowledge is grounded on reason and not on perception, because perception gives

contradictory impressions and renders the distinction between truth and falsehood wholly meaningless, while reason or thought alone can grasp eternal and changeless being which is the true essence of things.

In modern philosophy Descartes was a typical exponent of rationalism. According to him, there are in the mind certain fundamental ideas like the idea of an infinite and perfect being which cannot be derived from sense-experience, but are innate, having their source in the very nature of man's rational constitution. The development of true knowledge consists in the mathematical deduction of other truths from these innate ideas or principles which are recognised as true by reason or intuition. Leibniz also accepts the rationalistic ideal that genuine knowledge which is universal and necessary cannot be derived from experience, but are intuited by reason. According to him, every mind is a self-contained world in miniature, 'a windowless monad'; so all our ideas are innate. "Since the soul-monad is an independent being which no external cause can influence, knowledge cannot come to it from without, but must arise within the soul itself. The soul, therefore, cannot be an empty tablet upon which external nature writes its characters, as Locke holds. All our knowledge lies implicit in the mind : sensation and understanding alike ; experience does not create it, but it is brought out, cleared up, made explicit by experience. Nothing can exist in the intellect that did not first exist in sensation ; true,—except, Leibniz adds, the intellect itself." (Thilly : A History of Philosophy).

Thus from the study of the history of the rationalistic philosophy we find that, according to the rationalists, knowledge derived from innate principles through the activity of reason is eternal, certain, necessary and

universally true ; on the other hand, knowledge derived from sense-experience is limited to space and time and so cannot be universal and necessary. Moreover, sense-perception cannot reveal the inner nature of things, so it cannot give us proper knowledge of the ultimate reality. But reason with the help of its own innate and native faculties can unfold the full knowledge of the inner essence of things. This is the main contention of rationalism.

Criticism of the rationalistic theory :—We cannot support the rationalistic view that the propositions which follow necessarily through deduction from the innate and a priori self-evident concepts can give us real knowledge. If reason be the source of real knowledge, then why do the rationalistic philosophers differ and arrive at different contradictory conclusions ? By accepting similar definition of substance and by following the same rationalistic method Descartes arrives at the dualism of substances, but Spinoza arrives at the monism of substance. Moreover, the rationalists do not agree on the question—Which of the ideas are self-evident and innate. Again, the rationalists overlook the contributions made by sense-experience and lay emphasis only on reason. Thus they cannot explain the progress and novelty in knowledge. Lastly, reason cannot give us direct knowledge of facts which we acquire through sense-experience alone. The function of reason is to criticise or test the knowledge which we already have things from direct experience. In this connection Kant has truly pointed out that reason cannot present the materials of knowledge, but simply interprets and organizes or co-ordinates the unconnected and discrete sensations by applying to them certain a priori forms and categories. So the rationalistic view that knowledge is constituted exclusively by reason is not

tenable, because knowledge requires both the apriori or innate and a posteriori or empirical elements.

It is not pointless to mention how John Locke vigorously attacked the rationalistic view by advancing certain arguments against the rationalistic doctrine of innate ideas. Locke asserted that there cannot be any innate ideas; no ideas can exist in the mind prior to sense-experience. If there were innate ideas, they must have been equally present in all minds; but in facts children, savages and idiots do not possess them as they are not at all conscious of them. Again, if there be innate ideas at all, they must have been the same in all minds. But the so-called innate ideas of God, morality etc. are not cherished in the same form in different societies, in different countries and in different ages. We should, however, point out that Locke's arguments against the theory of innate ideas are not convincing. In fact, there are certain inborn and innate pre-dispositions or tendencies lying inherent in the mind even prior to our sense-experience. Ideas may be present in our minds even though we are not conscious of them. These may lie dormant in the mind even before our experience begins. The error of the rationalists lies in their underestimation of the contributions of sense-experience to the building up of knowledge.

Q. 4. Explain and examine Criticism as a theory of the origin of knowledge and show how far it can reconcile Empiricism and Rationalism.

The problem of the origin of knowledge is a fundamental question of epistemology. There are different theories regarding the question how knowledge originates in human mind. Of these theories three are important—**Rationalism, Empiricism, and Criticism.** According to rationalism, reason is the only source of true knowledge.

Real knowledge or universal truths lie innate in the mind or reason. So knowledge is not acquired from sense-experience, it is prior to it. On the other hand, according to empiricism, all our knowledge is acquired from sense-experience; there are no innate ideas. The entire knowledge is derived from perception or observation. Lastly, according to the theory of criticism, knowledge requires the contributions of both reason and sense-experience; reason supplies the form of knowledge and experience supplies the matter of knowledge; knowledge is formed by the combination of form and matter. When the materials of sense-impressions derived from sense-experience are interpreted and organized by reason through the application of some a priori forms from within the mind, we get knowledge. Thus the theory of criticism reconciles rationalism and empiricism.

Criticism—a detailed account In modern times Kant, a German Philosopher, has introduced the theory of criticism by basing philosophy upon the critical analysis of knowledge. Kant has shown through his critical analysis that knowledge involves two factors—**One is matter and the other is form.** The matter of knowledge comprises the discrete and unconnected manifold of sensation derived from sense-experience; while the form of knowledge includes space, time, substance, causality, etc. supplied by reason from within the mind itself, these forms remain inherent in human reason prior to sense-experience. When our reason by applying the a priori forms of knowledge to the discrete materials of sense-impressions can organize and interpret them, then we can have knowledge. In one word, knowledge is formed by combining both matter and form—the matter derived from sense-experience

and the form supplied by reason. The sense-impressions which are derived from experience do not alone constitute knowledge (as wrongly held by the empiricists) nor mere forms of space, time, substance, causality, etc. lying a priori (i. e. before experience) can give us philosophical knowledge (as wrongly held by the rationalists). According to Kant, matter and form—each is an indispensable part of knowledge, and knowledge is really a combination of matter and form i. e. it is an organic whole of sense and reason. Thus Kant recognises the partial contributions of both sense-experience and reason to the question of the origin of knowledge. According to him, form without matter i. e. reason without sensation is empty; while matter without form i. e. sensation without reason is blind and disorganized.

—Thus Kant with the help of his theory of criticism has tried to reconcile rationalism and empiricism by removing the defects and imperfections of each of these systems. Empiricism gives us an account of knowledge where we get bare matter without any form; on the other hand, pure rationalism gives us an account of knowledge where we get bare form without matter. Again, as Kant points out, sense-experience can, no doubt, give us new information about particular facts and thus ensure the progress of knowledge, but it fails to guarantee universality and necessity in knowledge; on the other hand, the a priori forms and categories inherent in the nature and constitution of human reason have their own universality and necessity as they are true for all minds and at all times, but they cannot give us any new information about the particular facts of experience. But, in the opinion of Kant, the philosophic knowledge requires universality and necessity as well as new information and progress. So Kant has rightly said that the true

philosophic theory of the origin of knowledge must include the contributions of both reason and sense-experience. "Experience supplies the data or materials of knowledge in the form of sensations. These are interpreted by the mind through the application of the a priori forms and categories of space, time, substance, causality, etc. It is in this way that we get knowledge of the world as a system of things and events, existing in space and time, and being the same for all minds. But the world which we know cannot be regarded as real in the strict sense. It is rather a world which we construct out of the materials supplied by sensations and by application of the forms and categories supplied by mind. What we know is not reality as it is in itself, but as it appears through our senses and the categories of our mind and understanding. (Dr. S.C. Chatterjee : The Problems of Philosophy) The nature of the reality or thing-in-itself is independent of our sense and understanding and so is unknown and unknowable.

The element of permanent value of Kant's theory of knowledge is the demonstration of the truth that knowledge consists in the co-relativity of sense and reason or understanding. When Kant asserts that in knowledge, instead of the mind passively conforming to an independent nature, nature should conform to mind, it is, no doubt, the Copernican revolution made by Kant in philosophy. But unfortunately Kant has failed to perceive the organic character of knowledge; he has simply conceived of it as the result of the combination of separable elements. The whole difficulty of Kant arises when he draws a gap between the world of experience and the world of reality and overlooks the organic unity between the self and not-self, between thought and reality. He forgets that these two are the two aspects or expressions of the same supreme reality, the Absolute Spirit. We should criticise Kant by pointing out that the known world is the real world and the laws of mind are the laws of reality, there cannot be any gulf between thought and reality.

THEORIES OF REALITY

Q. 1. Explain very briefly different forms of Realism and Idealism.

Or,

Is it possible for an object to exist independently of the knowing mind ? Discuss the different views.

What is the nature of the object of knowledge ? Has it any separate existence of its own independent of the knowing mind or does it depend for its existence entirely upon the knowing mind ? Is it independent of the knowing mind or entirely dependent upon the mind ? Is it objective or merely subjective state of consciousness ? This is a main question of epistemology. In answer to this question of epistemology there are two opposite theories. These two theories are **Realism** and **Idealism**. According to realism, the things of the world have their objective reality independent of the knowing mind ; the existence of the world of things does not depend upon anybody's knowledge or consciousness ; in other words, the world has its extra-mental reality, no matter whether it is known by some mind or not ; the being of a thing is neither determined nor created by knowledge, a thing can preserve its own independent existence even without being known by any mind. On the other hand, according to idealism, the world of things is always dependent on the knowing mind ; it exists as a mere idea of a mind ; the existence of the world is always dependent upon its being known by a mind ; so it is subjective in nature, it has no objective extra-mental reality ; in one word, its being is always created and determined by knowledge or cons-

ciousness. We may make special mention of two kinds of realism—**Popular Realism** and **Scientific Realism** and of two kinds of idealism—**Subjective Idealism** and **Objective or Absolute Idealism**.

(1) **Popular or Naive Realism** :—According to this theory, the things of the external world are real and have their existence independent of any knowing mind. Not only the physical objects, but also their qualities are ‘out there’ in the world external to mind. Things and their qualities have their objective extramental realities, their existence does not depend upon their being known by any mind ; they maintain their own independent existence in the external world, no matter whether they are known or perceived by any mind or not. The primary qualities like extension, size, solidity, motion etc. as well as the secondary qualities like colour, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold etc, and even the mutual relation of different things—all have their extra-mental realities ; these are not at all mere sensations or ideas of mind ; these have their objective existence independent of any knowing mind. In other words, all physical objects together with their qualities and relations are real, they do not depend on their being known or perceived by any mind. Moreover, the real nature of objects together with their qualities is directly revealed to us whenever we perceive them by means of our senses ; the mind can exactly know the world as it is in itself, because in our act of knowledge or perception things are directly presented to us. Hence we can directly know or perceive the real nature of things as they are in themselves. “Our ideas are exact copies of external real things, much in the same sense in which pictures are copies of the originals or in which images in a mirror reflect their causes.” Thus our ideas perfectly correspond to the extra-mental reality in

every act of knowledge or perception. Just like a beam of light our consciousness illuminates the real nature of objects with all their inherent qualities. According to this theory our consciousness can directly reveal the real nature of objects as they are in themselves, so this theory is also known as **Direct Realism**.

We, however, cannot support the view that our sense-perception can directly reveal the real nature of objects in all cases. In fact, we sometimes experience dreams, illusions, wrong visions which surely do not reveal the real nature of objects. So popular or direct realism cannot satisfactorily explain the cases of dreams and erroneous perceptions.

(2) Scientific or Critical Realism :—As distinguished from popular realism which represents the view of unreflecting and uncritical common man, scientific or critical realism is based upon critical and scientific analysis of thought processes. John Locke who is the founder of scientific critical realism does not recognise that all qualities objectively inhere in things or substances. In his view, the primary qualities belong to the external objects, so these have objective existence independent of mind; but the secondary qualities are always dependent on the knowing mind. These have no objective existence independent of mind, these are entirely subjective i, e, these are only states of our consciousness in the form of sensations and ideas, because these qualities are inseparably related to our sensibility. Thus, according to Locke, the primary qualities like extension, size, solidity, impenetrability, motion etc. are invariable—essential and universal to the external physical objects; they belong to the very nature of things themselves, independent of our sensations and ideas, and are reflected in their real

nature in all our sense-perceptions in the same way as these inhere, in external bodies, but the secondary qualities like colour sound, taste, smell, heat, cold etc. do not belong to the physical objects. these exist only in the consciousness of the knower as sensations and ideas, because these qualities appear differently to different individuals and also change in the case of the same individual with varying circumstances, even in certain circumstances these vanish altogether, so our ideas of secondary qualities are not exact copies of the real qualities outside our minds, these cannot have any resemblance to the external physical objects. "The external world outside of our minds is neither light nor dark, neither silent nor resonant, neither hot nor cold, but extended and impenetrable." Thus Locke explains that the primary qualities are objective, but the secondary qualities are subjective. According to Locke, there is in the external world the reality of matter as the substratum of the primary qualities. It is necessary to recognise non-sensuous material substance as the underlying support of the primary qualities, but the essential nature of this substance is unknown and unknowable. We can directly know only the qualities and infer the reality of matter indirectly through the ideas of these qualities. We can perceive only our own ideas and infer the independent existence of matter as the ground of our ideas. We are not directly acquainted with external things, we know only their representations which are ideas in our minds. Thus Locke advocates representationism in his theory of perception.

Locke's 'scientific realism or representationalism can no doubt explain illusions or wrong perceptions as the mind is not directly acquainted with external objects, but knows directly its own states and processes which may not

always correspond to reality. But if the direct experience of an external object be not possible, then the idea of external reality would not at all arise in our minds. The existence of a thing which cannot be perceived can never be inferred. So Locke fails to prove the existence of an external reality.

Thus neither popular realism nor scientific realism can satisfactorily explain the nature of knowledge and its relation to the object.

(3) Subjective Idealism of Berkeley :—Berkeley points out that Locke's view of the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities is purely arbitrary and unpsychological. Locke's view that the primary qualities are objective is criticised by Berkeley. Berkeley shows that the primary qualities like extension, size, motion, etc. are not at all the absolute and invariable qualities of things. Just like the secondary qualities the primary qualities also entirely depend upon the conditions of the perceiving organism and vary with varying circumstances. As the secondary qualities like colour, taste, smell, etc. appear differently to different people under different conditions, so, in Berkeley's view, the primary qualities like size, weight, etc. appear, differently to different persons or to the same person at different times under different conditions. Hence both the secondary and primary qualities are entirely relative to the observer, they are not at all the objective or absolute qualities of things. Thus both the primary and secondary qualities are subjective, they alike exist in the consciousness of the knowing mind as mere sensations and ideas. Just like the secondary qualities the primary qualities also have no existence apart from their relation to our sensibility. Again, the primary and secondary qualities are inseparably related to each

other. As apart from the extension and size of a thing we cannot perceive its colour, smell, sound, etc., so it is not possible to perceive pure extension and size of an object without its colour or sound or any other secondary quality. In Berkeley's view, both primary and secondary qualities depend upon perception, hence like the secondary qualities the primary qualities also are purely subjective ideas. If both the primary and secondary qualities are subjective, then matter cannot have any extra-mental reality, it is also reduced to a mere idea of the mind, because the external reality of matter separated and abstracted from the sensible qualities is a mere empty abstraction, its objective and independent existence apart from the qualities is inconceivable.

Thus Berkeley destroys the objective existence of material bodies outside mind and proves that all objects of the world are only ideas or experiences of our minds. There can be no object without perception and whatever comes under perception are nothing but ideas or experiences of the mind. The so-called external object is a mere cluster of qualities, and all possible qualities (secondary and primary) are ideas of the mind. There is no reality apart from ideas or perceptions. An object in order to exist must be perceived '**Esse est percipi.**' The existence of an object entirely depends upon the perception or consciousness of the subject or mind. "**To be is to be perceived**" "The commonsense view that perception brings us into contact with a world of objects independent of mind is to be totally abandoned. Things can exist only in so far as they are known. 'To exist, in other words, is to be an idea in some mind.'" (Prof. S. P. Chakravarty ; An Introduction to General Philosophy).

In his later writings Berkeley modifies his subjective

idealism by saying that all objects of the world may not be present in the finite minds, but all these are created and sustained at least in God's mind and thus their permanence and continuity are maintained even though we, the individual finite minds, perceive them or not. Whenever we perceive the external world, we simply reproduce the ideas of the Divine Mind from a finite or limited point of view. Thus Berkeley by introducing God has established the objective and permanent existence of the world and freed his idealism from the defect of solipsism which means that I and my ideas alone exist.

(4) Objective Idealism or Absolute Idealism :—According to this theory, God and the world are closely related to each other; the world is not a mere idea of the Divine Mind, it is a necessary, concrete and objective form of God, it is the real consequence or objective result of the Divine Power. As the world cannot exist without the consciousness of God, so God also depends upon the world which is the necessary object of his consciousness. Hegel is the main advocate of the theory of objective or absolute idealism. Berkeley has simply asserted that the world is a mere idea of the Divine Mind, and God is only a passive spectator of the world which exists within Him as His idea. So Berkeley's theory is known as subjective idealism. On the other hand, Hegel has shown that the world is not a mere subjective idea of God, it is, in fact, the concrete objectification of God who has evolved the entire world of finite things and minds out of His Absolute Thought or Idea. The objects of the world are the necessary materials or means for God's self-realisation, God manifests and objectifies Himself by evolving out of His own being Nature and finite minds. "The ultimate principle, according to Hegel, is neither a mere subject

apart from the object, as subjective idealism holds, nor a mere object apart from the subject, as materialism or realism holds, but the Absolute Spirit which is expressed in the finite spirits and Nature or a system of inter-related objects. The world is the externalization of the Absolute Mind. It is the object of the universal and eternal consciousness——both finite minds and the world are real and different from each other, yet they are related to each other. Their correlativity is due to their being inseparable moments in the life of the Absolute Spirit or Universal Self-Consciousness.” (J. N. Sinha: Introduction to Philosophy) As the world of finite things and minds are the necessary factors of God who is a thinking subject, so the objective existence of the world is recognised in the absolute idealism of Hegel, though it is not entirely independent of God. It is true that the world has its own being within God who is the Absolute subject, yet the world has a real existence, because without the world God cannot be a concrete living self-conscious power. It is only in and through the diversities of the world that God can realise His fullest unity. So the objective or absolute idealism of Hegel offers a more satisfactory solution of the problem of knowledge.

Q. 2. Explain and examine the theory of Subjective Idealism of Berkeley.

Or, Elucidate the doctrine ‘Esse est Percipi’ and examine the arguments that are usually put forward in its defence.

The subjective idealism of Berkeley is a form of idealism, according to which the things and beings of the world are mere ideas ; they have no extra-mental reality ; they are purely subjective. Berkeley has established his theory of subjective idealism by following the empiricism of John Locke. According to Locke, sense-perception is the only

source of knowledge ; the knowledge of a thing which cannot be perceived is not possible. But, quite inconsistently, Locke says that there is an extra-mental reality of material substance as the support of the primary qualities, though it is always imperceptible. Locke asserts that the existence of matter as the support or ground of qualities and cause of sensations must be necessarily assumed. Moreover, the independent existence of extra-mental reality must be admitted in order to ascertain whether our ideas are true or false ; when our ideas will correspond to the objective reality, they will be true, and when the ideas do not correspond to reality, they are false. But, according to Locke, the real nature of this material substance is unknown and unknowable. Berkeley, however, does not recognise the independent existence of any extra-mental object ; whatever exists must be, according to him, wholly dependent upon mind ; nothing can exist distinct and apart from mind or knowledge. In Berkeley's view, the object which is imperceptible cannot be said to exist ; it is not reasonable to assume the existence of an imperceptible object. Again, whatever we perceive is nothing but an idea of the mind. The so-called external world is a system of qualities, and all qualities, (both primary and secondary) are the ideas of mind. There is nothing outside ideas and the mind which is the support or ground of ideas. According to Berkeley, only mind and its ideas exist ; all the things and beings of the world are mere ideas of the mind.

Berkeley points out that Locke's view of the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities is purely arbitrary and unpsychological. Locke's view that the primary qualities are objective is criticised by Berkeley. Berkeley shows that the primary qualities like extension,

size, motion, etc. are not at all the absolute and invariable qualities of things. Just like the secondary qualities the primary qualities also entirely depend upon the condition of the perceiving organism and vary with varying circumstances. As the secondary qualities like colour, taste, smell etc. appear differently to different people under different conditions, so, in Berkeley's view, the primary qualities like size, weight, etc. appear differently to different persons or to the same person at different times under different conditions. Hence both the secondary and primary qualities are entirely relative to the observer, they are not at all objective or absolute qualities of things. Thus both the primary and secondary qualities are subjective, they alike exist in the consciousness of the knowing mind as mere sensations and ideas. Just like the secondary qualities the primary qualities also have no existence apart from their relation to our sensibility. Again, the primary and secondary qualities are inseparably related to each other. As apart from the extension and size of a thing we cannot perceive its colour, smell, sound, etc., so it is not possible to perceive pure extension and size of an object without its colour or sound or any other secondary quality. In Berkeley's view, both primary and secondary qualities depend upon perception hence like the secondary qualities the primary qualities also are purely subjective ideas. If both the primary and secondary qualities are subjective, then matter cannot have any extramental reality, it is also reduced to a mere idea of mind, because the external reality of matter separated and abstracted from all qualities is a mere empty abstraction, its objective and independent existence apart from the sensible qualities is inconceivable. "The idea of a world without the mind, that is, of a real world of matter, is such an abstract idea.

We separate the sensible objects from their being perceived, we conceive of matter as existing unperceived. This is impossible. We cannot see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, nor can we conceive any sensible thing or object, distinct from the sensation or perception of it." (Thilly : A History of Philosophy)

Thus Berkeley destroys the objective existence of material bodies outside mind and proves that all objects of the world are only ideas or experiences of our minds. There can be no object without perception and whatever comes under perception are nothing but ideas or experiences of the mind. The so-called external object is a mere cluster of qualities and all possible qualities (secondary and primary) are ideas of the mind. There is no reality apart from ideas or perceptions. An object in order to exist must be perceivede "**Esse est percipi.**" The existence of an object entirely depends upon the perception or consciousness of the subject or knowing mind. "**To be is to be perceived.**" "The common-sense view that perception brings us into contact with a world of objects independent of mind is to be totally abandoned. Things can exist only in so far as they are known To exist, in other words, is to be an idea in some mind," (Prof. S. P. Chakravarty : An Introduction to General Philosophy)

Dr. Johnson, a contemporary of Berkeley, tried to refute Berkeley's idealism by an appeal to common sense. He struck his foot against a stone and said, "I refute it thus." But Berkeley pointed out that Dr. Johnson here could not at all perceive any extramental reality viz. a stone, but simply experienced a group of visual and muscular sensations. So, in Berkeley's view, it is impossible to think of a thing as not perceived ; there can be nothing apart from the knowing subject.

A charge is levelled against Berkeley that he was a Solipsist as he held that nothing can exist without perception. Solipsism means—'the self alone exists, 'my world of ideas constitutes the only reality, beyond that there is nothing'. It appears from the earlier writings of Berkeley that he was a solipsist as he held that things do not exist independently of our thoughts and thus things are only ideas in the minds of the individual subjects.

In his later writings Berkeley, however, modified his subjective idealism by saying that all objects of the world may not be present in the finite minds, but all this are created and sustained at least in God's mind and thus their permanence and continuity are maintained even though we the individual finite minds perceive them or not. Whenever we perceive the external world, we simply reproduce the ideas of the Divine Mind from a finite and limited point of view. Thus Berkeley by introducing God established the objective and permanent existence of this world and freed his idealism from the defect of solipsism which means that I and my ideas alone exist.

But the defect of Berkeley's subjective idealism lies in the fact that he has simply asserted that the world is a mere idea of the Divine Mind, and God is only a passive spectator of the world which exists within Him as His idea. Thus Berkeley ignores the fact that the world is not a mere subjective idea of God, but the concrete objectification of God who has evolved the entire world of finite things and minds out of His Absolute Thought or Idea. In this connection Hegel truly points out that the world has a real existence, because without the world God cannot be a concrete living Self-conscious power.

The modern realists also have criticised Berkeley's

Subjectivism from their own standpoints. Moore in his famous article 'The Refutation of Idealism' has shown that Berkeley's idealistic dictum 'esse est percipi' (to exist is to be perceived or experienced) is not tenable or acceptable, because, according to Moore, the existence of an object is not dependent on the experience or consciousness of it. All will admit that the sensation of blue differs from the sensation of green. This difference is due to the nature of the objects (blue and green), and not due to sensation. Thus the objects of knowledge are independent of the knowing mind, and there is no reason to hold that the existence of a thing is inseparable from the experience of it.

Q. 3. Briefly evaluate the modern Theories of Neo-Realism and Critical Realism.

Recently a new form of realistic theory known as **Neo-Realism** is prevalent in Great Britain and America. The British thinkers—G. E. Moore, Alexander and Russell are the pioneers of Neo-Realism. In America Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Pitkin and Scriven are the main advocates of this theory. Neo-Realism is, broadly speaking, "a return to naive or natural realism" as it "conceives of objects as directly presented to consciousness and being precisely what they appear to be.....Objects are not represented in consciousness by ideas; they are themselves directly presented." In other words, the object perceived is identical with the object as it is in itself. Mind or consciousness is not distinct from object but is constituted by its objects. What we call consciousness is not any distinct subjective existence, but only a particular grouping of objects, defined by the specific response of the nervous system." Thus neo-idealism advocates direct realism and epistemological monism. But metaphysically

considered, the theory of neo-realism is pluralistic as it recognises the independent realities of the diversities of material objects as well as many conscious entities. According to this theory, the manifold thing and events of both the physical and mental worlds are all discrete and mutually independent entities which are not at all internally and organically related into a system; the world instead of being an organic unity is a loose aggregate of many independent reals which are only externally related. The universe is made of innumerable neutral entities which are physical in relation to other physical things in space and time, and ideas or mental states in relation to the nervous system. Thus neo-realism believes in a pluralistic universe.

Neo-realism is radically opposed to all forms of idealism or mentalism. It holds that there is nothing mental or subjective in the proper sense of the term; even the facts of unreal experiences like dreams, errors and illusions are not the constructions or modifications of the mind, but are all objective as these subsist in their own rights in the all-inclusive universe of being, and the status of their being or subsistence is not conferred on them by any mind.

Moore in his famous article 'The Refutation of Idealism' has shown that the idealistic dictum 'esse est percipi' (to exist is to be perceived or experienced) is not tenable or acceptable, because, according to Moore, the existence of an object is not dependent on the experience or consciousness of it. All will admit that the sensation of blue differs from the sensation of green. This difference is due to the nature of the objects (blue and green), and not due to sensation. Thus the objects of knowledge are independent of the knowing mind, and there is no

reasons to hold that the existence of a thing is inseparable from the experience of it.

The authors of the theory of neo-realism point out that Subjectivism or idealism involves the following fallacies :—

(a) **The fallacy of argument from the ego-centric predicament :—**

"The ego-centric predicament means the rather inconvenient situation in which a philosopher finds himself when he sees that his knowledge of objects centres round his ego, or self. If he has to know whether objects exist, and if so, how they exist, he has to relate them to his self, make them the objects of Self's knowledge. So it is not possible for him to know the existence and nature of things unknown and unrelated to the self. Perry points out that an idealistic philosopher like Berkeley unfairly makes out an argument, in favour of idealism, from this predicament. The difficulty or impossibility of proving the existence of things unknown by the self is used by the idealist as a proof for the non-existence of unknown objects. This argument of the idealist is called by Perry argument from the ego-centric predicament, and he points out that it is fallacious." (Dr. D. M. Datta ; Contemporary Philosophy).

(b) **The fallacy of exclusive particularity :** Subjectivism argues that, when an object is known, it becomes related to the mind. So nothing can exist without being the exclusive possession of the mind. This argument thus involves the fallacy of exclusive particularity.

(c) **The fallacy of definition by initial predication :—**
If the initial characterization of an object be taken as final, the fallacy thus involved is known as the fallacy of definition by initial predications. Thus when the

idealists interpret the universe as an object of some consciousness because an object is first known or perceived as an object of consciousness, they commit this fallacy.

Though the theory of neo-realism rightly exposes the defects of subjectivism and studies things in the objective way, in their objective setting through careful, systematic and exhaustive analysis of any topic of discourse, yet this theory cannot be fully supported. Firstly, we cannot accept the neo-realistic view that all relations are external. In fact, there are also internal relations amongst things which prove that there is a fundamental unity underlying the diversities of things and events of the world. So, as against the neo-realistic view of a pluralistic universe, we must hold that there is in the universe only one supreme reality which is a principle of a concrete unity organizing and co-ordinating the plurality of things and events of the world-process into an all-comprehensive system. Secondly, we cannot accept the neo-realistic view that both matter and mind are made of neutral entities which are at bottom neither physical nor mental. Thirdly, we cannot support the neo-realist's attempt to ignore the subjectivity of mind and to explain knowledge or consciousness as a cross-section of the universe i.e. as a collection of objects defined by the specific response of the nervous organism. But, in our view, consciousness or knowledge cannot be such a collection of objects. If it were so, then consciousness would appear as an external object, as 'out there', and not as an inner experience. So we can not appreciate the neo-realistic craze for objectivity in all matters. We should point out that consciousness instead of being a collection of objects is pre-supposed by the objects for their inter-relation and unification. Lastly, the neo-realistic view that all that is experienced

is objective and belongs to real things is also objectionable as it cannot satisfactorily explain how contrary and contradictory characters appear in our actual experience as belonging to the same object. We fail to understand how opposite characters belong to the thing itself independent of the perceiving minds. So we must assume that the characters of the object which are perceived are relative to the sensibility of the perceivers.

Another form of realism known as **Critical Realism** or **New Critical Realism** has come into existence very recently in America. This theory has been presented in a joint work called *Essays in Critical Realism* by Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellars and Strong. As against the epistemological monism advocated by neo-realism, the theory of new critical realism advocates epistemological dualism by holding that the object perceived and the object existing are two different entities. Thus new critical realism reinstates the representationalism of Locke. The advocates of new critical realism contend that objects cannot be known directly or immediately; they are known indirectly or mediately through the sense-data presented by them. 'All of them agree in holding that the data we directly get in perception cannot be physical existents, for that will lead us to posit the existence of contrary and contradictory characters in the same thing at the same time. They agree further that the data of perception cannot be the mental existents, states or ideas of the mind (as supposed by Locke). For, the sense-datum that we get in the perception of a round table is 'a round-table-about-three-feet-high', but the corresponding mental state can be neither round nor about three feet in height. Hence they conclude that the data of perception are essences or character-complexes of physical objects

and not the physical objects themselves nor any of our mental states. (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee : The Problems of Philosophy). Thus the new critical realists explain that the datum acts as a mediator between the subject and the physical object in every external perception. In this way they abandon on the one hand subjectivism which reduces the physical object to the mere datum, and on the other hand the neo-realistic view which reduces the datum to the physical object or ultimate reality.

But the defect of new critical realism lies in the fact that if things or realities be different from the sense-data or character-complexes and if our minds cannot directly know the things or realities, then how can we ascertain that our knowledge truly represents anything or that there is any independent world of things at all ? So we must fall back upon the idealistic doctrine, specially upon the objective idealism of Hegel and Neo-Hegelians, which alone can offer the satisfactory explanation of the nature and validity of knowledge by showing that all objects of knowledge are in some sense constructed by the mind.

SPACE. TIME, SUBSTANCE AND CAUSALITY

Q. 1. What is Space ? Distinguish between Perceptual Space and Conceptual Space.

Space—When we look at any material body, we find that it has some extension. Hence it has occupied a space, otherwise its extension cannot be explained. It is space which alone can explain the co-existence and movements of the material bodies. Space is conceived by us as the ground or condition of the co-existence and movements of the material bodies. It is also viewed as a 'continuum' holding and receiving things together and indicating their mutual relations of above-below, outside-inside, distance, direction, etc.

The characteristics of space are noted below :—

(a) Space is the receptacle or container of the motionless and moving bodies. It is in space wherein the different material bodies exist simultaneously and also move from one place to another. So space is a great void in which bodies have their co-existence and movement.

(b) Space is boundless and infinite ; we cannot conceive any limit to space, for any supposed limit of space must be in space. Hence space is continuous and unlimited.

(c) Space is viewed by us as extending or stretching in three directions or dimensions—length, breadth and depth i.e. right and left, up and down, forward and backward.

(d) Space seems to be infinitely divisible as it contains distinguishable parts or fragments which again are further divisible and such divisions have no end.

(e) Lastly, space can never be conceived as ceasing to exist even if all bodies contained within it are destroyed.

We may distinguish between perceptual space and conceptual space. We perceive space as limited by a horizon. Such space is perceived by touch (passive and active touch combined) and also by sight (passive and active sight combined). Perceptual space corresponds to spaces separately and individually, and here we distinguish three dimensions of space—length, breadth and depth of extended objects perceived. Perceptual space refers to our knowledge of the extension of things, the distances between objects and the relative shapes or sizes of the perceived bodies. Conceptual space, on the other hand, is any idealised extension which we conceive as a limitless and continuous whole by eliminating the particular objects of the perceptual spaces. Thus conceptual space is an abstract idea of one infinite and boundless whole containing the limited spaces of perception as its parts.

Q. 2. What is time ? Distinguish between Perceptual Time and Conceptual Time.

Time is usually taken to be the possible condition of events in the order of succession i.e. it is viewed as a condition which makes possible the flow of successive events. In other words, events take place one after another in time.

The characteristics of time are noted below :—

(a) Time is viewed as the ground of the sequence of events ; it makes all the changes and sequences of events possible. It is a continuous flow which will not cease even if no particular events take place.

(b) Time is infinite, it has neither beginning nor end ; we cannot conceive any limit to time, for any supposed limit of time must be in time. It flows endlessly.

(c) Time seems to be infinitely divisible as it contains distinguishable moments or durations e.g. a second, a minute, an hour, etc. which again are further divisible and such divisions have no end.

(d) Time is viewed as stretching only in one dimension which is a continuous flow of succession of which past, present and future are its stages.

We may distinguish between perceptual time and conceptual time. We get perceptual times in the shapes of past, present and future from our experience of successive events. The limited portions of duration which are presented in our experience are called perceptual times. Conceptual time, on the other hand, refers to our abstract idea of an eternal and infinite time which we generalize from perceptual times. Thus conceptual time is idealised duration which we conceive as limitless and endless by eliminating the particular events perceived in our experience.

Q. 3. How do you account for the origin of the ideas of Space and Time ?

There are different theories with regard to the question how the ideas of space and time originate in our minds. A brief account of these theories is given below :—

(1) **Common Sense View** :—According to this view, the world of things and events exist in space and time, so in our sense-experience we directly come to know of space and time together with our perception of things and events.

But this theory is not satisfactory, because space and time which are essentially infinite and eternal cannot be grasped by our sense-experience.

(2) **Empiricism** :—According to this theory, the notions of space and time are abstract concepts generalized from

our particular experiences. The idea of space is derived from tactuo-muscular sensations. From the motor experiences we abstract a general idea of space. Similarly, the idea of time is derived from our experience of particular events occurring successively. We remember some past events and anticipate those that are in future. From our experience of such successive events we abstract a general idea of succession and thus we get the idea of time.

This theory also is not satisfactory as the ideas of space and time instead of depending upon experience are themselves presupposed by it. Without presupposing space we cannot perceive movements ; again without presupposing time we cannot perceive the succession of events.

(3) **Evolutional Theory** :—According to this theory, the ideas of space and time were first acquired by our remote ancestors through their experience, and thereafter these have been transmitted to us by heredity and have thus become innate to us.

But this theory is at bottom empirical and shares the defects of empiricism.

(4) **Rationalism or Theory of Innate ideas** :—According to this theory, the ideas of space and time are innate ; they are not derived from experience ; they are prior to experience. It is our reason or intellect which evolves the ideas of space and time through its own activity.

This theory, however, is not wholly acceptable as it ignores the necessary contributions of sense-experience which develops the innate capacities of mind.

(5) **Theory of Kant** :—According of Kant, the ideas of space and time are not derived from experience. Space and time are *a priori* forms of our mind which we apply to our sensations from within the mind. Experience of particular objects and particular events cannot give us the

ideas of space and time, because space and time are the prior conditions or presuppositions of all experience. He further states that space and time are infinite; so experience cannot give the ideas of space and time ; these are a priori. Space and time are not the results, but the presuppositions of our perceptions ; these are the necessary conditions which make our experiences, outer and inner, possible. This is the most satisfactory view regarding the origin of our ideas of space and time.

Q. 4. Discuss the nature of Space and Time.

Or

Are Space and Time objective realities or are they subjective forms of mind only ?

Space is generally regarded as something receiving and holding things together ; while time is usually taken to be the possible condition of events in the order of succession. Space is a condition which makes possible the co-existence of finite things ; while time is a condition which makes possible the flow of successive events.

Now, the question is—What is the nature of space and time ? Have they any objective existence independent of mind or are they mere ideas of the subject or knower ? There are different views with regard to the question whether space and time are objective or subjective. A brief account of these views is given below :—

(1) **The view that space and time are objective :—**Common people regard space and time as objective entities independent of mind ; these are, according to them, objective receptacles of things and events. The ancient Greek atomists like Lucipius and Democritus admit the independent existence of space and hold that it is the eternal receptacle of the moving physical atoms ; the reality of

space is not lost even if no object is contained in it, it does not depend upon anything else for its own existence. The scientists like Galileo and Newton also support the commonsense view of the independent and objective existence of space and time which are the containers of all things and events. Space and time, according to them, are two independent and objective frame-works of the physical order, space being the frame-work which makes possible the co-existence of objects and their movements and time being the frame-work which makes possible the succession of events. Space and time are to be taken absolutely by themselves, no matter whether objects and events are contained in them or not. The Nyaya-Vaisesika system of the Indian Philosophy also holds that space and time are objective entities or substances ; all objects of the material world maintain their existence and changes in space and time , the creation, preservation and destruction of the material world is possible because of the objective existence of space and time ; even the connection and separation of atoms occur in space and time ; space and time are indivisible, eternal and all-pervading.

Descartes admits the objective reality of space and says that it is the essential attribute of matter ; matter and space (extension) are inseparable from each other ; hence like matter space also is objective and independent of mind. Spinoza also regards space as objective. In his view, space or extension is as attribute of infinite God or Nature. So the existence of space is not dependent on the knowing mind.

In recent times Alexander, a realist, holds that space-time is the ultimate reality or matrix out of which all things and events are made. Space and time are not two distinct and separate realities as held by Newton. Alexander

regards space and time as but one inseparable system of motion ; they are interdependent, 'so that there cannot be space without time nor there can be time without space ; space is in its very nature temporal and time spatial. Space supplies the continuum without which time would be mere discrete and disconnected instants ; on the contrary, time creates the discreteness of points of elements without which space would be an empty extension. "Without Space there would be no connection in Time. Without Time there would be no points to connect." "Space and Time by themselves are abstractions from Space-Time and the real existence is space-time, the continuum of point-instants or pure events." Alexander thinks of space-time in terms of motion, which gives rise to all existents (matter, life and even mind) by its internal differentiation.

Bergson holds that time alone is the ultimate reality of the whole universe ; its real nature which is eternal and unceasing flow or flux can be realised through intuition ; it cannot be grasped through sense and intellect which present only static, fragmentary and misleading appearances of it and as a result there appears before us the static world of matter in space. So, according to Bergson, time alone is the reality, and space is unreal appearance of reality.

(2) The view that space and time are subjective :— According to this view, space and time have no realities independent of mind ; they are entirely subjective and mind-dependent.

Leibniz holds that space is not an objective entity, it is a phenomenal appearance due to our confused perception of the co-existence of monads or spiritual atoms which alone are realities. When we confuse the ever-active monads as merely passive and static, then we have the

idea of space or extension, though there is no real space. Similarly, time also, according to Leibniz, has no objective reality. Each monad is self-dependent, it is not influenced by other monads. But we make such a confusion that one monad seems to be influenced by another. This confused and erroneous idea of inter-action or inter-relation of monads gives rise to the appearance of time. So space and time, according to Leibniz, instead of being objective entities, are mere confused ideas of mind.

The empiricists like Locke hold that space and time are not objectively real, but abstract concepts. One infinite space or time is different from different bits of spaces and times that happen in our sense-experience. In other words, space and time, according to them, are the results of our generalisations from experience; they are general ideas derived from particular experiences. Space is purely an abstract idea or concept which we generalise from our motor experience i.e, from tactuo-muscular sensation; time is purely an abstract concept which we generalise from the ideas of succession of events. Thus, according to the empiricists, space and time are merely abstract general ideas of the mind having no objective reality which can be revealed in our sense-perception.

Kant maintains that space and time are a priori forms of perception; they are not general ideas derived from particular experiences, because experiences themselves in order to be possible presuppose space and time. Again, space and time, according to Kant, are not real relations between things, not real things in themselves, but forms of perception which have their basis in the subjective constitution of human minds. There is no sense in speaking of real things as being in space and time. Space and time are empirically real but transcendently ideal. Space is the

form of our experience of the external impressions, and time is the form of our inner experience. Space and time are called by Kant empirically real in the sense that they are not merely forms of perception but they have a definite sensible nature. As space and time are necessary conditions of all human perceptions and as they are not peculiar to this or that individual, the objects of perception must be in space and time. In other words, space and time are "as much of the nature of data as the sensations themselves which they receive." But space and time, according to Kant, have only empirical reality, they are applicable to phenomena only ; they have no existence in reality or thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves do not exist in space and time. Space and time are nothing more than the subjective forms in which human mind perceives things ; they are, no doubt, the necessary forms to which all human perception is subject, yet they are subjective having their basis in the constitution of mind.

(3) The view that space and time are both subjective and objective :—According to Hegel, space and time are both subjective and objective ; they are not only a priori forms of the human mind, but also the forms of the Divine Mind which is the absolute reality ; so space and time have not only subjective existence, but are already existent in nature which is the objective expression of the Divine Mind. The world has been evolved by the Divine Mind according to the forms of space and time, so space and time are also the objective determinations of the Absolute Reality which includes the spatial and temporal order and at the same time transcends them.

(4) The view of the relativity of space and time :—In modern science specially in the fields of physics and mathematics, there has been a new theory of the physical world,

according to which the reality of the universe is neither space separated from time, nor time separated from space, but space-time in one. In the place of the absolute and independent characters of space and time we now have relativity, and in place of three separate dimensions of space and one dimension of time, we now have space-time with four dimensions. As distinguished from Newton, Einstein points out that space and time are entirely relative to the motion of the observers using different systems of measurement. Space and time have meaning only in relation to the moving system of objects and they vary as these systems do. The view of space and time acquired by an observer on earth is not the same as that seen by an observer on the sun. But the fact that space and time are relative to an observer does not mean that space and time are subjective and unreal ; on the contrary, they represent the real and objective order of things and relations.

Q. 5. Briefly review the different conceptions of substance. Or, Discuss the different views of the relation of substance to its qualities.

Substance is generally regarded as something which is permanent in the midst of changes ; it remains essentially the same throughout its changing states and qualities. It is a permanent entity which preserves its own identity throughout the successive changes of its qualities and at the same time gives its changing qualities, modes and forms connection, unity and continuity. Secondly, substance is regarded as a seat or centre of energy or force, it is not a mere passive or static receptacle of qualities, but a principle of force or a source of effort and activity by which it preserves itself and overcomes the external forces acting upon it. Thus qualities and activities inhere in substance. Thirdly, there is a close relation between substance and its

qualities. "Qualities are the manifestations of a substance. Without qualities it is a meaningless essence, just as qualities are unmeaning without a substance. Substance is the inner core or essence of its qualities; and qualities are the expressions or manifestations of a substance. Substance is not an unknown and unknowable substratum of qualities or attributes which inhere in it. It does not exist behind and beyond them. Nor is it a mere aggregate of qualities or attributes. Both substance and qualities are real and correlative to each other. They are not real apart from each other. Substance is expressed in each of its qualities. If it is not expressed in them, it becomes an unmeaning abstraction. Qualities also are meaningless apart from substance.....A flower is not a mysterious unknowable substance behind its extension, size, shape, softness, colour, smell and beauty. Nor is it an aggregate of these attributes without a substance. It is a substance or essence expressed in its manifestations or qualities. It is a concrete unity of both substance and qualities." (J. N. Sinha : Introduction to Philosophy).

But, according to popular ideas, though the qualities are not independent of the substance, the substance can exist without qualities. The qualities derive their existence from the substance, but the substance is self-caused and self-determined, it has its whole being in itself and its reality does not flow into it from anything else. The Vaisheshika system of Indian philosophy holds that the qualities always depend upon the substance, but the substance does not depend upon the qualities; substance can be conceived independent of and apart from the qualities and actions. The ancient Greek philosopher Plato in similar manner points out that substance is a self-existent permanent reality and the qualities which are changeable are unreal or phenomenal in character.

Descartes defines substance as "an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist". So he points out that God who is absolutely self-sustaining must be the absolute substance. But Descartes regards mind and matter (body) as two relative substances, because they are independent of each other though they are created by God and thus dependent on Him. Thought is the essential attribute of mind, while extension is the essential attribute of matter ; so mind and matter are mutually opposite substances quite independent of each other.

Spinoza takes the idea of substance and works it out with logical consistency. "If substance is that which needs nothing other than itself to exist or to be conceived, if God is the substance and everything else dependent on him, then, obviously, there can be no substance outside of God. Then thought and extension can not be attributes of separate substances, but are merged with these in God ; they are attributes of one single independent substance. Everything in the universe is dependent on it, God is the cause and bearer of all qualities and events, the one principle in which all things find their being. He is the one thinking and extended substance,—the dualism of substances disappears, but the dualism of attributes remains". According to Spinoza, Substance, Nature and God denote the same Being. Substance which is the ground and cause of its own existence must be one, infinite, unlimited, eternal, unchangeable and perfect being.

Leibniz develops the concept of substance by substituting independent action for independent existence, self-activity for self-existence. "With the equation of activity and existence the substantiality which Spinoza had taken away from individual things is restored to them : they are active, consequently, in spite of their limitedness,

substantial beings. Because of its inner activity every existing thing is a determinate individual, and different from every other being. Substance is an individual being endowed with force". Thus, according to Leibniz, there is an infinite number of substances, each of which is an indivisible, indestructible and independent centre of force or activity. These are spiritual atoms : these are called monads.

All these philosophers recognise that substance has objective reality. But consistent empiricism does not admit the objective character of any substance. According to it, a substance is a mere cluster of changing qualities ; there is no identical and unchangeable thing or reality behind the qualities, because no such permanent thing is known through perception. Locke who is the father of empiricism holds that sense-experience or perception is the only source of Knowledge. Our perception reveals different qualities and ideas, but not things or substances. But, inconsistently enough, Locke admits firstly material substance as the unknown support or substratum or ground or bearer of primary qualities which are revealed in sensations, secondly mental substance as the underlying support of ideas which are indicated by reflection, and thirdly God who is inferred as the infinite cause of all reality. Berkeley rejects Locke's unknown and unknowable material substance, because, according to him (Berkeley), a thing in order to exist must be perceived by the mind. So matter as an unknown and unknowable substratum is meaningless abstraction, a non-entity. Berkeley, however, admits the substantiality of mind which must exist as the bearer or support of ideas. He also recognises the existence of God who creates and sustains the world as a system of ideas within His own mind. But Hume denies permanent substance of any kind whether of matter or mind or God

and reduces both the mental and extramental substances to a dynamic flow of impressions. The so-called substance, according to Hume, is a mere cluster of its changing states and qualities. Mill also holds that substance is a "permanent possibility of sensations." Thus consistent empiricism recognises only the changing states and qualities and maintains that the idea of a permanent substance is illusory.

Kant holds that substance is neither an objective entity independent of mind nor merely a cluster of sensations and ideas. It is an a priori category of the understanding which is necessary and indispensable for interpreting sensations and its ideas. We can understand our experience of changing sense-impressions by referring them to a permanent substance. So experience presupposes the principle of substance which is a necessary form or category of the understanding. But substance is real within the range of our experience, it is not applicable to the thing-in-itself which is outside experience.

Hegel maintains that substance is both subjective and objective ; it is not only an apriori category of the human mind but also an objective entity already existing in the world, being a category of the Divine Mind. Hegel upholds the concrete notion of substance which is the unity of both substratum and its modes and qualities—a dynamic concrete unity which realises itself through its changing states and qualities.

In recent philosophy we find a scientific approach to the problem of substance. According to Alexander, the stuff of the universe is space-time or pure motion which lies at the root of all things. When, however, we take a static view of things, we call them substances. But this does not show that an object is really static, because reality

itself is motion. Russell also states that there is nothing like permanent and static substance. He considers substance from three standpoints—logical, physical, and epistemological. From logical standpoint substance is always a subject of a logical proposition, and never a predicate or a relation. From physical standpoint the ever-changing electrons and protons compose things of the world. From epistemological standpoint we perceive only events which do not refer to any permanent substance which is an unnecessary and unjustifiable assumption. In fact, the physical object is a mere group of events. Whitehead also points out that reality is never apart from the process, but is always with the process; the being of a thing consists in its becoming. So the idea of a permanent substance behind and beyond changing events or processes, qualities and relations, is only a figment of imagination.

Q. Explain the different conceptions of Causality. Which view of causality appeals to you most ?

The things and events of the world are mutually related. No object or event of the world is completely isolated. All things and events are inter-dependent. One object is acting upon another object, and that action has also its reaction. When one object by its influence produces change in another object, the former in relation to the latter is called 'Cause' and the latter in relation to the former is called 'effect'. The changes in objects are due to causality, and without causal relation we cannot understand the changes in the objective order of things. Moreover, it is only through the discovery of casual relation among the different things or events that we can acquire systematic, organised and unified knowledge of the world.

Now, the question is—What is the real nature of causality ? How does the cause produce the effect and why ?

In this connection the different views should be mentioned :—

(1) **Popular View** :—According to this view, causality implies force or power ; a cause is an agent which exerts power and thus produces the effect. The potter makes pot by exercising his own force or power, so the potter is the cause of the effect 'pot'. Common people lay emphasis upon the efficient cause to explain any event of the world. They ascribe this power or force even to the inanimate, material objects which are supposed to be endowed with power, and even volitions, for the production of effects. John Locke just like a common man accepts this power of producing the effect as a cause.

(2) **Scientific View** :—Physical science has made an improvement upon the popular view by holding that motion is the true characteristic of a cause. When the motion of an object is transmitted from it to another object, then the motion in the former is called the cause and the motion in the latter is called the effect. According to the scientific view, the energy in the cause is transformed into the energy in the effect. In science causality is interpreted in the light of conservation of energy and is reduced to transference and transformation or redistribution of energy.

(3) **Empirical View (the Views of Hume and Mill)** :—

"Empiricism which reads everything in terms of subjective impressions does not spare cause and effect which are also nothing but two successive mental phenomena, one preceding and the other following. To it a phenomenon A will be the cause of another phenomenon B which follows upon the phenomenon A, if they are repeated in our experience. Such repetitions of two consecutive phenomena begets in us the habit of expectation that since one phenomenon A has happened, the phenomenon B will

follow. Hence to empiricism causal relation means nothing else than invariable sequence of mental phenomena." Hume, a true and consistent empiricist, holds this view. He revolts against the popular conception of causality which involves the idea of necessary connection and the idea of power. Hume points out that our perception which is the only source of knowledge does not provide us with any impression of which the idea of necessary connection can be said to be a copy. "All events seem extremely loose and separate. One event follows another but we can never observe any tie between them. They seem con-joined but never connected". If we take a thing or event, we can never discover without the help of actual experience what effect will come out of it, however minutely we observe it by itself. The effect cannot be discovered in the cause. So there is no necessary connection between the cause and the effect. Similarly, we have no sense-impression of any force or power passing from the cause to the effect.

The grounds on which Hume denies necessity in causation are mainly three :—(a) The past is no guarantee for the future. The fact that fire burnt in the past is no guarantee that it will do so in future. (b) The causal propositions are not necessary, because their opposites are not inconceivable. (c) The causal propositions are not analytic, but synthetic, because they are derived from experience. Whatever is derived from experience is contingent, and not necessary.

Thus, according to Hume, our belief in causality is simply due to the fact that we have always found in our experience one event invariably following another particular prior event. The so-called connection between antecedent and consequent phenomena is nothing but a subjective habit of expectation, and such idea is derived

from our experience of repeated conjunction of events. One phenomenon follows another without any objective necessity and connection. If causal relation were a necessary one, it would have occurred universally just as 7×7 will always make 49. But have we any similar assurance with regard to causal relations? Certainly not. Experience does not guarantee it, it leads only to probability.

J. S. Mill, while criticising Hume's view of causality, has pointed out that the cause is not merely an invariable antecedent of the effect (for in that case day would have been the cause of night), but must be unconditional. Thus Mill in recognising the unconditional character of the cause has indirectly introduced into the idea of causality the notion of efficiency or power and objective necessity, which Hume has emphatically denied.

(4) **Kant's View** :— Kant tries to save philosophy from the sceptical conclusion of Hume. Causality, according to Kant, is a case of an objective succession of events which is irreversible. As it is irreversible, it is necessary. The rule determining the succession of events determines the 'being' of every event by making it conditioned by what precedes it. So causality involves necessity. Secondly, propositions stating causal connections are not wholly derived from experience. 'Causality' is a category (of the mind) which is necessarily presupposed by experience. Experience presupposes the law of causality which determines the succession of events. So causality involves necessity. Thirdly, necessity implies objectivity, and what is objective must have genuine universal validity. Thus Kant has criticised Hume by showing that causality is a necessary and objective relation which determines the events of the world of experience. Causation is not merely invariable succession nor accidental conjunction of two events,

but necessary connection between them. "It is not an abstract concept generalised from our experience of succession of events, as Hume supposed. It is our a priori category of the understanding which it is compelled to apply to phenomena which invariably succeed each other in conformity with a definite rule, whose sequence is irreversible and therefore objective and necessary." (J. N. Sinha: Introduction to Philosophy)

But Kant's view that causal relation is objective is only 'apparent', because, according to him, causality is real only within the range of experience, it is not applicable to the things-in-themselves or noumena behind phenomena. So causality has no ontological reality i.e. there is no causality in things-in-themselves. In other words, causality, according to Kant, is an apriori form or category of mind which can be applied only to the phenomenal world, but cannot reach reality. The causal relation, according to him, is not objective in the proper sense of the term, because like Hume he remains contented with the limits of experience. So we find that Kant fails to answer the difficulty raised by Hume.

(5) **Hegel and Martineau's View** :—According to Hegel and Martineau, the changes that take place in nature are directed towards a definite end or purpose. So there must be some reason for every change in nature, it is not a matter of chance or blind necessity. There must be an intelligent principle which guides and regulates the sequence of events of nature for realising some purpose. Thus Hegel and Martineau contend that all causality is will-causality. God who is the ultimate spiritual reality determines the process of all things for the realisation of some end. According to Hegel, causality is not a mere category of human mind, but it is also a category of reality, an objective ex-

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pression of the Absolute Spirit, who accounts for the regular, orderly and systematic changes of nature. "There is an immanent purposiveness in the heart of all things and this explains why there are changes in the universe. Causality according to these thinkers is always finality. All things, physical and mental, remain as parts of an intelligent plan or purpose, which is being realized through the different levels of the evolution of the world". (S. P. Chakravarty : An Introduction to General Philosophy)

This idealistic and teleological view of Hegel and Martineau offers a satisfactory explanation about the real nature of causal relation. Indeed, the order, harmony, unity and design prevailing in the different objects of the world prove that the world is not the product of mere blind and mechanical forces of matter, but it is due to the guidance of a supreme purposive intelligent or conscious power. The succession of the world-events, of course, is a mechanical process i.e. from the cause which is antecedent to the effect which is consequent. When one event is continuous with other events, the process, no doubt, is mechanical, but it has also a spiritual or teleological significance as the events tend towards the realisation of the supreme spirit. The 'how' aspect of the world-course requires mechanical explanation and the 'why' aspect requires teleological explanation.

PLURALISM, DUALISM AND MONISM

Q. 1. Give a critical account of the theory of pluralism or of the pluralistic view of the universe.

Every object of the world has two aspects—one is the external or sensible aspect called appearance or phenomenon and the other the internal or super-sensuous aspect called reality or noumenon which underlies the sensuous aspect or surface show of things. It is the business of philosophy to investigate the nature of reality underlying the surface show of things.

Now, the question is whether there is only one ultimate reality of the universe or there are two or many realities. The theory which recognises only one ultimate reality of the universe is called **Monism**; the theory which recognises only two mutually independent realities or substances is called **Dualism**; and the theory which recognises innumerable realities or substances is called **Pluralism**.

Pluralism: According to this theory, there is a plurality of self-existent, mutually independent and distinct, eternal realities in the universe. Common people cherish this pluralistic view of the universe as they come across diversities or multiplicity of objects in their experience which they accept as independent realities, but they do not realise any fundamental unity underlying the plurality.

Pluralism is mainly of three forms—(1) **Materialistic Atomism**, (2) **Spiritualistic Atomism** and (3) **Neo-Realism**.

(1) **Materialistic Atomism** :—According to this theory, there is an infinite number of material atoms which are eternal, self-existent, independent, indestructible and indivisible. These material atoms are the ultimate realities which compose all objects of the world. In other words, the universe is a mechanical aggregate or conglomeration of an infinite number of self-existent and independent atoms distributed at random through space. All beings, inanimate and animate, unconscious and conscious, are produced by the random working or fortuitous combinations of these material atoms. Hence the infinite number of material atoms are the ultimate realities which lie at the root of all things of the world including life, mind, society, art and religion which are all the products of the spontaneous concurrence of atoms through the random play of the mechanical forces of attraction and repulsion. The atomists do not recognise the existence of God ; according to them, the creation, preservation and dissolution of the world i.e. all things and events of the world take place quite mechanically through the operation of the self-existent material atoms ; there is no intelligent agent or conscious will-power guiding the world process.

Criticism :—The theory of materialistic atomism is not satisfactory. Life and mind cannot be evolved from the combinations of the material elements. Life is essentially of different nature from the material elements ; the free movement, self-determination, self-development, self-reparation and self-reproduction which are the essential characteristics of life are conspicuously absent from matter. Similarly, mind also is essentially different from matter ; mind is conscious, while matter is unconscious. Hence life and mind cannot originate from the constituent elements of matter. Matter and its elements may afford

suitable and appropriate conditions or grounds for the evolution and manifestation of life and mind, but the material atoms themselves cannot create or produce life and mind. Moreover, the world which exhibits wonderful unity and harmony, order and design, cannot be the product of blind physical atoms. So this theory without recognising the existence of an intelligent guiding principle leaves too much to chance. On the other hand, we find in our experience that our material body is greatly influenced by mind and the material atoms themselves can be known with the help of mind or consciousness; we cannot use matter to explain mind, rather it is mind which can explain the existence and nature of matter. Hence we must hold that it cannot be the material atoms from which the world of nature, life and mind has been derived; rather there must be a supreme conscious reality from which matter, life and mind have been evolved. This supreme reality or substance is none but God. The world of diversities has been evolved from God and is sustained by Him. God has been regulating the course of the evolution of the world according to certain plan and purpose by making use of the material atoms as necessary means and thus He has been realising his own perfection in and through the evolution of the world.

(2) **Spiritual Atomism** ;—This theory also is a kind of pluralism. According to this theory, the ultimate elements of the world are innumerable spiritual atoms or monads which are all non-material in character. Leibniz, a German philosopher, propounded this view. According to him, the world is constituted by infinite number of monads which are indivisible, self-existent and self-active, mutually independent and self-centred, spiritual units or forces. Of course, though the monads or spiritual atoms are essentially

spiritual or psychical entities, yet consciousness is not equally manifest in all of them. "Every monad has the power of perception or representation ; it perceives or represents and expresses the entire universe. In this sense it is a world in miniature, a microcosm ; it is a living mirror of the universe, a concentrated world, a world for itself. But each monad represents the universe in its own way, from its own point of view, with different degrees of clearness, it is limited, an individual, and has other individuals outside it." Again, as each monad is independent and self-centred, it is not determined from without ; it is windowless, so nothing from outside can ever come into it ; everything is potential or implicit in it. So the monads cannot act upon one another. But though the monads are absolutely free from external influences, yet there are such unity and harmony among them that any change occurring in one of them has its reflection in another. According to Leibniz, it is God, the monad of all monads, who pre-established unity and harmony among the monads at the time of creating them. All the monads were created by God who pre-adjusted them to one another. "God alone is the primary unity or original simple substance, from which all monads, created and derived, are produced, and are born, so to speak, by continual fulgurations of the Divinity." (Leibniz).

Criticism :—If the monads are created by God and their mutual relation is pre-determined and pre-adjusted by God, then the monads cannot be really ultimate realities or substances. Hence the theory of spiritual atomism as propounded by Leibniz cannot be in fact a form of pluralism, it is fundamentally a kind of monism as it assumes only one ultimate reality which is the existence of God through whose will the monads attained their reality. Thus

Leibniz ultimately denied the absolute independence and freedom of the monads by making them dependent on the Supreme Moand, God.

(3) Neo-Realism : This theory also is a form of pluralism as it recognises the independent realities of the diversities of material objects as well as many conscious entities. According to this theory, the manifold things and events of the both the physical and mental worlds are all discrete and mutually independent entities which are not at all internally and organically related into a system ; the world instead of being an organic unity is a loose aggregate of many independent reals which are only externally related. As the objects of the world are externally related to one another, they are not dependent on or fundamentally affected by their relations. So the view of external relations as advocated by the neo-realists leads logically to a pluralistic theory of the world.

Criticism : The theory of neo-realism cannot be fully supported, because we cannot admit only external relations amongst the different objects. There are also internal relations which prove that there is a fundamental unity underlying the diversities of things and events of the world. In fact, there is in the universe only one supreme reality which is a principle of a concrete unity organizing and co-ordinating the plurality of things and events of the world process into an all-comprehensive system.

Q. 2. Explain and examine the metaphysical theory of Dualism.

According to the theory of dualism, there are two kinds of mutually independent substances or realities. Some say that these two kinds of realities are matter and mind or body and mind ; again, some say that these two are God and matter or Purusa and Prakriti.

In Indian philosophy the Nyaya system holds that God is the efficient cause, and matter the material cause, of the world ; God and matter are two different realities. The Sankhya system holds that the realities of the world are Purusa or Selves and Prakriti ; Prakriti is material, unconscious and active, while Purusa is immaterial, conscious and passive ; Prakriti undergoes change or modification, while Purusa is unchangeable and immutable. Prakriti and its different products are the objects of Purusa's enjoyment.

In western philosophy Plato and Aristotle introduced the theory of dualism by regarding God and Matter as two independent entities. In later times, Descartes revived dualism by admitting matter or body and mind as two substances radically different from and independent of each other. In his view, body and mind are diametrically opposed to each other, because the essential attribute of body is extension devoid of consciousness and the essential attribute of mind is thought or consciousness devoid of extension ; mind is free and is regulated by its inherent purpose or will, but matter or body has no free motion of its own, it is wholly determined by mechanical laws

The main defect of the theory of dualism is that if body and mind be essentially distinct, independent and opposite entities, then it is difficult to explain the close connection and interaction that we find between them in our everyday experiences. Descartes, of course, said that mind and body act upon each other in the pineal gland located in the brain which is the seat of both mind and body. He realised that thought and extension can be combined, in man, in unity of composition, but not in unity of nature. Descartes' idea here seems to be that the relation between mind and body is not such that a physical state becomes a mental state or vice versa, but the mind, according to him,

is simply troubled by the organic processes. His obscurity and vacillation on this point are due to his desire to explain the material world on purely mechanical principle and at the same time leave a place for the action of a spiritual principle.

Geulincx and Malebranche, the two followers of Descartes, introduced the theory of occasionalism in order to remedy the defects of interactionism. According to occasionalism, though mind and body are opposed to each other, there is a correspondence between them, and this correspondence is brought about at every time and in every case directly by God. When changes arise in the body of a particular person, God makes corresponding sensations arise in the mind of that person. Again, whenever there is desire in the mind of a person, God produces the corresponding movement in the body of that person. But this theory of occasionalism is not satisfactory as it reduces God to a mere constant instrument to the needs of mankind, and it believes in perpetual miracle, for it asserts constant intervention of God.

Leibniz expounded the theory of pre-established harmony, according to which God pre-adjusted body and mind to each other and pre-established a harmony between the two in such a way at the time of the creation of the world that the two always correspond to each other without any further divine intervention. "The soul follows its own laws, and the body its own likewise, and they accord by virtue of the harmony pre-established among all substances (monads). There is a perfect harmony between the perceptions of the monad and the motions of the bodies, pre-established at the outset between the system of efficient causes (bodies) and the system of final causes (minds)." But the theory of pre-established

harmony involves the same difficulty as occasionalism. While occasionalism speaks of perpetual miracle through constant intervention of God, the theory of pre-established harmony admits of only one miracle when God pre-established harmony between two heterogeneous substances like mind and body at the time of creation. But how is it possible for God to establish a harmony between two entirely opposite substances ?

Spinoza expounded the theory of parallelism in order to avoid the difficulties involved in Descartes' dualism and interactionism. According to Spinoza, mind and body are not two distinct substances ; God is the only absolute substance and besides God there is no other substance at all ; mind (or thought) and body (or extension) are two parallel attributes or correlative aspects of one and the same substance, God. Interaction or connection causal between mind and body or their mutual influence is not possible. Yet there is a very close relation between them, because the two are the parallel attributes or manifestations of one and the same reality. Wherever there is any action or change in the body, there is corresponding action or change in the mind ; and vice versa. The correlation or parallelism between mind and body is thorough-going and universal. Every psychosis has its corresponding neurosis. The order and connection of the physical realm is the same as the order and connection of the psychic realm ; "the order of the actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind". Thus in the system of Spinoza, the dualism of substance disappears, but the dualism of attributes remains. Thought and extension are not the attributes of separate substances, but are merged with these in God. Spencer also holds that the mental and

bodily phenomena are two parallel series, but, according to him, the ultimate substance which appears in these two parallel series is unknown and unknowable.

But the theory of parallelism cannot adequately explain why mind (thought) and body (extension) which are essentially different from each other should have concomitance or correspondence with each other at all as two parallel series. So in order to give a satisfactory explanation of the relation between mind and body, we must abandon the dualism of substances or attributes i. e. dualism of any kind, and should accept the view that body or matter and mind are the different stages of the self-expressions of one Supreme Mind or Spirit. Thus body and mind, being the manifestations of the same supreme reality, must be organically related to each other and so interaction between them is also possible. Mind acts upon the body for its self-expression, and the body acts upon mind to help it realise its end. One universal supreme spirit (God) which is the ultimate reality of the universe differentiates itself into the world of matter and mind as its necessary stages of self-expression. So, mind and body are the same in kind and there is a perfect community between them ; the two being co-substantial, correspondence or interaction between the two is easily conceivable.

Q. 3. Explain the theory of Monism and its different forms.

The theory which admits only one ultimate reality or fundamental principle of the universe is called monism. According to this theory, there is only one supreme reality or absolute substance underlying the different things of the world and the whole world is derived from and dependent upon one ultimate principle or reality apart from which nothing else can have distinct and self-existent entity. All

objects of the world are evolved out of one absolute reality. The monists hold that the different objects of the world are internally or organically related to one another, and these internal relations amongst the different objects prove that there is one absolute substance or supreme reality which brings about unity and harmony amongst the diversities of the world by organizing them into a system. This unifying principle, according to the monists, is one, eternal and absolute substance or reality.

Monism has three main forms—(1) **Abstract Monism**, (2) **Conditional Dualism** and (3) **Concrete Monism**.

(1) **Abstract Monism** :—According to this theory, there is one absolute substance which is the only reality ; the world and living beings have no substantial existence of their own ; the diversities of the world are unreal and illusory appearances. Thus the theory of abstract monism admits the reality of only one substance and denies the many ; the world of plurality has no reality outside the one absolute substance nor within it as its different constituent parts. In Western Philosophy Spinoza and in Indian Philosophy Sankara, the founder of the Advaita Vedanta, are the main advocates of abstract monism.

According to Spinoza, God is the only absolute substance, He is infinite and eternal ; He is wholly immanent in the world and men ; all is God and God is all i. e. the world is God and God is the world. Thus Spinoza holds that God or the absolute substance, being identical with the world-process and being its essence or indwelling spirit, anything distinct from God is not a reality but an unreal appearance or illusion. God is the only reality, the world of things and minds are simply aspects or modes of Him, these have no substantial existence of their own ; all finite beings are merged and swallowed up in the reality

of God who is the only substance. Thus Spinoza lays so much emphasis on the immanence of God that he virtually denies the reality to all things of the world. His view is called abstract monism in as much as it abstracts the one from the many and admits the reality of the one only at the cost of the many.

In India, the Upanisads and the Advaita Vedanta Philosophy hold abstract monism, because Brahma or Atman is regarded as the sole reality without any second. The world, according to the Sankara Vedanta, is an unreal and illusory appearance ; the reality is one without any second and the appearance of the many is due to our ignorance.

But the theory of abstract monism is not satisfactory, because pure unity without the plurality of objects is a meaningless abstraction ; the one absolute substance abstracted from the finite things and beings is an empty being, a pure void, practically amounting to non-entity. If God does not express Himself in and through diverse objects, He will be a meaningless abstract unity devoid of objective contents. In fact, God, instead of being an abstract unity, must be admitted as a concrete unity who objectifies Himself in and through the plurality of the things and beings and realises His development, richness and fulfilment through them. Abstract monism overlooks this important aspect.

(2) **Conditional Dualism** ;—This theory recognises only one eternal and self-existent supreme reality, but, according to this theory, another sphere of existence has been created by this supreme and absolute reality and after creation it has got an independent existence apart from the supreme Being. Before the creation of the world, God, the supreme Being, eternally existed in His perfect and self-contained

reality as an infinite, immutable, omniscient and omnipotent self-conscious Being. Though He is essentially perfect and self-contained and has no personal wants or needs, yet at a certain point of time He created the world and living beings out of nothing in accordance with His own will for giving joy and happiness to the living beings. Thereafter, He imparted forces into the world and invested the selves with free wills or volitions, and thus the world including the living beings attained its separate and independent existence outside Him and has been running on by itself in accordance with its inherent laws and forces without constant divine intervention.

But the theory of conditional dualism is not satisfactory. It assumes that 'the world was created in time, prior to which its Divine cause existed from eternity without it.' Now the question is—Why did God create the world at that particular time? Dr. H. Stephens truly remarks, "If God existed from all pre-eternity without a world, it is difficult to understand why he became active and creative at a particular point? What need had God for a world at this point? Why did He not continue wrapt up in His own self-sufficient unity for all post-eternity?" If He had no want or need of His own (which He as a perfect Being should not have), then did He create the world out of His whim or arbitrariness? Secondly, God being infinite, there can be nothing outside Him. But this theory assumes that God instead of remaining inside the world becomes completely transcendent and external to it. In this case God becomes limited by the world and He loses His infinitude. Hence at least for the preservation of the infinite and unlimited character of God we cannot conceive anything outside Him. We must admit that God as an infinite being is immanent in the world and at the same time transcends it.

(3) **Concrete Monism** :—According to this theory, there is one supreme reality unifying and organizing the many into one all-comprehensive system ; unity and plurality both are real, but they are so internally related that they are organized and integrated into one harmonious whole. This theory emphatically holds that pure unity without the plurality of objects is a meaningless abstraction ; the one absolute substance abstracted from the finite things and beings is an empty being, a pure void, practically amounting to non-entity ; the reality is always unity-in-plurality ; one and many are correlative and necessary to each other, the world of plurality is the necessary expression or objectification of one supreme reality. So the ultimate reality of the universe is a concrete-Individual, because the reality always realises itself by unifying and co-ordinating the diverse objects into one concrete whole.

The main exponents of concrete monism are Hegel, Caird and Royce in Western Philosophy and Ramanuja in Indian Philosophy. According to them, God is the ultimate reality ; but He is not an abstract Being, but a principle of unity-in plurality. All things of the world are real as they are the necessary parts of the Divine Life. Both the world and finite selves are the objective expressions of God, and He has been eternally realising His own Self and His supreme purpose in and through them. It is the essential nature of the Divine Spirit to comprehend the world and selves within its perfect and infinite self as a concrete principle of unity-in-plurality. Indeed, God is a supremely perfect and concrete Being ; He is immanent in the world and finite spirits because these are His objective expressions ; again, He transcends them as their superme ideal. The diversities of the world and spirits are evolved by God and are sustained or preserved within

Him ; again, God Himself as a concrete Individual necessarily unfolds Himself in and through the plurality of things and beings and realises His development, richness and fulfilment through them. "God as a dynamic reality realises His own nature by differentiating Himself into the world of things and minds with its attributes and relations, for therein lie His self-realisation and self-fulfilment." Thus concrete monism recognises only one fundamental reality of God who, of course, does not negate the contents of the universe and thus become a mere abstract power by swallowing up the substantial existence of the world of finite beings, but realises His concrete nature by eternally evolving out of His own infinite being the world of things and minds and giving them reality of different degrees. "The world of things and minds instead of being absorbed in the all inclusive reality of God, enjoys relative reality, discharges its function and realises its values within the concrete reality of God."

Hence concrete monism is a very satisfactory theory regarding the nature of the ultimate reality of the world.

MATTER AND THEORIES OF MATTER

Q. 1. What is Matter ? Give an account of the ancient and modern views or Theories of matter.

The things which we perceive with our external sense-organs and which we find to occupy certain portion of space are generally called material objects. The ultimate stuff which compose these objects is called 'matter.' The forms or shapes of objects may vary, but matter which constitutes their basal stuff is unchangeable and indestructible. When a tree is cut into pieces and burnt, it is reduced to ashes. Thus the tree, no doubt, becomes extinct, but the material stuff of the tree remains intact, within the ashes, it does not become extinct. The primary qualities of matter include extension, mobility, impenetrability, etc. ; while the qualities like sound, colour, taste, smell etc. which are produced due to the actions of the primary qualities upon our senses are called the secondary qualities.

(1) Ancient Theories of Matter :—The earliest philosophers of ancient Greece were materialists. According to them, matter is the ultimate reality or stuff of the entire universe, and out of matter the different kinds of objects including even life and mind have gradually come into being. Some held that the universe is composed of one kind of material stuff ; while others held that it is composed of more than one kind of basal elements. The ultimate and basal element of matter composing the world is, according to Thales, water ; according to Anaximenes, air ; and, according to Heraclitus, fire. On the other hand, according to Empedocles, the world is composed not of
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one kind of material particles, but of four elements—earth, air, fire and water. The composition and decomposition of objects are due to the mixing and unmixing of these four elements on which two kinds of forces—love and hate act from outside, because matter, according to him, is absolutely dead without any principle of motion in itself.

Leucippus and Democritus were the first philosophers of ancient Greece who introduced atomism. According to them, the world is composed of infinite number of indivisible and indestructible material particles called atoms which are too small to be perceptible to the senses. "They (the atoms) are entirely non-qualitative, the only differences between them being differences of quantity. They differ in size, some being larger, some smaller. And they likewise differ in shape. Since the ultimate particles of things thus possess no quality, all the actual qualities of objects must be due to the arrangement and position of the atoms" (Stace). Of course, the atoms have no power of motion in themselves; they are acted upon by external forces. It was Anaxagoras who maintained that the atoms differ not only in quantity, but also in quality and kind, e.g. the atoms of gold are of different kind from the atoms of wood. He differed from the atomists in another respect. The atomists regarded the forces as completely material, but, according to Anaxagoras, the moving force is essentially non-physical and incorporeal: "It is called *Nous*, that is, mind or intelligence. It is intelligence which produces the movement in things which brings about the formation of the world. What was it, now, which led Anaxagoras to the doctrine of a world-governing intelligence? It seems that he was struck with the apparent design, order, beauty and harmony of the universe. These things, he thought, could not be accounted for by blind forces." (Stace).

Thus this is the brief account of the ancient western theories regarding the nature and constitution of matter.

(2) Modern Theories of Matter :—In modern philosophy, we find, Descartes discusses the nature of matter which, according to him, is an extended substance governed by mechanical laws. Locke admits the existence of matter as the unknown support or substratum of the perceived physical qualities. But Berkeley rejects Locke's unknown and unknowable material substance, because, according to him (Berkeley), a thing in order to exist must be perceived by the mind. So matter as an imperceptible substratum is a meaningless abstraction, a non-entity ; it is nothing but a group of ideas in the mind.

But these views of matter are not supported by scientific researches and experiments. The researches that are being made in modern times regarding the nature and constitution of matter have yielded the following two kinds of theories —(a) **Atomic Theory or Static Theory of Matter** and (b) **Dynamic Theory of Matter**.

(a) The Atomic Theory or Static Theory of Matter :—In the earlier part of the nineteenth century it was Dalton who revived the atomism of Democritus. According to him, if we go on dividing and subdividing a material body, we shall ultimately get such subtle and small particles or point as cannot be further divided into smaller units. These indivisible particles or elements of matter are called atoms. The atoms are entirely passive and inert and devoid of any inherent force or motion. But they can shift from one position to another due to the external forces acting upon them. As the atoms were regarded by Dalton as static without any inherent force or motion, his atomism is also described as the static theory of matter.

(b) **The Dynamic Theory of Matter** :—The recent researches and experiments in the field of science have clearly shown that the atoms are not passive and inert nor absolutely indivisible constituents of matter, but each of them is a complex structure of energies or a system of forces in equilibrium. So the essence of matter instead of being passivity and inertness, is energy or active power. Thus, according to Boscovitch and Faraday, the ultimate constituents of matter called atoms are not absolutely hard and impenetrable nor absolutely indivisible units, but are centres of force from which attractive and repellent forces operate according to fixed laws. According to Sir William Thomson (Lord Kelvin), the atoms are probably small Vortex-rings or whirlpools rotating in perfect fluid called ether. According to Ostwald, an atom is a more complex system of forces than Faraday's centre of force or Kelvin's Vortex-ring. An atom itself is made up of simpler units which revolve about one another and about a common centre with enormous rapidity. In fact, each atom is a very complicated structure which may be described as a little world in itself. The scientists like Rutherford, Bohr, etc, hold that an atom consists of electrical charges including one nucleus (proton) called positive electrical charge and one or more electrons called negative electrical charge or charges revolving round the nucleus. For examples, in the hydrogen atom only one electron is revolving round its central nucleus, so it is very light. On the other hand, in the uranium atom altogether ninety-two electrons are revolving round its nucleus, so it is very heavy. Thus modern science has proved that the atoms are not static, but dynamic in character ; energy or motion is their essence. The modern science having disproved the passivity and inertness of matter has practically dematerialised matter.

Q 2. Explain and Examine Materialism or the materialistic view of the world.

Materialism is a theory of the universe, according to which the whole universe including life and mind is constituted by matter and its force. Matter is regarded as the only ultimate reality or stuff from which all things and beings are derived. This theory assumes an infinite number of atoms as the constituent elements of matter. These atoms are eternal, self-existent, indestructible and indivisible units of matter. All beings, inanimate and animate, unconscious and conscious, are produced by the accidental and mechanical combinations of these material atoms. Materialism holds that matter lies at the root of all things of the world including life, mind, society, art and religion which are all the products of the redistribution of matter and motion.

The following are the main propositions of materialism :

(a) Life arose spontaneously out of non-living matter. Life or vitality is not at all a unique mysterious entity quite distinct from the material forces. The living organism is a mere physico-chemical machine produced from the material elements and the functions of a living body can be analysed and explained in terms of physico-chemical processes. The protoplasmic cells which are the sources of life have been produced through the fortuitous combination and interaction of some physical and chemical elements like carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, etc, and out of these protoplasmic cells the various species of living beings have been gradually evolved.

(b) Mind is the function and product of the brain which is material in character. So mind also has no substantial reality independent of the bodily functions ; it is only an

epiphenomenon or a by-product of the brain matter. Behaviourism which is an extreme form of materialism goes so far as to deny the existence of mind or consciousness and explain the so-called mental phenomena in terms of bodily or nervous behaviours which are all organic reaction in responses to the stimuli. Thus, according to materialism, there is no freedom of will or free choice in the behaviours of the living beings which are entirely determined by the preceding physical and physiological forces and conditions.

(c) The process of the evolution of nature, life and mind takes place quite mechanically through the operation of the self-existent matter and its inherent force and motion ; all things, even life and mind, are evolved by mere chance combination of material particles through the random play of the mechanical forces of attraction and repulsion ; there is no intelligent agent or conscious will-power guiding the process of evolution. Matter, motion and force—these three primordial elements alone determine the origin and evolution of the world including life and mind, and the whole process is mechanical and automatic without being determined and regulated by any creative idea or thought. From this materialistic account of mechanical evolution we find that, as all things are derived from matter, so there is no gap or break in the process of evolution, no gap between matter and life or between life and mind ; the process of evolution is a continuous chain ; and, secondly, every successive stage of evolution is a mere repetition in more complex form of the antecedent stage without the emergence of any new and novel qualities in the course of evolution.

(d) As all things arise from matter, so there can be no immaterial soul and its immortality nor supernatural power like God and spirits. In other words, there can be no

other world' beyond the spatio-temporal world of nature.

(e) The moral ideal advocated by the materialists consists in the enjoyment of the greatest amount of pleasure. Thus the materialists preach the hedonistic ethics.

Criticism :—The theory of materialism involves many difficulties. It assumes everything and explains nothing. This theory is not acceptable for the following reasons :—

(a) Life cannot be the product of lifeless matter as held by the materialists. A living body is endowed with the powers or processes of irritability, self-preservation, self-reparation, self-reproduction, self-development and free movement, but these characteristics are absent from the constitution and function of lifeless matter. Hence life cannot arise from lifeless matter. Matter may afford suitable conditions for the appearance of life, but it does not directly produce life. Even when we find that living germs appear in rotten material bodies, we should not hold that the rotten matter produces the germs, but the germs were already in the atmosphere, and the rotten substances are mere conditions which help the manifestation of the germs.

(b) The account of the origin of mind or consciousness as given by the materialists is also unsatisfactory. Mind is essentially different from matter ; mind is conscious, while matter is unconscious. Hence mind cannot originate from matter. On the contrary, we find that mind, instead of being explained by matter, controls and directs material bodies. While criticising the materialistic hypothesis, John Caird rightly remarks, "You cannot get to mind as an ultimate product of matter, for in the very attempt to do so, you have already begun with mind. The earliest step of any such inquiry involves categories of thought,

and it is in terms of thought that the very problem you are investigating can be so much as stated." In deducing mind from the material atoms, atoms themselves must have to be thought, and this thought necessarily implies mind as the explanatory ground of matter. So materialism leads to *petitio principii*. Moreover, matter which is a lower category cannot explain the higher categories like mind or consciousness.

(c) The theory of mechanical evolution of the world as advocated by the materialists cannot be supported. The world which exhibits wonderful unity and harmony, order and design, cannot be the product of blind and accidental physical or mechanical force; the beauty, order and harmony of the world-system can be explained only with reference to some creative thought or intelligent purpose which acts as the guiding principle of the world-evolution.

(d) As to the moral ideal of the materialists we should say that man as a rational being cannot accept the ideal of mere pleasure which is sensual in character, but should seek the realization of the perfection of his whole self, both rational and sentient.

(e) Lastly, matter which is, according to materialism, the ultimate reality, has been dematerialised in modern science. Matter is no longer the gross and inert object of our perception; atoms are not static, but dynamic in character; energy or motion is their essence. Thus the modern science having disproved the passivity and inertness of matter has practically dematerialised matter.

LIFE

Q. 1. Distinguish between mechanism or a machine and life or an organism.

Or

Distinguish between living and non-living things.

A lifeless machine and a living organism—both are the wholes consisting of different parts or organs. As a machine is formed by the combination of some material parts and performs certain function, so a living organism also, being constituted by a peculiar combination of the different limbs and organs, produces a result and performs certain functions. Thus in both a machine and an organism the different parts are properly arranged and related in a harmonious and well-ordered unity. So the materialistic and mechanistic thinkers hold that a machine and a living body are the same in kind or quality, and life is a mere subtle and complex form of matter. According to them, life is not at all a mysterious principle quite distinct from matter and its force, but it has been produced by matter itself.

But this view of the materialists cannot be supported. If we analyse the characteristics of both a machine and a living organism, we find that they fundamentally differ not only in degree or quantity but also in kind or quality. The points of difference that we notice between a machine and a living body are the following :—

(a) A machine is a mere artificial combination or organisation of its different parts, because the parts existed independently before the production or construction of

the machine and can again exist intact independently after being separated from the machine. On the other hand, a living organism is a natural combination or composition of its organs and limbs, because no organ or limb can exist apart from, and independent of, the living body. Thus in the case of a machine the parts have more importance, as these precede the whole, and the machine is made out of the pre-existing parts which are externally adjusted to one another; but in the case of a living body the whole has more importance as it precedes and vitalizes its organs which are internally adapted to one another as a result of the differentiation of the organism itself. In other words, the machine depends upon its parts, but in the case of an organism the whole is as much necessary to its parts as the parts are necessary to the whole. Moreover, the different parts of a machine are combined and adjusted to one another by an external agent or workman and thus can form a whole. But the different parts of a living organism are evolved as a result of the inherent power or function of the organism as a whole; the different organs are influenced and controlled by the internal organizing power of the living body and thus attain mutual co-ordination and unity.

(b) A machine has no purpose of its own; it simply serves the purpose or need by which the artificer or workman is prompted to make it and put motion to it. On the other hand, a living organism has its own end or purpose immanent in it and is prompted by its inherent power to move and work in order to realise its own end. A living organism has its inherent power to function on its own initiative, but a lifeless machine has no such power of its own but requires regulation from an external agent who puts motion to it from without.

(c) Lastly, a living body has the powers of self-preservation, self-riparation, self-reproduction, self-evolution or self-improvement through assimilation of materials from without and development from within, free movement, spontaneity and variation in response to the environment ; but these characteristics are absent from the constitution and function of a lifeless machine. "Life is self-adjusting, self-maintaining, self-preserving and self-perpetuating, There is nothing like this in the mechanical world. Machines do not adjust, maintain, preserve or perpetuate themselves." (Patrick).

In this connection John Caird very aptly remarks, "In organic structures we find not only the idea of system, but also the idea of system which is self-developed-in other words, not only of a unity of diversified parts or elements correlated by one principle, but of a unity which is due to the self-activity of that principle. We can conceive in mere inorganic matter a systematic order imposed from without and maintained simply by the action of inorganic forces. Every human construction, such as a house or a piece of mechanism, is an order of this kind, for it is the arrangement of dissimilar parts for the realization of a common idea or plan. But in all such construction, the idea or plan is something foreign to the nature of the separate parts or materials by means of which it is realizedThe stone, the wood, the lime, which compose the house have nothing in themselves which makes it necessary that they should be combined in the house." "In a complex living organism it is quite otherwise. Here we come upon the conception of unity of which the idea or end is not arbitrarily imposed from without, on certain independent materials, but it is the result of an internal spontaneity or self-activity, working out diversities of member,

form, function, from its own inherent self-producing energy, and, form at the same time, in the act of differentiating, reintegrating its diversities into the common unity. Here, instead of the end being outward and accidental to the means, it is their own immanent end; instead of the parts being used up for the production of the end, we have membered totality in the production and maintenance of which the parts have their own natural fulfilment or realization."

Q 2. Explain and examine the different theories of the origin of life.

Or

Discuss the relative merits and demerits of Mechanism and Vitalism as theories of the origin of life.

Or

Distinguish between the Abiogenesis or Mechanistic and Biogenesis or Vitalistic theories of Life. Is idealistic or teleological account of life more consistent than either of them ?

With regard to the origin of life there are three different theories—(1) Mechanism or Abiogenesis Theory, (2) Vitalism or Biogenesis Theory and (3) Idealism or Teleological Theory.

(1) **Mechanism or Abiogenesis Theory** :—According to this theory, life has originated spontaneously from non-living matter. Life or vitality is not at all a unique mysterious entity quite distinct from the material force ; life has been produced as a result of the operation of the material forces. According to the mechanists, the living organism is a mere physico-chemical machine produced from the material elements ; and the functions of a living body can be analysed and explained in terms of physico-chemical

processes. The protoplasmic cells which are the sources of life have been produced through the fortuitous or accidental combination and interaction of some physical and chemical elements like Carbon, Hydrogen, Oxygen, Nitrogen, etc. and out of these protoplasmic cells the various species of living beings have been gradually evolved. So the mechanists try to explain that a living organism is a complex physical and chemical machine whose behaviour can be analysed into physico-chemical processes. "Life is not a mysterious entity radically different from the ordinary processes of activity and movement that are observed in the living organism. Life is what life does. If the behaviour of the organism can be explained in terms of mechanistic causation, then life is said to be explained. It is claimed that many so-called vital phenomena-respiration, circulation, digestion, etc. have been so explained. We have every reason to believe that all vital movements will, sooner or later, be explained mechanically with the progress of human knowledge." (S. P. Chakravarty: An Introduction to General Philosophy).

Thus, according to the mechanistic or abiogenesis theory, living and non-living bodies do not differ in kind or quality; they differ only in the degrees of complexity. The mechanists have established their view on the basis of the following arguments:—

(a) The living organisms, just like non-living bodies, are subject to the laws of Nature; so it is reasonable and scientific to explain life mechanically in terms of physical and chemical and processes, it is not necessary to assume any supernatural mysterious principle or *forte* in order to explain the origin and nature of life.

(b) In modern times the various vital processes like the spontaneous response of the organism to external stimuli,

the growth of different organs and muscles, etc. are being explained mechanically. So it is hoped that with the all-round progress of the biological sciences the mechanical explanation of all the vitalistic processes will be possible.

(c) If we can furnish mechanical explanation of the different processes and functions of life, then it will be intelligible to us, it will no longer remain difficult and mysterious. So the mechanical account of the origin and nature of life is the most natural, progressive and ideal explanation.

(d) Vital force entirely depends upon the constitution of the body ; with the growth of physical strength vitality is increased ; again, with physical decay there is decrease of vitality. From these it can be concluded that life has come out of non-living matter.

Criticism :—The mechanists are right when they contend that life is not a mysterious entity completely different and isolated from other levels of existence, but there is continuity of structures and functions between the inorganic and the organic. Again, the mechanistic theory rightly recognises that life is what life does. Thus the mechanistic method is ever progressive, scientific and easily intelligible. But when it asserts that life is the product of lifeless matter, it is surely defective and open to serious objections. The mechanists wrongly hold that the elementary forms of life, known as protoplasms, are formed through the accidental combination of the atoms of certain physico-chemical elements. John Caird rightly criticises the mechanistic view by saying, "The protoplasm which can be analysed and of which the chemical constitution is known, is not living but dead protoplasm, whilst that protoplasm which can be designated living though containing similar elements with that which is not living, manifests qualities or func-

tions that are totally new, and which, therefore, cannot be ascribed to its merely chemical or "physical composition." Secondly, the mechanists have admitted only difference of degree between matter and life. But, in fact, matter and life also differ in kind or quality. Indeed, a living body is endowed with the powers or processes of irritability, self-preservation, self-reparation, self-reproduction, self-evolution or self-improvement through assimilation of materials from without and development from within, free movement, spontaneity and variation in response to the environment ; but these characteristics are absent from the constitution and function of lifeless matter. "Life is self-adjusting, self-maintaining, self-preserving and self-perpetuating. There is nothing like this in the mechanical world. Machines do not adjust, maintain, preserve or perpetuate themselves." (Patrick) Hence life cannot arise from lifeless matter. Lastly, matter may afford suitable conditions for the appearance of life, but it does not directly produce life. Even when we find that living germs appear in rotten material substances, we should not hold that the rotten matter produces the germs but the germs were already in the atmosphere, and the rotten substances are mere conditions which help the manifestation of the germs.

(2) **Vitalism or Biogenesis Theory** :—According to this theory, life has come out of the antecedent or previously existent life ; it can never arise from the non-living matter. Life cannot be explained mechanically in terms of matter and machine as it is, according to this view, a mysterious entity. Though life or vital force is necessarily located in the physical organism, yet life is radically distinct from the material body, it is not a mere subtle and complex form of material force. Matter and life, according to the vitalists, differ not only in degree, but also in kind or

quality. Life or vital force is a new quality or power quite distinct from the mechanical force. Indeed, a living body is endowed with the powers or processes of irritability, self-preservation, self-reparation, self-reproduction, self-evolution or self-improvement through assimilation of materials from without and development from within, free movement, spontaneity and variation in response to the environment, but these characteristics are absent from the constitution and function of lifeless matter. So the phenomena of life cannot be explained by mere mechanical forces and laws. There must be a mysterious, non-physical, special vital power which alone can explain the unique, novel and autonomous character of life. It is this vital force which alone can unify and co-ordinate the physical and chemical elements and regulate them to realize a common end. So life cannot be likened to anything else. It cannot be deduced from matter and machine. The cause of life is life itself. It is *sui generis*.

Vitalism, again, is of two forms—old vitalism and new vitalism or neo-vitalism. In the writings of Aristotle we get old vitalism. He regarded life as the organizing power of the body. Subsequently, in the works of many philosophers of the medieval age this old vitalism was prevalent. According to this view, it is necessary to admit a distinct entity called 'vital principle' in addition to the material force. This vital principle cannot be detected by any experiment, and for this reason it cannot be explained by any mechanical and scientific process.

On the other hand, Hans Driesch, an eminent German biologist, has come to the conclusion with much experimental evidence that life cannot be explained by any mechanical process. Life, according to him, is an independent force, which cannot be formed by the combination

of mere inorganic elements. "Life is due to 'entelechy' or 'psychoïd'. Vital principle is mental in nature. It is a mental power that organizes the body. This doctrine is called neo-vitalism." (Dr. J. N. Sinha, Introduction to Philosophy)

Criticism :—Vitalism is right when it hints at the real essence and significance of life and its autonomy, but it is wrong when it denies that aspect of life which can be experimented upon by scientific investigations. Though life has some new and special characteristics, yet it cannot but be admitted that life is not completely isolated from matter, there is a very close relation and continuity between matter and life. The inseparable relation between matter and life has been to a great extent overlooked and under-estimated by the vitalists. Vitalism has failed to explain why life differs from matter. The real solution of this problem can be found in the teleological theory advocated by the idealists.

(3) **Idealism or Teleological Theory** :—According to this theory, the ultimate reality of the universe is an eternal, universal reason or supreme consciousness which gradually manifests itself for its self-realization through the successive stages of the evolution of matter, life and mind. The same supreme and absolute mental power manifests itself first in the mechanical forces of the inanimate material world, then in life as vital power, and lastly in the finite minds as conscious and intelligent power, with a view to realizing its own essential nature through these successive stages of evolution. The advocates of the teleological theory rightly recognises that though matter is not the cause of life, yet it is the necessary condition or the preparatory stage for the manifestation of life as life appears as a necessary stage next to matter in the self-expression of the supreme spirit, matter is only the instrument for the appearance of life. Thus mechanism and vitalism are reconciled in teleology. Mechanism considers life from outside, and vitalism considers life from inside, but teleology considers life from both outside and inside and explains its true nature as one of the self-expressions of the Absolute Spirit.

THEORY OF EVOLUTION

Q. 1. What is Evolution ?

Evolution means process of change or development in a gradual or orderly manner. When a thing undergoes gradual and orderly change from its simple state to its complex state through the operation of its inherent forces or laws, it is said to have evolution. So evolution implies a gradual change from the implicit to the explicit, from the undeveloped to the developed state. Herbert Spencer says, "The process of evolution is always from a simpler to a more complex form, from an undifferentiated and homogeneous to a differentiated and heterogeneous state, from an indefinite and incoherent to a definite and coherent condition."

Q. 2. What is your reason for believing in the evolutionary process of the world ?

There are two opposite theories of the origin of the world — **The Theory of Creation and the Theory of Evolution**. According to the theory of creation, the world was created by God at a particular period of time in the same form in which it now exists ; God created the world together with all things and beings all on a sudden in the remote past by mere act of His arbitrary will. But modern science does not support the theory of creation. The evidences furnished by the sciences like Astronomy, Geology and Biology clearly show that the world in its first stage was not a finished product, but it has been gradually evolved in successive stages of matter, life and mind from a lower

and simpler condition. Modern scientists contend that the various classes of things and beings which are found in the world in the present time did not exist in the same forms before. The present conditions of the world have been the result of slow and gradual process of evolution. The things and beings of the world were not created all on a sudden at some point of time in the past. The various classes of the objects of the world have been produced and are being produced by a gradual evolution from lower to higher forms and from simpler to more complex ones through some inherent forces according to some fixed laws. So modern science favours the theory of evolution and negates the theory of creation.

Q. 3. Give a brief account of the Mechanical and Teleological Theories of Evolution.

According to the theory of evolution, the various classes of things and beings which are found in the world in the present time did not exist in the same forms before or God did not create these things in the same forms at a particular period of time in the remote past. The present conditions of the world have been the result of the gradual process of evolution. The things and beings of the world were not created all on a sudden at some point of time in the past. The things composing the present world-system have been evolved or manifested as a result of the long-drawn process of evolution. The various classes of the objects of the world have been produced and are being produced by a gradual evolution from lower to higher forms and from simpler to more complex ones through some inherent forces according to some fixed laws.

Now, the question is—What is the nature of the inherent force which accounts for the gradual evolution of the different classes of the objects of the world? Is it merely blind, unconscious and mechanical material force or some conscious, intelligent and purposive mental or spiritual power? Is the process of the evolution of the world taking place through the operation of purely mechanical physical force or is it being regulated and guided by an intelligent and purposive rational power? In answer to this question we get two different theories **(1) The Mechanical Theory of Evolution** and **(2) The Teleological Theory of Evolution**. According to the mechanical theory of evolution, the unconscious material force causes the evolution, not only of the inanimate material objects, but also of life and mind automatically through the motion inherent in matter according to the laws of nature. The physical force being essentially blind and unconscious causes and determines the evolution of the world quite mechanically without the guidance of any intelligent idea or purposive activity. On the other hand, according to the teleological theory, the process of evolution of the world is guided by thought or purpose; the world is not a mere product of the operation of the blind physical or mechanical forces of nature, but is being evolved by the guidance of an intelligent principle for realising some definite end or purpose. The world has within it organization, order, design, skilful adaptations; wonderful unity and harmony which justify the guidance of a supreme purposive conscious and intelligent power.

(1) The Mechanical Theory of Evolution :—

The advocates of the mechanical theory of evolution hold that the evolution of the world:

including matter, life and mind takes place quite mechanically through the operation of self-existent matter and its inherent force and motion ; all things, even life and mind are evolved by mere chance combination of material particles through the random play of the mechanical forces of attraction and repulsion ; there is no intelligent agent or conscious will-power guiding the process of evolution. Matter, motion and force—these three primordial elements alone determine the origin and evolution of the world including life and mind, and the whole process is mechanical or automatic ; the process of evolution is not at all determined by any creative idea or thought. Matter is the ultimate reality, the stuff of all things and beings. Even life and mind also are the products of fortuitous or accidental combination of material atoms ; life and mind differ from matter not in quality but only in quantity or degree of complexity.

Herbert Spencer who is the main advocate of the mechanical theory defines evolution as 'an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion ; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity ; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.' He holds that the process of evolution involves 'integration and differentiation—the scattered and diffused elements of matter are first combined or integrated and then within the same integrated system the process of differentiation or disintegration takes place and results in the multiplication of different systems. Spencer accepts the 'Nebular Hypothesis of Kant and Laplace to explain his mechanical theory of cosmological evolution. According to this hypothesis, the matter which composed the solar system existed in the remote past as a scattered or diffused nebula or cloud of

gas, vapour or 'star dust'. "In the beginning, the world was a fiery mass in a nebulous state, all alike and highly diffused. It began to be solidified, integrated and different. Planets were separated from the sun; land and water, mountains and valleys appeared and represented further differentiation. The primitive nebular mass was in a state of unstable equilibrium and by the physical forces inherent in the atoms, matter solidified into globular bodies round the centres of greatest density. The gaseous cloud of star-dust thus differentiated into suns and planets. Life came out of non-living matter and evolution of living forms follows the law of integration and differentiation. At first there is the undifferentiated mass of protoplasm. Afterwards manifold differences of organs and functions grow within it. In social evolution also the same process is operative. Thus Spencer believes in the mechanical integration and disintegration of the material forces only and does not see any purpose of the evolutionary process." (S. P. Chakravarty : An Introduction to General Philosophy)

Criticism of the mechanical theory:—We cannot fully support the mechanical view of evolution. According to this view, the ultimate reality of the universe is matter which has gradually produced life and mind. But in fact life and mind cannot be evolved from matter. Life is essentially of different nature from matter; the free movement, self-determination, self-development, self-reparation and self-reproduction which are the essential characteristics of life are conspicuously absent from matter. Similarly, mind also is essentially different from matter; mind is conscious, while matter is unconscious. Hence life and mind cannot originate from matter. Matter and its elements may afford suitable and appropriate con-

ditions or grounds for the evolution and manifestation of life and mind, but matter itself through its inherent motion and force cannot create or produce life and mind. Moreover, the world which exhibits wonderful unity and harmony, order and design, cannot be the product of blind and accidental physical or mechanical force; the beauty, order and harmony of the world-system can be explained only with reference to some creative thought or intelligent purpose which acts as the guiding principle of the world-evolution. The mechanical theory without assuming the existence of an intelligent guiding principle leaves too much to chance. Lastly, the mechanical theory can at best describe **how** (i.e. in what order or process) the evolution of the world takes place, but it cannot satisfactorily explain **Why** (i.e. for what purpose and end) the evolution is determined and regulated; this can be answered only by teleology which explains evolution with reference to the end and not with reference to the beginning of the process.

(2) The Teleological Theory of Evolution :—

Many philosophers have tried to establish the teleological theory of evolution of the world by showing the defects and drawbacks of the mechanical theory. They have emphasised that the evolution of the world is guided by reason, intelligence, purpose and ideal. According to the teleological theory, the universe which has within it order, design, unity and harmony cannot be the product of the chance combination of irrational and blind material atoms by the random play of mechanical forces, it cannot be explained by blind matter, motion and force: there must be a supreme intelligent creative activity which guides the course of the world-evolution according to some fixed design for realising certain

definite end or purpose, and this supreme intelligent or conscious Being is the ultimate reality of the universe and its regulative principle.

The advocates of the teleological theory advance the following argument in support of their view that the evolution of the world is not mechanical, but purposive :—

“The world abounds in infinitely complex adaptations of means to ends, and the lower ends to higher ones which cannot be explained as accidental products of blind mechanical forces ; they exhibit clear marks of design which require the guidance of an intelligent designing principle in nature. **Selection, combination** and **gradation** are marks of intelligent design, these signs of intelligence are abundantly found in nature, specially in organic nature. (Martineau). For example, the different limbs of animals have been so **selected** as to fit them with one another and adapt them to the different media in which they live, on the land, under water, in the air. **Combination** is strikingly found in what is called the ‘correlation of organs’ which means that the whole organism is so tied together during its growth and development, that none of the organs can change in form without the others also changing. There is also a wonderful **gradation** of arrangement ‘by which a given end is attained through a train of independent means, each making provision for the next, till the series is consummated and crowned by the fulfilment.’ (Martineau). For example, life depends upon lifeless matter for its existence, and conscious existence depends upon life for its support. Thus there is an all-pervading, continuous gradation of arrangement in the causality of nature which is the distinguishing mark of intention. Thus the complex adaptations as revealed in selection, combination and

gradation are regulated by an intelligent Being or God." (Dr. J. N. Sinha : Introduction to Philosophy)

Now, the question is—Is the end or purpose which guides the evolution external to the world or immanent in it? In connection with this question there are two kinds of teleological views – **External or Transcendent Teleology** and **Internal or Immanent Teleology**.

According to the notion of External or Transcendent Teleology, the purpose or plan which regulates the evolution of the world does not exist in the world; the world itself has no purpose of its own. The purpose which is the final cause of the world regulates the world from outside it. God has externally imposed upon the world His own plans or designs after creating it out of nothing. Aristotle says that God lies outside and above the world and its motion and regulates the world and its evolution for realising His own supreme purpose or design.

But against this external teleology we should point out that if God who is essentially infinite and all-pervading be external to the world, then he would be limited by the world and his infinite character would be lost. Moreover, we cannot support this view, because it does not recognise the close and organic connection between God and the world. Again, we can never conceive that God remaining indifferent to the joys and sorrows of man fulfils His own selfish plans or motives alone.

The advocates of Internal or Immanent Teleology, on the other hand, hold that purpose becomes meaningless if it is not internally and organically related to the process of the world-evolution itself. If the regulative purpose lie outside the process of evolution, then the evolution itself would become mechanical and artificial. So, according to this view of internal teleology, the plan or

purpose which regulates the course of the world's evolution must in fact be immanent in the world, because this world is the self-manifestation of the Absolute Spirit or God who realises Himself as an immanent spirit of the world-system and whose purpose is reflected in the world in its successive stages of evolution which is essentially His own self-evolution.

Concluding Remark :—In our view both the kinds of teleology have their partial truths or justifications. If we do not recognise internal teleology i.e. if the purpose be not internally or intimately connected with the world-process, then we cannot satisfactorily explain the close and organic relation between God and the world. Again, if we do not recognise the external or transcendental character of the Divine Purpose, then we cannot satisfactorily account for the infinite possibilities of the evolutionary process. The view of internal teleology makes the divine purpose wholly immanent and exhausted in the actual world-process and thus leaves no scope for further possibilities of the emergence of new order of things. So we must admit the efficacy of both the immanent and transcendent forms of teleology.

Q. 4. Explain and examine the Mechanical Theory of Evolution.

According to the theory of evolution, the various classes of objects of the world have been produced and are being produced by a gradual process of evolution from the lower to the higher forms and from simpler to more complex ones through some inherent force according to some fixed laws.

Now, the question is—What is the nature of the inherent force which accounts for the gradual evolution of

the different classes of the objects of the world? Is it merely blind, unconscious, irrational and mechanical material force or some conscious, intelligent, purposive mental or spiritual power? Is the process of the evolution of the world taking place through the operation of purely mechanical physical force or is it being regulated and guided by an intelligent and purposive rational power? In answer to this question we get two different theories—Mechanical Theory of Evolution and Teleological Theory of Evolution. According to the mechanical theory, the blind and unconscious material force causes the evolution, not only of the inanimate material objects, but also of life and mind automatically through the motion inherent in matter without the guidance of any intelligent idea or purposive activity. On the other hand, according to the teleological theory, the process of evolution of the world is guided by thought or intelligent principle for the realisation of some end or purpose.

Mechanical Theory of evolution and its different forms —

The advocates of the mechanical theory of evolution hold that the evolution of the world including matter, life and mind takes place quite mechanically through the operation of self-existent matter and its inherent force and motion; all things, even life and mind, are evolved by mere chance combination of material particles through the random play of the mechanical forces of attraction and repulsion; there is no intelligent agent or conscious will-power guiding the process of evolution. Matter, motion and force—these three primordial elements alone determine the origin and evolution of the world including life and mind, and the whole process is mechanical or automatic; the process of evolution is not at all determined by any creative

idea or thought. Matter is the ultimate reality, the stuff of all things and beings. Even life and mind also are the products of fortuitous or accidental combination of material atoms; life and mind differ from matter not in quality but only in quantity or degree of complexity. In one word, the evolution of the whole universe is the result of the blind and mechanical process of integration and differentiation of material atoms. The materialists and naturalists advocate the mechanical theory of evolution. In their view, matter, force, motion, causality, and the physical processes of attraction and repulsion—these are causing the slow and gradual process of the evolution of the different classes of objects through purely mechanical way.

The mechanical theory, again, is of two forms—(1) **Mechanical Theory of Cosmological Evolution** which explains the origin and evolution of the world and (2) **Mechanical Theory of Biological Evolution** which explains the origin and evolution of one species of life from another.

(1) **Mechanical Theory of Cosmological Evolution :—** Herbert Spencer by following Laplace has given mechanical explanation of the origin and evolution of the world. He defines evolution as "integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation". He holds that the process of evolution involves integration and differentiation. Spencer accepts the 'Nebular Hypothesis' of Kant and Laplace to explain his mechanical theory of cosmological evolution. According to this hypothesis, the matter which composed the solar system existed in the remote past as a scattered or diffused nebula or cloud of gas, vapour or 'star dust.' In the beginning, the world was a fiery mass in a nebulous state, all alike

and highly diffused, It began to be solidified, integrated and different. Planets were separated from the sun ; land and water, mountains and valleys appeared and represented further differentiation. The primitive nebular mass was in a state of unstable equilibrium and by the physical forces inherent in the atoms, matter solidified into globular bodies round the centres of greatest density. The gaseous cloud of star-dust thus differentiated into suns and planets. Life came out of non-living matter and evolution of living forms follows the law of integration and differentiation. At first there is the undifferentiated mass of protoplasm. Afterwards manifold differences of organs and functions grow within it. In social evolution also the same process is operative. Thus Spencer believes in the mechanical integration and disintegration of the material forces only and does not see any purpose of the evolutionary process." (S. P. Chakravarty : An Introduction to General Philosophy)

(2) Mechanical Theory of Biological Evolution :—

According to this theory, matter is the source or cause of life ; life originates by the operation of material force. Germ-cell is produced by the fortuitous combination of some material atoms like carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen. This germ-cell is called 'protoplasm. Again, as a result of fortuitous or accidental variations within the germ-cell or in the living body one kind of animals is mechanically produced from another kind. We should mention here the views of Darwin, Lamarck and Weismann, regarding the origin and evolution of different species of living beings..

(a) **Darwin's Theory of Biological Evolution :—**Darwin holds that spontaneous and fortuitous variations within the body

cells of one species ultimately give rise to a different species. In his view, biological evolution is chiefly based upon three principles—(i) fortuitous variations within the living cells, (ii) transmission of these fortuitous variations to the offsprings by heredity and (iii) natural selection or survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence. Of course, it is not possible to find out the cause why such accidental variations take place. But these variations within the living-cells cause variations in the living body itself. For this reason no two living organisms are alike. Of the variations some are favourable and some are unfavourable. The individuals of a given species having favourable variations survive in their struggle for existence and are selected by nature. Such favourable and beneficial variations are transmitted to the offsprings by heredity and go on accumulating from generation to generation, and as a result a new species comes into being. On the other hand, the unfavourable and injurious variations make the creatures unfit for the struggle and the species in which the unfavourable variations accumulate from generation to generation gradually perish.

(b) **Lamarck's Theory of Biological Evolution** :—Lamarck holds that the organic changes are not due to the spontaneous and fortuitous variations within the body-cells, but these modifications are brought about by the reaction of the body upon the environment to satisfy organic needs. The variations or modifications thus acquired by the organism through its effort and practice in reaction to the influence of the environment are transmitted to the offsprings by heredity. As distinguished from Darwin who holds that the new organs are first evolved due to spontaneous variations in the germ-cells and then we make use of them in reacting to the force of the environment i.e. the organs precede their functions, Lamarck maintains that the functions precede

the organs, because the environment compels the living organism to react to its influence and as a result of the exercise and struggle for existence to meet organic needs new organs are evolved. "For instance the ancestors of giraffes did not have long necks. They constantly stretched their necks to eat the tender leaves at the top of the trees. This act of stretching the necks constantly elongated them. This elongation of the necks was inherited by the next generation. In this way, modifications were made in the structure of the animal bodies, and, in course of generations, so many modifications were made that new species were formed." (Dr. J. N. Sinha : Introduction to Philosophy)

(c) **Weismann's View**—Weismann has refuted Lamarck's view with the help of many experiments and indirectly supported Darwin's theory. According to Weismann, there is continuity of the germ-plasm from generation to generation ; the germ-cells are not at all affected by the modifications acquired by the organisms in reaction to the environment, so such acquired modifications which are mere changes in the somatic cells in the outer body are not transmitted ; only the germ-cells are transmitted from generation to generation subject to their spontaneous variations.

Criticism of the mechanical theory :—We cannot fully support the mechanical view of cosmological and biological evolution. According to this view, the ultimate reality of the universe is matter which has gradually produced life and mind. But in fact life and mind cannot be evolved from matter. Life is essentially of different nature from matter ; the free movement, self-determination, self-development, self-reparation and self-reproduction which are the essential characteristics of life are conspicuously

absent from matter. Similarly, mind also is essentially different from matter; mind is conscious, while matter is unconscious. Hence life and mind cannot originate from matter. Matter and its elements may afford suitable and appropriate conditions or grounds for the evolution and manifestation of life and mind, but matter itself through its inherent motion and force cannot create or produce life and mind. Moreover, the world which exhibits.See Page 151 up to of the process.

Q. 5. Give a detailed account of the Teleological Theory of Evolution.

Many philosophers have established the **Teleological Theory of Evolution** of the world by showing the defects and drawbacks of the mechanical theory of evolution. They have held that the evolution of the world is being guided or regulated by some purpose, ideal, reason and intelligence. According to the teleological theory, the universe which has within it order, design, unity and harmony cannot be the product of the chance combination of irrational and blind material atoms by the random play of mechanical forces; it cannot be explained by blind matter, motion and force; there must be a supreme intelligent creative activity which guides the course of the world evolution according to some fixed design for realising certain definite end or purpose, and this supreme intelligent or conscious being is the ultimate reality of the universe and its regulative principle.

The teleological theory is based on the criticism of the mechanical view of evolution of the world. The advocates of the teleological theory raise certain objections against the contention of the mechanical theory. The mechanistic theory regards matter as the ultimate reality which has gradually produced life and mind. But the advocates of

the teleological theory point out that life and mind cannot be evolved from matter. Life is essentially of different nature from matter; the free movement, self-determination, self-development, self-reparation and self-reproduction which are the essential characteristics of life are conspicuously absent from matter. Similarly mind also is essentially different from matter, because mind is conscious, but matter is unconscious. Hence life and mind cannot originate in matter. Matter and its elements may afford suitable and appropriate conditions or grounds for the evolution or manifestation of life and mind, but matter itself through its inherent motion and force cannot create or produce life and mind.

The advocates of the teleological theory assert that the evolution of the world is not mechanical, but purposive. In support of their view they advance the following argument :—

“The world abounds in infinitely complex adaptations of means to ends, and the lower ends to higher ones which cannot be explained as accidental products of blind mechanical forces; they exhibit clear marks of design which require the guidance of an intelligent designing principle in nature. **Selection, Combination and Gradation** are marks of intelligent design; these signs of intelligence are abundantly found in nature, specially in organic nature. (Martineau) For example, the different limbs of animals have been so **selected** as to fit them with one another and adapt them to the different media in which they live, on the land, under water, in the air. **Combination** is strikingly found in what is called the ‘correlation of organs’ which means that the whole organism is so tied together during its growth and development that none of the organs can change in form without the others also changing. There is also a wonderful **gradation** of arrangement by which a given end is

attained through a train of independent means, each making provision for the next, till the series is consummated and crowned by the fulfilment' (Martineau). For example, life depends upon lifeless matter for its existence, and conscious existence depends upon life for its support. Thus there is an all-pervading, continuous gradation of arrangement in the causality of nature which is the distinguishing mark of intention. Thus the complex adaptations as revealed in selection, combination and gradation are regulated by an intelligent Being or God." (Dr. J. N. Sinha : Introduction to Philosophy)

Now, the question is—Is the end or purpose which guides the evolution external to the world or immanent in it? In connection with this question there are two kinds of teleological views—**External or Transcendent Teleology and Internal or Immanent Teleology.**

According to the notion of External or Transcendent Teleology, the purpose or plan which regulates the evolution of the world does not exist in the world the world ; itself has no purpose of its own. The purpose which is the final cause of the world regulates the world from outside it. God has externally imposed upon the world. His own plans or designs after creating it out of nothing. Aristotle says that God lies outside and above the world and its motion and regulates the world and its evolution for realising His own supreme purpose or design.

But against this external teleology we should point out that if God who is essentially infinite and all-pervading be external to the world, then he would be limited by the world and his infinite character would be lost. Moreover, we cannot support this view, because it does not recognise the close and organic connection between God and the world. Again, we can never conceive that God remaining indifferent to the joys

and sorrows of man fulfils His own selfish plans or motives alone.

The advocates of Internal or Immanent Teleology, on the other hand, hold that purpose becomes meaningless if it is not internally and organically related to the process of the world-evolution itself. If the regulative purpose lie outside the process of evolution, then the evolution itself would become mechanical and artificial. So, according to this view of internal teleology, the plan or purpose which regulates the course of the world-evolution must in fact be immanent in the world, because this world is the self-manifestation of the Absolute Spirit or God who realises Himself as an immanent spirit of the world system and whose purpose is reflected in the world in its successive stages of evolution which is essentially His own self-evolution.

Concluding Remark :—In our view both the kinds of teleology have their partial truths or justifications. If we do not recognise internal teleology i. e., if the purpose be not internally or intimately connected with the world-process, then we cannot satisfactorily explain the close and organic relation between God and the world. Again, if we do not recognise the external or transcendental character of the Divine Purpose, then we cannot satisfactorily account for the infinite possibilities of the evolutionary process. The view of internal teleology makes the divine purpose wholly immanent and exhausted in the actual world-process and thus leaves no scope for further possibilities of the emergence of new order of things. So we must admit the efficacy of both the immanent and transcendent forms of teleology.

Q. 6. Give a critical account of the Theory of Creative Evolution.

The great French philosopher, Bergson, who is the advocate of the theory of creative evolution, maintains that new forms

and qualities are being perpetually evolved and created in course of evolution; the evolutionary flow goes on unceasingly with the creation of new qualities and objects without in the least being determined either by the past or by the future; the course of the evolution of the world is absolutely free and undetermined. *Elan vital* or life impulse, according to Bergson, is the basic reality; it is a constant flow and flux; it changes continuously; freely creating new forms of existence. Reality freely and spontaneously evolves at every moment new future out of the past; 'it swells as it advances'; but the past is not repeated in future; it is new at every stage.

Bergson holds that both mechanical and teleological conceptions of the evolution of the world are unsatisfactory, because the theory of mechanical evolution shows that the present is determined by the past, and the theory of teleological evolution shows that the present is determined by the future. But, according to Bergson, the course of the evolution of the world is strictly undetermined, free, and spontaneous. The mechanical theory holds that the present order of the world is derived from and completely determined by the totality of its past or antecedent conditions. Thus the present, being predetermined by the past, is nothing new, but it was already contained in the determining past conditions; there is no room for any free choice or novelty. If we know the complete set of determining antecedents we can easily see the future and predict what effect would take place. But this mechanistic position is not acceptable to Bergson, because, according to him, the process of evolution which is free and creative is wholly undetermined and thus unpredictable. Again, the teleological view which explains the course of evolution with reference to further end, plan or purpose and thus derives the present order of the world

from the future is also not acceptable to Bergson, because every effect, according to the teleological conception, is determined by the pre-arranged plan or purpose, and thus there is no room for free and spontaneous creation and there is nothing undetermined and unforeseen. In the language of Berson, "The doctrine of teleology, in its extreme form, as we find it in Leibniz for example, implies that things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged. But if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is again useless. As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again, it is supposed that all is given. Finalism (or teleology) thus understood is only inverted mechanism..... It substitutes the attraction of the future for the impulsion of the past".

Thus, according to Bergson, the course of evolution which is a process from simplicity to multiplicity, from the undifferentiated to the differentiated, is in fact the expression of a basic life force 'which divides its energy along divergent paths as it advances', instead of being 'the product of many factors combined mechanically or teleologically, as mechanism or finalism believes'. "Bergson thus comes to think that the evolution of the world can be satisfactorily explained neither by the accidental collocation of the dead circumstances, as mechanism supposes, nor by reference to a perfect, pre-arranged plan, but by admitting a common living force which is striving to express itself along divergent paths and striving constantly for balance and harmony. This force he calls the vital impetus, the *elan vital*. It is identical with the basic Reality or Force underlying all manifestation ... Bergson's theory of **creative evolution** anticipates the basic contention of the theory of **emergent evolution**, put forward in more recent time by some realistic thinkers, namely that the process of evolution gives birth to new forms of existence. But novelty for Bergson is not merely a more complex organisation or interre-

lation of elements previously existing in the matrix as the theory of emergent evolution holds. Creation of novelty is more thorough-going ; it is the birth of something altogether new. Moreover, while emergent evolution is interrelation of the many basic elements in new ways, creative evolution consists in the birth of many new forms by the diversification of the one basic energy. Again, whereas emergent evolution places God at the end of the process, creative evolution puts God at the beginning, identifying it with the original impulse that drives the world from behind." (Dr. D. M. Datta : Contemporary Philosophy).

Criticism :—Though Bergson's theory of creative evolution rightly recognises that new forms and qualities are being continuously evolved and created in the course of evolution, yet it ignores the universally accepted scientific principle of causation by denying causal determination in the different stages of evolution. Bergson's romantic conception of creative evolution is nothing but poetry and dream ; it cannot satisfy our intellect. Without any causal determination, constant evolution of new forms and qualities becomes a sheer miracle. In fact, we cannot conceive of the world process without an intelligent purpose guiding it.

Q. 7. Give an account of the Theory of Emergent Evolution.


In connection with the evolutionary process of the world a question arises as to whether evolution produces any thing new or it merely rearranges and repeats the old events in a more complex form. According to the **Theory of Repetitive Evolution or Mechanistic Evolution**, evolution is a process in which nothing really 'new' is produced, but every stage is a mere repetition or rearrangement of the preceding stage in a more complex form ; an effect is not at all a new creation, but a bare repetition of the pre-existing conditions in their more complex

form ; for example, life is nothing new but a complex form of matter, mind also is not a new creation but a complex form of life. This theory regards "a chemical compound as only a more complex mechanical mixture, without any new kind of relatedness of its constituents. It regards life as a re-grouping of physico-chemical events with no new kind of relatedness expressed in an integration." On the other hand, according to the **Theory of Emergent Evolution**, evolution is a process in which something new is produced at each level which is not a mere repetition of the preceding level. This theory admits the continuity of the world process and at the same time speaks of the emergence of new forms and qualities which are being evolved and created as the process of evolution passes from one level of existence to another level. Thus the theory of emergent evolution holds that, though there is continuity of the evolutionary process from the inorganic to the organic level and from the organic to the mental level, yet life is not a mere complex form of matter but is something new with new qualities and powers not pre-existing in matter, and mind also is not a mere rearrangement of organic conditions in a more complex form but is something new with novel qualities and powers not pre-existing in the antecedent organic conditions.

Lloyd Morgan and S. Alexander are the main advocates of the theory of emergent evolution. Lloyd Morgan recognises the emergence of the new qualities and forms throughout the course of evolution. At every stage of evolution there is a 'new departure in the passage of natural events'. Life, no doubt, appears in a material body, but life has a new kind of relatedness, not pre-existing in the non-living matter ; again, mind, no doubt, arises in a living body, but mind possesses a new kind of relatedness not found in the bare organism. Thus though the effect is the resultant of the antecedent conditions,

yet the evolution is not repetitive, but at every stage of the evolutionary process there is the emergence or advent of new quality or power which cannot be explained by the resultant alone.

"Like Lloyd Morgan Alexander is a naturalist and an empiricist, and like him Alexander too presents an emergent view of the universe. But whereas Morgan starts from physical events related in space and time and tries to show how, out of these, all inorganic material substance, life and mind can be conceived to emerge. Alexander pushes the idea of emergence still further and shows how the entire universe including all physical events, life, mind and even deity can be conceived to evolve out of bare Space-Time. In a word, for Alexander everything, except Space-Time, emerges out of the matrix of Space Time. A convenient diagram by which Morgan has pictorially represented the basic scheme of Alexander's philosophy consists of a 'synoptic pyramid' like the following :



ST—Space time.

D—Deity.

N—Nisus towards Deity.

Space-Time is the base of this 'pyramid of emergent evolution' and out of it emerge the higher and higher levels, matter, life, mind and deity. Deity forms the apex of the pyramid, and there is a nisus towards the deity inherent in the process of evolution. This explains the upward direction of the process." (Dr. D. M. Dutta : Contemporary Philosophy)

Criticism : The theory of emergent evolution has rightly recognised the emergence of new form and quality at every stage of the evolution of the world. But the emergence of new qualities and forms without teleology is a sheer miracle. In fact, we cannot conceive of the evolutionary process of the world without an intelligent purpose guiding it.

MIND OR SELF

Q. 1. What is Mind or Self? Are mind and self identical ?

'Mind' or 'self' is a non-material spiritual entity or substance which underlies and unifies all the changing mental states and processes like thinking, feeling, willing etc. into one organic whole. The self or mind recognises itself in its conscious as one and the same individual person expressing itself in and through its states and activities. It is not a mere aggregate of the changing mental states and processes ; it is in fact the receptacle or ground of all mental states and activities. As consciousness is its essential attribute, it is regarded as the subject, knower and enjoyer. Of course, mind or self is not an abstract spiritual substance completely isolated from the sundry experiences of the different states and processes nor a mere sum-total or group of ever-changing, separate and discrete mental phenomena ; it must be some permanent and identical and at the same time active and conscious spiritual principle (or 'person') which systematises, co-ordinates and organizes the changing and discrete states and processes of mind into one unified whole. The mind or self expresses and realises its own concrete nature and attains its own living unity in and through the different fleeting experiences like thoughts, emotions, wills, etc. Hence it is a concrete unifying principle and active organizing power which holds together and harmonises the manifold experiences. With the growth of varied experiences it also attains its development, richness and fulfilment,

In Indian philosophy, however, mind and self are not the same entities. The self or soul is different and separate from the mind. The self or soul is an indestructible and eternal spiritual substance which is entirely separate from the body ; but mind is an internal sense-organ (pertaining to the body) with which the self perceives the facts of both inner and outer experiences. The self is the subject or knower ; but the mind is its instrument. Of course, in western philosophy 'self' and 'mind' have been used as almost synonymous terms ; the self and the mind are treated as one and the same entities.

Q. 2. Discuss briefly the different Views or theories of Self or Mind.

There are three main views or theories of self or mind. These are the following :—

(1) Noumenal View or Soul-Substance Theory :—According to this view, the mind or self is a non-material spiritual substance ; it is an unchangeable, permanent entity or substance behind and beyond the changeable and fleeting different mental states and activities like thinking, feeling, willing, etc. The mind or self has been regarded as an identical, permanent and unchangeable spiritual substance which is a mere receptacle or support of the different and discrete changing experiences. The unconscious matter cannot be the ground of the mental qualities and activities like thinking, feeling, willing, etc, because unconscious matter itself cannot think, feel and will. Hence there must be a non-material conscious spiritual substance as the support or receptacle of these mental experiences, and that spiritual substance is called 'mind' or 'self'.

Criticism :—A mental substance apart from its attributes and functions is an empty abstraction, a meaningless identity without difference, a dull unity without rich diversity. The self or mind must be regarded, not as a mere passive receptacle or support above and beyond different mental

phenomena, but as a concrete unity which manifests or realises itself in and through its mental states and processes. There cannot be any thinker apart from thinking, the two aspects must be organically and inseparably connected. The self or mind must be a concrete unifying principle and active organizing power which holds together and harmonizes the manifold and diverse experiences.

(2) Phenomenal view or Empirical Theory :—According to this view, mind or self is a mere aggregate or collection of the different and discrete changing mental states and processes; there is no unchangeable and abiding spiritual substance or conscious person or knower underlying these states and processes as a ground or support of them. What we call mind or self is nothing but a flow of changing or fleeting mental phenomena. Hume who holds the empirical view of self contends that there cannot be any changeless and abiding mental substance; what we call mind is a mere 'heap or collection of different perceptions'; it is a series of mental states and processes 'which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement.' There is no changeless and permanent substance beyond this series of changing mental states. The self is not a substance which has these changing states; it is the changing states themselves. The different and discrete mental phenomena can be linked together into a bundle or group of experience according to the laws of association, but this does not show any underlying fundamental unity of the self.

Criticism :—We cannot at all think of changing mental states and processes without presupposing some permanent ego or self which possesses these states and processes and unites them into one organic whole. In our self-consciousness we are indeed aware of some permanent unifying principle as the abiding substance which thinks, feels and wills. If we do not assume any

permanent and changeless mind or self as the knower who knows, then we cannot explain our knowledge and experience. Further, we cannot explain the psychological facts of memory and recognition without assuming the existence of an abiding and identical self as recollecting what was perceived in the past by the same self and recognising an object which was cognized before by the same self. Lastly, in actual experience every man is conscious that he is the same identical person as he was in the past and he will continue and preserve his own self-identity in future.

(3) Concrete Idealistic View or Personalistic Theory :—

According to this view, mind or self is an active and conscious person, a self-conscious and self-determining spirit ; it is a principle of unity present in different experiences which are co-ordinated and organized into one unified whole by its power of synthetic activity. This active and conscious person is the source and organizer of all the mental states and processes. Mind is a concrete unifying principle and active organizing power which holds together and harmonises the manifold experiences. Mind or self expresses and realises its own concrete nature and attains its own living unity as a self-conscious and self-determining spirit in and through the different fleeting experiences like thoughts, emotions, desires, etc, which are its own self-manifestations.

This is the most satisfactory view of mind or self.

Q. 3. Explain and examine the Soul-Substance, Theory.

Or

Is the Spiritual Substance theory satisfactory ?

According to some philosophers the mind or self is a non-material spiritual substance ; it is an unchangeable and unmoved permanent entity or substance behind and beyond the

changeable and fleeting different mental states and activities like thinking, feeling, willing, etc. The mind or self has been regarded as an identical, permanent and unchangeable spiritual substance which is a mere receptacle or support of the different and discrete changing experiences. The unconscious matter cannot be the ground of the mental qualities and activities like thinking, feeling, willing etc. because unconscious matter itself cannot think, feel and will. Hence there must be a non-material conscious spiritual substance as the support or receptacle of these mental experiences, and that spiritual substance is called 'mind' or 'self'.

Of those philosophers who have accepted the **Soul-Substance Theory** and admitted the soul or self as a non-material **spiritual Substance** the names of the ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle and the modern Philosophers like Descartes, Locke and Berkeley deserve special mention.

According to Plato, the soul is a non-bodily spiritual or mental substance ; it is the receptacle of the mental functions like rationality, feeling and will. The true nature of the soul is its rational element which is essentially independent of the body and which continues to exist even after the demise of the body. As reason or rationality is not dependent upon body, it is indestructible and eternal just like the soul. But feeling and will are the two inferior qualities which the soul attains in its connection with the body. In Plato's view, the soul is essentially immortal or indestructible, purely rational and free. Due to desire the soul comes in contact with the body and becomes subject to the joys and sorrows. After the demise of the body or with the help of the attainment of real knowledge it becomes free from the bondage of the body and exists in its own nature which is the state of pure reason.

Aristotle follows Plato and regards the soul as a non-bodily spiritual substance. Aristotle says that the soul is the 'form' or 'organization' of the body. This means that the soul is a rational spiritual substance which organizes and regulates the body. This rational spiritual principle is immortal or indestructible ; it is an entity, which exists in its own right and does the functions of thinking, feeling and willing.

In modern times Descartes, Locke and Berkeley have re-established the views of Plato and Aristotle regarding the nature of the soul or self. According to Descartes, the soul or mind is a conscious, simple and indivisible spiritual substance ; the mind or soul is a substance, and thought or conscious is its essential attribute. The mind or soul is entirely opposed to and independent of material body; because matter is an inert and unconscious substance, and extension is its essential attribute ; but the mind is a non-extended and conscious substance. The existence of mind or self cannot be doubted, because doubting itself implies a thinker which doubts or thinks ; so the existence of self or mind is assumed without any doubt as a self-evident truth. Moreover, in the view of Descartes, the existence of self must be admitted as a changeless support or receptacle of the mental functions like thinking, feeling and willing, because the unconscious and extended material body cannot possess these conscious functions. The mind or soul which is independent of body is an immortal and changeless substance ; it has its own entity distinct from the changing experiences. According to Locke, no qualities or functions can exist without any substance. Hence the existence of mind or self must be admitted as the necessary substratum or support of the mental qualities and functions like thinking, feeling, willing, etc. As matter cannot think, so it cannot be the substratum of mental

functions. It is the soul or self which is the ground of all mental activities. The existence of the soul as a mental substance can be known directly through intuition. Berkeley also regards the soul as a mental substance entirely distinct from its ideas and experiences. He does not admit the existence of material substance independent of mind ; according to him, matter is a mere idea of the mind. Mind or soul is an immortal spiritual substance which is the subject, knower and enjoyer of all its ideas and experiences and without which no idea or experience is possible as there cannot be any 'floating ideas.'

The Nyaya-Vaisesika, the Jaina and the like in Indian philosophy also admit the existence of soul-substance as the ground of thought, feeling, will, etc.

Criticism :—Hume, a most consistent empiricist, has very sharply criticised and refuted the soul-substance theory. According to him, what is perceptible can alone be admitted as existent. But the mind or self as a passive and changeless substance can never be perceived ; so there is no such abiding and changeless spiritual substance as mind or self ; such a reality is a mere figment of human imagination. With the help of our internal observation or introspection we merely get the sundry experiences of discrete and changing ideas, feelings etc. but we do not feel the impression of any unified, unchangeable, permanent and abiding mental entity or substance. Hume says, "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception." So in Hume's view, there cannot be any changeless and abiding ultimate mental substance ; what we call mind or self is a mere "heap or collection of different perceptions"

it is a series of mental states and process "which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement." There is no changeless and permanent spiritual substance apart from this series of changing mental states. The self is not a substance which has these changing states ; it is the changing states themselves.

Kant says that the self is non-sensuous, hence it is not the object of perception ; it is always a subject or knower. When we characterise the self as spiritual substance, an immortal entity etc., then we are involved in self-contradiction, for in this case the self becomes reduced to a mere object of knowledge. But the self is essentially a knower or subject which knows ; it itself cannot be known ; it is unknown and unknowable.

Besides the criticisms as raised by Hume and Kant against the soul-substance theory we have to add something more. A mental substance apart from its attributes and functions is an empty abstraction, a meaningless identity without difference, a dull unity without rich diversity. The self or mind must be regarded, not as a mere passive receptacle or support above and beyond different mental phenomena, but as a concrete unity which manifests and realises itself in and through its mental states and processes. There cannot be any thinker apart from thinking, the two aspects must be organically and inseparably connected. In fact, mind or self is not an abstract spiritual substance completely isolated from the sundry experiences of the different states and processes nor a mere sum total or group of ever-changing and fleeting discrete mental phenomena ; it must be some permanent and identical and at the same time active and conscious spiritual principle (or person) which systematises, co-ordinates and organizes the changing and discrete mental phenomena into one unified whole. The mind or self expresses and realises its own concrete nature and attains

its own living unity in and through the different ~~fleeting~~ experiences like thoughts, emotions, wills etc. Hence it is a concrete unifying principle and active organizing power which holds together and harmonises the manifold and diverse experiences. With the growth of varied experiences it also attains its development, richness and fulfilment. Thus the self or mind must be a principle of identity in difference, and of unity in plurality.

Q. 4. Give a critical account of the Empirical or Phenomenal view of Self or Mind.

Or,

It has sometimes been said that there is no such thing as a mind over and above what are called mental states. Do you agree ?

The Empirical or Phenomenal view of the nature of mind or self is that mind or self is a mere aggregate or collection of the different and discrete changing mental states and processes ; there is no unchangeable and abiding spiritual substance or conscious person or knower underlying these states and processes as a ground or support of them. What we call mind or self is nothing but a flow of changing or fleeting mental phenomena.

Though Locke is the father of empiricism, the empirical theory has been most clearly and consistently expressed in Hume's philosophy. Locke says that no qualities and functions can exist without any substance. Hence the existence of mind or self must be admitted as the necessary substratum or support of the mental phenomena like thinking, feeling, willing, etc. It is the soul or self which is the ground of all mental activities. Berkeley, another empiricist, also maintains that mind or soul, is an immortal spiritual substance which is the subject, knower and enjoyer of all its ideas and experiences and without which no idea or experience is possible as there cannot be any ~~floating~~

ideas'. But Hume, an extreme and consistent empiricist, has shown the defects and inconsistencies inherent in Locke and Berkeley's views by saying that if sense-experience be the only source of knowledge as held by empiricism, then what cannot be perceived through sense-experience cannot be admitted as existent. The mind or self as a passive and changeless substance can never be perceived; so there is no such permanent and changeless spiritual substance as mind or self; such a permanent reality is a mere figment of imagination. With the help of our internal observation or introspection we merely get the sundry experiences of discrete and changing ideas, feelings, etc., but we do not feel the impression of any unified, unchangeable, permanent and abiding mental entity or substance. Hume says, "There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment conscious of what we call our self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and so are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." So in Hume's view, there cannot be any changeless and abiding ultimate mental substance; what we call mind or self is a mere 'heap or collection of different perceptions'; it is a series of mental states and processes 'which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement.' There is no changeless and permanent spiritual substance beyond this series of changing mental states. The self is not a substance which has these changing states; it is the changing states themselves. The different and discrete mental phenomena can be linked together into a bundle or group of experiences according to the laws of

association, but this does not show any underlying fundamental unity and identity of the self.

Mill and James also have given empirical account of the self. Mill says, "Mind is nothing but the series of sensations and internal feelings as they actually occur, with the addition of possibilities of feelings." James also says that mind is a 'stream of consciousness' and 'the passing thought is the only thinker.' In the Bauddha system of Indian Philosophy also we find an empirical account of self which, according it, is not a permanent entity, but a collection of ever-changing mental and physiological processes.

Criticism :—We cannot fully support the empirical or phenomenal view of self or mind on the following grounds :—

(a) We cannot at all think of changing mental states and processes without presupposing some permanent ego or self which possesses these states and processes and unites them into one organic whole. Kant rightly says that all the sundry experiences must be referred to a particular self which is the agent or experienter.

(b) In our self-consciousness we are indeed aware of some permanent unifying principle as the abiding substance which thinks, feels and wills. If we do not assume any permanent and changeless mind or self as the knower or subject which knows, then we cannot explain our knowledge and experience. Thought itself thinks, feeling itself feels, willing itself wills—all these empirical accounts are meaningless. In fact, if we do not assume the self as a conscious subject or knower, the association and mutual relation of the different and changing mental states and experiences cannot be properly understood. The empirical theory without reference to a permanent self makes knowledge impossible, because knowledge implies the relation between a permanent subject or knower and an object which is known.

Conscious experiences, Kant truly says, are meaningless without the knower or the subject self.

(c) We cannot explain the psychological facts of memory and recognition without assuming the existence of an abiding and identical self as recollecting what was perceived in the past by the same self and recognising an object which was cognized before by the same self. It is only when we assume a permanent principle of unity that we can explain memory and recognition.

(d) The empirical view does not admit any personal identity and continuity of the same self. But in actual experience every man is conscious that he is the same identical person as he was in the past and he will continue and preserve his own self-identity in future. In this connection Kant rightly points out that there must be the thinking self as a principle of unity present in all experiences.

(e) The self is also established as a knower or subject, it cannot be grasped as an object of knowledge. Hume has unsuccessfully tried to know the knower as an object to be known. If we fail to know the self, this does not adversely affect the existence of the self. He who searches the self, doubts its existence and denies it is himself the self. It cannot be grasped like a material body, the knower should be viewed as a knower, not as an object to be known.

Q. 5. Explain the Concrete Idealistic view of the Self or Mind.

Or,

Give an account of the Personalistic Theory of Mind or Self.

According to the concrete idealistic view or the personalistic theory of mind or self, mind or self is an active and conscious person, a self-conscious and self-determining spirit; it is a principle of unity present in different experiences which are co-ordinated and organized into one unified whole by its power

of synthetic activity. This active and conscious person is the source and organizer of all the mental states and processes. Hence, according to this theory, the mind or self is not an abstract spiritual substance completely isolated from the sundry experiences of the different states and processes nor a mere aggregate or collection of ever-changing separate and discrete mental phenomena ; it is in fact a permanent and identical and at the same time active and conscious spiritual principle or person which systematises, co-ordinates and organizes the changing and discrete states and processes of mind into one organic whole. The mind or self expresses and realises its own concrete nature and attains its own living unity as a self-conscious and self-determining spirit in and through the different fleeting experiences like thoughts, emotions, desires etc. which are its own self-manifestations. Hence it is a concrete unifying principle and active organizing power which holds together and harmonises the manifold experiences. With the growth of varied experiences it also attains its development, richness and fulfilment. Moreover, the self is a centre of free activity which controls and regulates its own course and also an intelligent agent which creates and appreciates values.

Kant says that the mind or self is an active agent and knower which synthesises, organizes and unifies different experiences into significant wholes. The self which is a principle of unity is called by Kant 'synthetic unity of apperception.' But this unity, according to Kant, is a transcendental unity ; its real nature is unknown and unknowable ; it is a pure subject or knower, so it is not the object of our knowledge ; we can know only its appearances, but what it is in itself cannot be known. Thus Kant draws an unbridgable gap or gulf between the self as it is in itself and the self as it appears to us. It amounts to saying that Kant's noumenal self which is a transcendental unity does not include the experiences which it unifies.

Hegel, however, criticises Kant's view of noumenal self by pointing out that the self is a concrete and active self-conscious person whose real nature is revealed or reflected in and through the manifold experiences, so we can know the real nature of the self through its manifestations in experiences, and as such it is not unknown and unknowable. "Self's unity is a systematic and organic unity of experiences where each item reflects the whole and the whole depends upon the plurality of experiences. All the sundry experiences that are the contents of an individual's life, form a systematic whole as the manifestations of a unitary person or ego and such organization of experience is made possible by the activity of the subject. This self is a person facing the world of not-self and acting upon it with will and intelligence.....More varied and comprehensive the organized experiences, the more rich is the content of personality. Naturally, the most perfect personality will include within its unity all the experiences, actual and possible, and thus it will be an unlimited infinite personality from whose all-embracing unity nothing is left out. This perfect personality is God or the Absolute by participating in whose life we are real. Finite human personalities are, therefore, more or less imperfect manifestations of the Absolute Life or Reality." (S. P. Chakravarty : An Introduction to General Philosophy)

Q. 6. What is the materialistic conception of Self and how far is it acceptable ?

Or,

Would you regard mind as the by-product of matter ?

The materialists do not admit the independent reality of mind. In their view mind is the product of matter ; consciousness is nothing but the by-product or epi-phenomenon of the brain which is material in character. In other words, mind is the function of the brain which is a part of material body. The origin of mind is due to certain peculiar physical and chemical

processes of the nervous system which is a vital part of the living body. Hence mind, according to the materialistic conception, has no substantial reality independent of the bodily functions ; it is a mere function of the brain matter. Behaviourism which is an extreme form of materialism goes so far as to deny the existence of mind or consciousness and explain the so-called mental phenomena in terms of bodily or nervous behaviours which are all organic reactions in responses to the stimuli. Thus, according to materialism, there is no freedom of will or free choice in the behaviours of the living beings which are entirely determined by the preceding physical and physiological forces and conditions.

Criticism :—The account of the origin of mind or consciousness as given by the materialists is not satisfactory. Mind is essentially different from matter ; mind is non-extended and conscious, while matter is extended and unconscious. Hence mind cannot originate from matter. On the contrary, we find that mind, instead of being explained by matter, controls and directs material bodies. While criticising the materialistic hypothesis, John Caird rightly remarks, "You cannot get to mind as an ultimate product of matter, for in the very attempt to do so, you have already begun with mind. The earliest step of any such enquiry involves categories of thought, and it is in terms of thought that the very problem you are investigating can be so much as stated." In deducing mind from the material atoms, atoms themselves must have to be thought, and this thought necessarily implies mind as the explanatory ground of matter. Moreover, every individual is conscious that he remains the same identical person or self in the midst of different changes, but the organic body never remains the same, it undergoes changes. So the changeable body cannot be regarded as a self-identical person, there must be an independent reality of the self as a person though it is intimately

connected with the body. Lastly, our moral consciousness and voluntary actions prove that our minds have their own independent entities.

Q. 7. Give a critical account of the behaviouristic view of Self or Mind.

Or,

'Mind is a Sum of behaviours'.—Discuss.

Or,

Explain and examine the view that the self is nothing but physiological responder.

The theory of behaviourism denies the existence of self or mind or even consciousness and explains the so-called mental phenomena in terms of bodily or nervous behaviours which are all organic reactions in responses to the stimuli. The behaviours of living beings are not at all initiated or prompted from within, there being no self-determining individual and there being no scope of any free choice or freedom ; all the behaviours are entirely determined by the preceding physical and physiological forces and conditions.

The behaviourists have replaced mind by neuro-muscular system which functions as a reaction to the environment and its stimulus. Watson is the main advocate of the behaviouristic theory. He does not recognise the existence of the soul, the mind, consciousness or any mental process. He explains all experience in terms of behaviour which is a mere response of the organism to a stimulus. Sensation and perception are not at all mental states but mere responses of the sense-organs to stimuli. Imagination and thought are nothing but implicit muscular behaviour. Thought is literally sub-vocal speech. Emotion consists in "profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems." The individual is thoroughly determined by

environment, there is nothing like instincts or hereditary traits. The so-called intelligent behaviour of man is nothing but conditioned reflex and learning is nothing but conditioning behaviour more and more. Thus the whole chain of mental events is reduced to some such string of facts—first of all movements are aroused in the living organism; then there is the adjustment in the nervous system, and finally results the reaction. "All human action is made to appear to be of the type of reflex action, to be the issue of merely of the play of nervous currents, started in the sense-organs by stimulations from the physical world and propagating themselves through the jungle of the nervous system, finding always the paths of least resistance according to purely physical principles. All human action is reflex action, or, as the principle is more commonly formulated, every human action is a mechanical response to a stimulus." (Mc. Dougall : Outline of Psychology) Thus the behaviourists advocate the stimulus-response theory, according to which, the person reacting is more or less akin to a reflex machine.

Criticism :—By denying mind or consciousness the behaviouristic school becomes materialistic and shares all the defects of materialism. Human behaviour has both mental and bodily aspects and the one cannot be separated from the other. The mental side is as important as the physical side. Running is an activity which no doubt can be observed from outside and studied objectively. But certainly it can be understood better if we know that the individual running is doing so to escape a danger or to reach an object. The determination of the individual being is from within, not from without. The starting point of human conduct should be, not the outside stimulus, but the purposive attitude, the inner drive or interests. If human conduct be regarded as a mere mechanical response of organism, when religion, morality, etc., will be meaningless. Our inner experience reveals that we have a mind or self as a conscious

and active agent which synthesises, organizes and unifies different experiences into a significant whole.

Q. 8. What are the different possible views regarding the exact nature of the relation between mind and body? Which of them is satisfactory?

Experience reveals to us that there is a close relation between mind and body. Sensations and perceptions are possible only when the appropriate sense-organs are stimulated. Continuous mental works make us physically tired, and strenuous physical activity leads to mental exertion; physical illness is accompanied by mental disabilities, and mental disorder often leads to the breakdown of the body.

Now, the question here is—How are we to explain the close connection between mind and body? How is it possible for both mind and body having different and opposite natures (one being spiritual and the other material, the one being conscious and the other non-conscious, but extensive) to become so closely related to each other?

The following are the theories regarding the relation between mind and body :—

(1) Dualism :—Descartes who revived the theory of dualism in modern philosophy held that matter (or body) and mind are two substances radically different from, and independent of, each other. In his view, body and mind are diametrically opposed to each other, because the essential attribute of body is extension devoid of consciousness and the essential attribute of mind is thought or consciousness devoid of extension; mind is free and is regulated by its inherent purpose or will, but body has no free motion of its own, it is wholly determined by mechanical laws.

The main defect of the theory of dualism is that if body and mind be essentially distinct, independent and opposite

entities, then it is difficult to explain the close connection and interaction that we find between them in our everyday experiences. Descartes, of course, said that mind and body sit upon each other in the pineal gland located in the brain which is the seat of both mind and body. He realised that thought and extension can be combined, in man, in unity of composition, but not in unity of nature. Descartes' idea here seems to be that the relation between mind and body is not such that a physical state becomes a mental state or vice versa, but the mind, according to him, is simply troubled by the organic processes. His obscurity and vacillation on this point are due to his desire to explain the material world on purely mechanical principle and at the same time leave a place for the action of a spiritual principle.

Geulinx and Malebranche, the two followers of Descartes, introduced the Theory of Occasionalism in order to remedy the defects of Interactionism of Descartes. According to occasionalism, though mind and body are opposed to each other, there is a correspondence between them, and this correspondence is brought about at every time and in every case directly by God. When changes arise in the body of a particular person, God makes corresponding sensations arise in the mind of that person. Again, whenever there is desire in the mind of a person, God produces the corresponding movement in the body of that person. But this theory of occasionalism is not satisfactory as it reduces God to a mere constant instrument to the needs of mankind, and it believes in perpetual miracle, for it asserts constant intervention of God.

Leibniz expounded the Theory of Pre-established Harmony, according to which God pre-adjusted body and mind to each other and pre-established a harmony between

the two in such a way at the time of the creation of the world that the two always correspond to each other without any further divine intervention. "The soul follows its own laws, and the body its own likewise, and they accord by virtue of the harmony pre established among all substances (monads). There is a perfect harmony between the perceptions of the monad and the motions of the bodies, pre established at the outset between the system of efficient causes (bodies) and the system of final causes (minds)." But the theory of pre-established harmony involves the same difficulty as occasionalism. While occasionalism speaks of perpetual miracle through constant intervention of God, the theory of pre-established harmony admits of only one miracle when God pre-established a harmony between two heterogeneous substances like mind and body at the time of creation. But how is it possible for God to establish a harmony between two entirely opposite substances ?

(2) **Monism** :—According to this theory, mind and body are not two distinct substances. They are at bottom one. Under the head of monism, the following are the sub-theories :—

(a) **Parallelism or Parallelistic Monism** :—Spinoza expounded the theory of parallelism in order to avoid the difficulties involved in Descartes' dualism and interactionism. According to Spinoza, mind and body are not two distinct substances ; God is the only absolute substance and besides God there is no other substance at all ; mind (or thought) and body (or extension) are two parallel attributes or correlative aspects of one and the same substance, God. Interaction or causal connection between mind and body or their mutual influence is not possible. Yet there is a very close relation between them, because the two are parallel

attributes or manifestations of one and the same reality. Whenever there is any action or change in the body, there is corresponding action or change in the mind ; and vice versa. The correlation or parallelism between mind and body is thorough-going and universal. Every psychosis has its corresponding neurosis. The order and connection of the physical realm is the same as the order and connection of the psychic realm ; "the order of the actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind." Thus in the system of Spinoza, the dualism of substance disappears, but the dualism of attributes remains. Thought and extension are not the attributes of separate substances, but are merged with these in God. Spencer also holds that the mental and bodily phenomena are two parallel series, but, according to him, the ultimate substance which appears in these two parallel series is unknown and unknowable.

But the theory of parallelism cannot adequately explain why mind (thought) and body (extension) which are essentially different from each other should have concomitance or correspondence with each other at all as two parallel series. Secondly, it is difficult to explain mind and body as parallel on the same level with each other. Rather, we are led to think of one being more prominent than the other. In fact, mind is more prominent and fundamental than body, because extended matter or body is known only in terms of mind and through mind. Thirdly, human understandings and reasonings seem to have little physiological correlates ; while sensations and feelings have their corresponding physiological processes to a remarkable degree. So there cannot be any concomitant relation between the two in the same directions. *Lastly, Spinoza's doctrine that wherever there is extension*there is

thought miserably ends in *panpsychism* which is not supported by scientific evidence, because thought or consciousness can not be found in every material body like wood or stone, but is found only in a highly organized nervous system of the body.

(b) **Materialism** :—This theory explains the relation between mind and body by reducing mind to an epiphenomenon or by-product of the brain which is a part of the body. Thus mind is the product of the body. But this theory is not satisfactory, because mind which is conscious cannot be produced by body which is non-conscious. Moreover, we are conscious of the reality of mind which controls and directs bodily energy.

(c) **Idealism** :—According to the idealism of Hegel, mind or spirit is the ultimate reality. One universal supreme spirit (God) which is the ultimate reality of the universe differentiates itself into the world of material bodies and mind as its necessary stages of self-expression. So body and mind, being the manifestations of the same supreme reality, must be organically related to each other and so interaction between them is also possible. Thus mind and body are the same in kind and there is a perfect community between them ; the two being co-substantial, correspondence or interaction between the two is easily conceivable. Mind uses the body as its organ or instrument and acts upon it for its self-expression ; again, body acts upon the mind and thus helps it realise its end.

Hence the idealism of Hegel most adequately explains the relation between mind and body.

VALUE

Q. 1. What is Value ? What are its kinds ?

Value literally means worth or excellence. A thing is said to have value when it has some utility or usefulness and can produce in us some degree of satisfaction. So what is valuable is desirable.

Now, some objects are desired for their own sake and some other objects are desired as mere means for the realisation of some other ends. Accordingly, there are two kinds of values—**intrinsic values** and **extrinsic values**. The **intrinsic values** are ends in themselves and are pursued for their own sake. They do not derive their worths from anything external to themselves, but the source of their worths lies in their very nature or constitution. In this sense Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Individuality and the like can be called **intrinsic values**, as these are the supreme ends and these never borrow their worth from anything external to themselves ; values are rooted in their very beings. Man seeks these values for their own sake as the highest ideals. **Extrinsic values**, on the other hand, are conditional and instrumental values ; these are sought as mere means for the realisation of some other ends ; these do not possess absolute values, but relative values in so far as these serve some other purposes and thus borrow their worths from something external to themselves. For example, money has **extrinsic value** as it is not desirable in itself, but it is sought as a means for some other desirable end i.e., for the commodities it can buy. In this connection it may be said that the commodities themselves are not the supreme end and so do not possess **intrinsic value**, though in the present

case these are the desirable end for which money serves as an instrument. The commodities which seem to be an end in this case will be found to serve some other end, and thus we find a gradation of means and ends in our life. "Sometimes what is intrinsic from one level of our life becomes extrinsic when that level is transcended. But it may be pointed out that from the highest level of our spiritual development the intrinsic values become identical with Absolute Values." What has intrinsic value in the absolute sense must be fully satisfactory in itself; and in this sense the highest ideals of human life *e.g.* Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Individuality etc. should be regarded as intrinsic or absolute values.

Q. 2. Distinguish between Judgment of Fact and Judgment of Value.

From one standpoint we may classify judgments into two types—**Judgment of Fact** and **Judgment of Value**. When in a judgment we find only description of facts and there is no determination of value with reference to any standard or ideal (*e.g.* This flower is red), we get judgment of fact. On the other hand, when in a judgment we determine or appreciate the value or utility of a thing with reference to an ideal (*e.g.* The rose is beautiful), we get judgment of value. Thus a judgment of fact is called descriptive judgment, while a judgment of value is called appreciative judgment. In a judgment of Fact we simply apprehend actual facts of experience and describe these as they actually are. It is our sense-experience which prompts us to make judgments of fact in which we ascribe various predicates to the things or events which we actually experience. On the other hand, in a judgment of value we appraise the worth of objects and evaluate them with reference to some norm, standard or ideal. Here we do not merely describe the given situation, but

express our appreciation or depreciation, approval or disapproval, satisfaction or dissatisfaction regarding the situation. It is our emotional-conative experience, and not mere sense-experience, which prompts us to make a judgment of value in which we commend or condemn a given factual situation. "A judgment of fact and a judgment of value may look alike in respect of their external form but there seems to be a fundamental difference between the two in as much as the latter implies, whereas the former does not, an attitude of the mind to the world a part of which is judged."

Q. 3. What is the nature of value? Is it subjective or objective?

With regard to the nature of values there are different opinions. Some thinkers hold that all values are purely subjective as these are entirely relative to human conditions and thus depend upon mental reactions. Again, some other thinkers hold that the values are objective, because they are independent of subjective feelings or individual preferences, there must be something in the object which makes judgment of value necessary. Again, there is a third view, according to which the values are subjective-objective as in the case of value-judgment we must recognise both the objective ground of valuation and the contribution of the mind in valuation.

(a) **The view that the values are subjective:—** According to this view, the value of a thing is subjective as it entirely depends upon the mental reaction or attitude of the subject. The judgments of value being appreciative judgments, these essentially require the individual's appreciation or depreciation, approval or disapproval, satisfaction or dissatisfaction which are purely individual preferences. When we express the value-judgment "The rain-bow is beautiful," it is not our sense-experience of the rain-bow itself from which

we derive the impression of beauty, but it is our emotional-cognitive experience which is purely our personal attitude that evokes the sense of beauty. As the values are not usual objects of our sense-perception, we cannot regard them as objective qualities of things. The values are nothing but the creations of the individual's private feelings. As the feelings are subjective and variable, so the values are purely subjective experiences which vary from individual to individual, and vary in the case of the same individual from time to time. The ideals of aesthetic and moral values vary from country to country, from age to age, from individual to individual. What is beautiful to one may be ugly to another as tastes differ. What is morally good to one race may be immoral to another as moral notions differ. So reality itself is valueless, and it is our mind which projects the values upon objects according to its peculiar feeling and attitude, taste and temperament. So Lotze, according to whom all values are entirely subjective, defines value by saying, "What we mean by value in the world lies wholly in the feeling of satisfaction or of pleasure which we experience from it." Thus the locus of all values is in the individual mind which appreciates them; they do not exist in the external objects.

"Empirical or psychological and pragmatic theories of value will make all values subjective, because in each of them experience of value is purely subjective reaction. According to the empiricist and pragmatist, not only the existence but also the truth, goodness and beauty of a thing are determined by their being experienced and by their affecting the subject, ill or well, or by their satisfying or subverting the needs of the subject. In any case, it is the element of feeling, either in the form of interest or in the more particular form of interest or in the more particular form of conative satisfaction,

that determines the value of a thing. According to these theories of value all objective values, which are determined by the character of objects valued, are meaningless and illusory." (H. M. Bhattacharyya ; Principles of Philosophy)

(b) **The view that the values are objective :—**According to this view, the values, like other qualities, belong to the objects or realities themselves. Though the value-judgments are appreciative judgments, yet the appreciation or depreciation which implies an attitude of mind is conditioned by the nature of the objective environment ; it is the thing which really evokes the mental reaction of appreciation or depreciation, satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Though tastes or appreciations differ from individual to individual, yet there is something inherent in the very constitution of the object which makes the value-judgment necessary and compels us to evaluate the thing in a particular way. In fact, the value-judgments about Truth, Beauty and Goodness are necessary and universal judgments which are formed according to some common objective standards ; we are necessarily obliged to admit their values which do not depend upon our personal wish, whim, taste or temperament. Value is not a mere feeling of satisfaction, but an object which gives satisfaction. The realists hold that the value must have an objective ground which is independent of subjective feelings. The naive-realistic theory asserts, ' Value is resident in objects, that it is a quality of them on an equal footing with any other.' Moore, a modern realist, also holds that value is completely independent of any human experience or attitude, it attaches to the thing and preserves its entity, no matter whether there is any mind to enjoy it or not.

(c) **The view that the value is subjective-objective :—**According to this view, the values are the subjectively

determined objective qualities. The locus of value is neither exclusively in the object nor exclusively in the mind. "In every value there are two sides—the subject of valuation and the object of value, and the value resides in the relation between the two, and does not exist apart from them." It is, indeed, a quality of the object conditioned by the appreciation of the subject. Value is neither an absolute creation of mind nor has any meaning apart from the valuation or appreciation of the mind. "S. Alexander tries to combine the subjectivist and objectivist theories of value in his theory of emergent evolution. Value, according to him, is neither purely subjective nor purely objective. It is a subjectively conditioned objective reality. Values are emergent qualities of Space-Time. This means that values were not present in the collocations of Space-Time before the appearance of mind in the world but appeared only when Space-Time reached such a degree of integration as to make the emergence of mind possible. They have been added to things and belong to them as truly as their other qualities. Values may be called tertiary qualities but they are not like such empirical qualities of external things as space, colour, fragrance, etc. which can exist whether any body knows them or not. 'Beauty', 'goodness' etc. are neither objective like the primary qualities nor peculiar to mind and thus subjective like consciousness, nor are they like the secondary qualities common both to subjects and objects. They characterise the whole situation consisting of knower and known, of subject and object, which is true or good or beautiful. It can thus be said that values emerge as a result of an amalgamation of spirit with nature." (Dr. K. C. Gupta : Studies in Philosophy ?)

Prof. Alexander's view offers a satisfactory account of the nature of values.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOD

Q. 1. Examine the content of the idea of God as conditioning the world and the Soul or Self.

Or,

Enumerate the attributes of God as an Absolute Being. Can personality be attributed to God ?

According to the theory of teleological evolution, God is the self-realising immanent spirit of the world-system, the evolution of the world being essentially His self-expression. He realises Himself as an actual, concrete, self-conscious living power in and through the world-process. All finite things including man exist for the sake of one ultimate Supreme or absolute end. Thus God is believed to be a Supreme Person who is the creator of the world as well as the moral governor of mankind.

The attributes of God may be viewed from two aspects—
(a) *Causal* and (b) *Moral*.

(a) **Causal attributes of God**—God is the cause of the world. But the idea of God as a cause implies certain attributes in Him. We ascribe to Him **all power or omnipotence**. This means that all power or might is in Him. The second attribute of God is His *unity*. From the physical unity of Nature we prove the oneness of God. We should not suppose more causes of the world if one can account for it. Many causes or gods would involve conflict and contradiction. The third attribute of God is His **Self-existence or absoluteness**. He is a self-sufficient Being depending upon nothing outside Himself. All the conditions are evolved by Him, hence these are not external to Him. Thus God,

being absolute, is also *infinite* and *eternal*. He, being the ultimate cause of the world, Himself remains underived or *causa sui*. Lastly, we should ascribe *intellect* or *rationality* to God. But unlike human intelligence divine intelligence has nothing external to it, but creates everything out of itself. Thus God is one universal cause, the infinite and eternal seat of all power, an omniscient mind ordering all things selected with perfect wisdom.

(b) **Moral attributes of God**—We think of God as a concrete personality in whom the moral ideal is perfectly realised. To God we must ascribe what is highest in our nature. Hence we must ascribe to Him (i) benevolence and love towards His created beings and (ii) justice and impartiality towards moral beings. He regulates benevolence with justice.

Now, some philosophers are of opinion that God, being infinite and absolute cannot be a person. According to them, the personality of God is inconsistent with His infinite character. How can the Absolute be a concrete, self-conscious living power having all the attributes of a person? Thus Balfour holds that God is no doubt a person, but He is finite, because He externally related to men and is limited by them. On the other hand, Spinoza holds that God is an absolute substance, but He is not a person, because He is an abstract reality having no contents to be conscious of. But Hegel most logically shows that God is not only absolute but also a person. God, according to Hegel, is a self-conscious absolute rational principle who involves the plurality of its contents as necessary stages of His self-manifestations and self-fulfilment and thereby attains the concrete unity of experiences and values. The objects of consciousness are not external to God, but are evolved by God from within Himself.

So God, instead of being limited by any not-self, is in the fullest sense a person as the contents of His consciousness are the self-evolved materials of His own life.

Q. 2. Explain the relation of God to the world and man, with special reference to the doctrines of transcendence and immanence of God.

Or,

Discuss the different theories of the relation of God to the world and man.

There are mainly three theories regarding the relation of God to the world and man—(1) *Deism*, (2) *Pantheism* and (3) *Theism*.

(1) **Deism** :—According to this theory, God is wholly external or transcendent to the world and man. Before the creation of the world, God eternally existed in His perfect and self-contained reality as an infinite, immutable, omniscient and omnipotent self-conscious Being. Though He is essentially perfect and self-contained, and has no personal wants or needs, yet at a certain point of time He created the world including living beings out of nothing in accordance with His own will. Thereafter He imparted various necessary mechanical forces into the world for its function. He also imparted free wills into the finite selves created by Him so that they may freely do their own works, good or bad. Thus the world including man attained separate and independent existence outside God. Though the world is thus independent of and separate from God, yet when the world faces any crisis, God for the time being intervenes in it and saves it from decay and disaster. But except in cases of great emergencies the world including man goes on under the influence of its inherent forces and human free wills independent of God just

as a machine becomes independent of its maker and functions out of its own inherent forces.

Criticism :—Though the doctrine of deism as a form of monism believes in one God as the supreme reality of the world and emphasises the freedom of the finite selves, yet it is open to some objections. Firstly, deism assumes that 'the world was created in time, prior to which its Divine cause existed from eternity without it.' Now the question is—why did God create the world at that particular time? Dr. H. Stephens truly remarks, "If God existed from all pre-eternity without a world, it is difficult to understand why He became active and creative at a particular point? What need had God for a world at this point? Why did he not continue wrapt up in His own self-sufficient unity for all post-eternity?" Secondly, deism assumes that God instead of remaining inside the world becomes completely external and transcendent to it after its creation. But against this view it may be said that God would be limited by the world lying external to Him, and thus He would lose His infinitude. Thirdly, if God be aloof from His creation including human beings, then it cannot appeal to the deep religious sense of man. A man of religion wants that God should be very close to him. But a distant deity wholly transcending the world and man destroys His close personal relation to mankind.

(2) **Pantheism** :—According to this theory, God is wholly immanent in the world and man. Pantheism is the view that all is God and God is all, i.e., the world is God and God is the world. While deism holds that God is wholly transcendent and external to the world, pantheism denies the transcendence of God and conceives God as wholly immanent in the spatio-temporal world. In other words, pantheism maintains that God is identical with the world-process and is

its essence or indwelling spirit, and so anything distinct from God is not a reality but an unreal appearance or illusion. God is the only reality ; the world of things and minds are simply aspects or modes of Him, these have no substantial existence of their own ; all finite things are merged and swallowed up in the reality of God who is the only substance. Thus pantheism is called all-God theory, because so much emphasis is laid on the immanence of God that pantheism virtually denies reality to all the things of the world. It denies the substantial reality of the world and recognises the reality of God alone.

Spinoza is the reputed author of the doctrine of pantheism in modern philosophy. He says that God is the absolute substance or reality ; The worlds of things and minds have no real or substantial existence of their own. In India the Upanisads and the Advaita Vedanta philosophy are generally pantheistic, because Brahma or Atman is regarded as the sole reality without any second. The world, according to the Sankara Vedanta, is an unreal and illusory appearance.

Criticism :—Though pantheism emphasises the unity of the universe by making God as essence or indwelling spirit and though it advocates a high-toned religious view by speaking of full dependence of man on God, yet this theory is open to some serious objections. Firstly, pantheism overlooks the concrete nature of the divine personality which objectifies itself in and through the plurality of things and beings. This theory makes God a meaningless abstract unity devoid of objective contents by denying the substantial existence of the world of things and minds. Thus pantheism goes against the testimony of our general self-consciousness which actually reveals that we are real individuals with the feelings of uniqueness. Secondly, pantheism

by denying the independent existence of the finite selves destroys freedom, morality, self-development and values. The attributes, relations and individualities are all reduced to illusions. As all changes, modifications and developments are denied, reality is reduced to a static existence. Subject and object, mind and nature, being merged in the all-swallowing Substance, knowledge-relation becomes an utter impossibility.

(3) **Theism** :—According to this theory, God is both immanent in the world and transcendent to it ; He pervades the world and at the same time transcends it ; His infinite and eternal entity and power are not exhausted within this finite and limited world ; He maintains His existence even by transcending the world ; the world is only a partial expression of God's infinite spirit and power. As in theism God is regarded as both immanent and transcendent in relation to the world, so this theory effects a combination of deism and pantheism.

Martineau and **Hegel** are the main advocates of theism ; but there is a difference between their views. According to the theism of **Martineau**, God is both immanent and transcendent in relation to the physical world or nature, but He is completely transcendent to the finite selves or human beings ; He does not at all reside within them. After creating the selves or men and endowing them with free wills or Volitions, God has kept them quite distinct and separate from Himself and does not interfere with their independent existence and activities. In **Martineau's** view, if God were immanent in the selves or men, then their independent existence and free wills would be hampered ; So God voluntarily reduced His infinitude and made Himself limited and has been residing entirely outside the finite selves. But

we cannot accept Martineau's view on the ground that God who is essentially infinite cannot make Himself finite even by His will.

On the other hand, according to the theism of Hegel, God is immanent and transcendent in relation to both the world and the finite selves or men; both the world and the finite selves are the self-expressions of God, but His existence and power being infinite and eternal, He is not exhausted within the limit of the world and selves through which He reveals Himself. He even transcends them and resides in His own perfect, eternal and infinite nature. In one word, God is immanent in both the world and men and at the same time is also transcendent to them. This kind of theism as advocated by Hegel is known as **Pan-en-theism**, because God includes and comprehends both the world and selves within His own infinite and perfect existence. All is in God (pan=all, en=in, theos=God).

Hegel's **Panentheism** has rightly recognised only one fundamental reality of God who does not negate the objective contents of the universe, but who realises His concrete nature by eternally evolving out of His own infinite being the world of things and minds and giving them reality of different degrees. "The world of things and minds instead by being absorbed in the all-inclusive reality of God, enjoys relative reality, discharges its function and realises its values within the concrete reality of God." The diversities of the world and spirits are evolved by God and are sustained or preserved within Him; again, God Himself as a concrete unity necessarily unfolds Himself in and through the plurality of things and minds and realises His development, richness and fulfilment through them. Thus

Hegel's panentheism offers a most satisfactory view of the relation of God to the world and men.

Q. 3. Explain and examine Deism as a theory regarding the relation between God and the world.

According to Deism, God is wholly external or transcendent to the world and man. Before the creation of the world God eternally existed in His perfect and self-contained reality as an infinite, immutable, omniscient and omnipotent self-conscious Being. Though He is essentially perfect and self-contained, and has no personal wants or needs, yet at a certain point of time He created the world including living beings out of nothing in accordance with His own will for giving joy and happiness to the living beings. Again, some thinkers hold that there was matter independently existing outside God, and God created the world out of the pre-existing matter. Thereafter He imparted various necessary mechanical forces into the world for its function. Thus the world, being created by God, attains its separate and independent existence outside Him and runs on by itself in accordance with its inherent laws and forces without constant divine intervention. As God created the world, He is regarded as its first or primary cause; and the necessary physical forces imparted by God into the world are called the second causes, because these forces enable it to go on of itself and perform its own works. Though the world is thus independent of and separate from God, yet when the world faces any crisis, God for the time being intervenes in it and saves it from decay and disaster.

God created not only the world, but also the different finite selves. Thereafter God imparted into them free wills, and with the freedom of the wills the finite selves do their own works, good or bad, and can commit even moral evils or

sins transgressing the divine purpose and thus workout their own destiny. So the free wills also are the second causes. Of course, when the human race is about to decay due to excessive sins and corruptions, God for the time being intervenes in order to save the society from decay. But except in cases of great emergencies the world including man goes on under the influence of the secondary causes being independent of God just as a machine becomes independent of the maker and functions out of its own inherent forces.

Criticism :—Though the doctrine of deism as a form of monism believes in one God as the supreme reality of the world and emphasises the freedom of the finite selves, yet it is open to the following objections :—

(a) Deism is based upon the theory of creation of the world at a particular point of time which goes against the evidences of science in favour of evolution, so deism cannot be supported on scientific grounds.

(b) Deism assumes that 'the world was created in time, prior to which its Divine cause existed from eternity without it.' Now the question is—why did God create the world at that particular time? Dr. H. Stephens truly remarks, "If God existed from all pre-eternity without a world, it is difficult to understand why He became active and creative at a particular point? What need had God for a world at this point? Why did He not continue wrapt up in His own self-sufficient unity for all post-eternity?" If He had no want or need of His own (which He as a perfect Being should not have), then did He create the world out of His whim and arbitrariness? Again, God is eternally a conscious Being, and consciousness necessarily involves an object. So the world must be the object of Divine consciousness. God as supreme consciousness would be an empty abstraction.

without the world which is the objective content of His consciousness. So when God is eternal, the world as God's necessary object of consciousness must also be eternal and thus the world must have existed from eternity at least in a rudimentary form. The existence of all-conscious and all-knowing God is not possible for a single moment without the world which is His necessary manifestation or objectification. So an eternal correlativity of God and the world must be admitted.

(c) Deism assumes that God instead of remaining inside the world becomes completely external and transcendent to it. In other words, God resides outside the world and man after creation is complete. But against this deistic view it may be said that God is essentially infinite and all-pervading. If there be any world outside Him, then God would be limited by it and in that case He would lose His infinitude. Hence at least for the preservation of the infinite and unlimited character of God we cannot conceive anything outside Him. We must admit that God as an infinite Being is immanent in the world and at the same time transcends it.

(d) Deism holds that after the creation of the world God resides outside it and remains indifferent to it. He does not usually think of it as it independently goes on under the influence of its inherent secondary causes, but He intervenes only in times of emergency. But it may be asked here that if God be aloof from His creation and indifferent to it, then why should He be suddenly eager to save the world during emergency? This shows that God never remains indifferent to and aloof from His creation, but has an intimate relation to it. Really speaking, the world cannot go on under the influence of its mechanical forces. If God be not immanent in the world as its regulative and guiding principle, we cannot

explain the order and design, unity and harmony of the world-system.

(e) The deistic view is too anthropomorphic, as the relation between God and the world has been conceived in analogy with the relation between a human artificer and his machine. But this analogy is not sound. A human machine-maker is furnished with necessary materials lying outside him out of which he makes a machine, and he makes the machine to earn his livelihood. But God creates the world out of His own self and from nothing outside Him, and He cannot be prompted by any feeling of want for the fulfilment of which he may create the world.

(f) The doctrine of deism does not generally appeal to the deep religious sense of man. A man of religion wants that God should be very close to him and that He must be a loving God who has absorbing interest in man. But Deism speaks of a distant deity wholly transcending the world and thus this theory destroys the close personal relation between God and man. Again, deism suggests that man enjoys absolute freedom being wholly independent of the divine interference. But we should point out that human will can not claim absolute freedom, but enjoys only relative freedom quite in harmony and consistency with the universal divine will.

Q. 4. Explain and examine Pantheism as a theory of the relation between God and the world.

According to Pantheism, God is wholly immanent in the world and man. Pantheism is the view that all is God and God is all, i.e. the world is God and God is the world. Thus this theory is a reaction to Deism. While deism holds that God is wholly transcendent or external to the world, pantheism denies the transcendence of God and conceives

God as wholly immanent in the spatio-temporal world. In other words, pantheism maintains that God is identical with the world-process and is its essence or indwelling spirit, and so anything distinct from God is not a reality but an unreal appearance or illusion. God is the only reality ; the worlds of things and minds are simply aspects or modes of Him, these have no substantial existence of their own ; all finite beings are merged and swallowed up in the reality of God who is the only substance. Thus pantheism is called all-God theory, because so much emphasis is laid on the immanence of God that pantheism virtually denies reality to all the things of the world.

The theory of pantheism is called by several names. It is known as the doctrine of complete divine immanence since it lays sole emphasis that God is wholly immanent in the world and is identical with it. It is also called abstract monism in as much as it abstracts the one from the many and admits the reality of the one only at the cost of the many. Again, this theory is known as acosmism as it denies the substantial reality of the cosmos or world and recognises the reality of God alone. Some forms of pantheism speak of the finite things and beings as mere modes or modifications of God who is the absolute substance, while some other forms go to the extreme of characterising the finite things and beings as illusory. But whatever may be the forms of pantheism, it pays scant attention to the finites and glorifies God, the absolute substance, as the only reality. As a result, the substantive existence of the forces of nature and volitions of man is denied for all practical purposes.

Pantheism originates from a sense of dependence of the thing of the universe which cannot be regarded as self-existent or independent. Spinoza is the reputed author of

this doctrine in modern philosophy. He says that God is the absolute substance or reality ; the worlds of things and minds have no real or substantial existence of their own. "Individual things lack independence of every sort.....Finite things are modi of the infinite substance, mere states, variable states, of God. By themselves they are nothing, since out of God nothing exists. They possess existence only in so far as they are conceived in their connection with the infinite, that is, as transitory forms of the unchangeable substance." In India, the Upanisads and the Advaita Vedanta philosophy are generally pantheistic, because Brahma or Atman is regarded as the sole reality without any second. The world, according to the Sankara Vedanta, is an unreal and illusory appearance.

Criticism :—The great merit of pantheism is that it emphasises the unity of the universe and makes God the essence or indwelling spirit of all things. In this respect, it is more satisfactory than pluralism, materialism and deism. Again, pantheism advocates a high-toned religious view as it speaks of full dependence of man on the supreme Being who is his essence or indwelling spirit. If any man believes that God is everything and everything is God, then such a man will undergo such a modification that he cannot but do what is right, and Sins will never touch him. In fact, the pantheists in all ages are noted for their spotless character and high-toned religious sense. We find how chaste are the lives of the pantheists like Parmenides, Spinoza and the Vedantists in general "The attraction of Pantheism and of pantheistic systems of philosophy lies in this, that they meet the cravings of the religious mind for absolute union with God and of the speculative mind for intellectual unity." (John Caird).

It is a matter of great regret that Pantheism has been

misunderstood by some writers as painted atheism. But it is nothing but gross misinterpretation of pantheism which really lays sole emphasis on God and inspires man to merge himself in God, while atheism denies God altogether.

Pantheism, however, is open to the following serious objections :—

(a) As in pantheism God is viewed as wholly immanent in the world, the whole being of God has thus been completely exhausted within the world and He has no scope of transcending the limit of the world. In this way God has been reduced to a finite thing and His infinitude has been lost. But, according to the pantheists, God is an infinite substance. Then how can He be limited to the world ? So we must admit that God is both immanent in the world and at the same time transcendent to it in order to preserve His infinite character.

(b) According to pantheism, God alone is the reality, while the world and man have no substantial existence of their own. But if God does not express Himself in and through diverse objects, He will be a meaningless abstract unity devoid of objective contents. In fact, God must be admitted as a concrete unity who objectifies Himself in and through the plurality of the things and beings and attains His development, richness and fulfilment through them. But pantheism overlooks this aspect.

(c) Pantheism goes against the testimony of our general self-consciousness which actually reveals that we are real individuals with the feelings of uniqueness.

(d) Religion presupposes a relative distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped. But if we accept pantheism, then the worshipper becomes a non-entity. In that case there will remain nobody to worship God. So pantheism appears to be unsatisfactory from the religious standpoint.

(e) Pantheism by denying the independent existence of the finite selves destroys freedom, morality, self-development and values.

To sum up : Pantheism makes Reality an abstract unity devoid of all contents. The attributes, relations and individualities are reduced to illusions. As all changes, modifications and developments are denied, reality is reduced to a static existence. "Causal efficacy is replaced by mathematical necessity and all values are reduced to colourless facts. Our distinctions between truth and error, good and bad, and between beauty and ugliness become meaningless, as the entire system of things is transformed into a realm of mechanism. Moral responsibility becomes an empty ethical concept and freedom a convention of speech. Subject and object, mind and nature are merged in the all-swallowing substance to the utter impossibility of knowledge-relation." (H. M. Bhattacharyya : The Principles of Philosophy).

Q. 5. Give an account of Theism as a theory regarding the relation between God and the World.

Or

How far does Theism reconcile Deism and Pantheism ?

Or

What, according to you, is the consistent and satisfactory theory of the relation between God and the World ?

By Theism we generally mean the view which recognises the existence of God. But the word 'Theism' is also used in a special sense in which it is a view of the relation between God and the world. Theism will be discussed here only in this special sense. According to this special sense of theism, God is both immanent in the world and transcendent to it ; He pervades the world and at the same time transcends it ;

His infinite and eternal entity and power are not exhausted within this finite and limited world; He maintains His existence even by transcending the world; the world is only a partial expression of God's infinite spirit and power. As in theism God is regarded as both immanent and transcendent in relation to the world, so this theory effects a combination of deism and pantheism.

In fact, both deism and pantheism have been reconciled in theism with their defects and errors duly corrected. According to Pantheism, God is wholly immanent in the world i.e., He pervades the world and is wholly identified with it; no object of the world can exist distinct from, and independent of, God; God and the world are the same and non-different. But in pantheism God being regarded as wholly immanent in the world, His infinite and eternal power has been exhausted in the finite world and His existence outside the world has not been admitted; as a result, God who is essentially infinite has been reduced to finite and limited existence. Secondly, in pantheism the reality of God alone has been recognised, but the substantial existence of the world has been denied. On the other hand, according to Deism, God is wholly transcendent or external to the world. But in deism though the substantial existence of the world is recognised, yet God becomes virtually limited by the separate and independent existence of the world, because according to this theory, God is not at all immanent in the world but He wholly transcends it. Moreover, as deism does not recognise any internal and organic relation between God and the world, it cannot properly explain the natural expression and self-realisation of God in and through the world. But theism which recognises both the immanence and transcendence of God in relation to the world has duly removed the defects of

both deism and pantheism. According to theism, God is neither wholly transcendent to the world nor wholly immanent in it; He pervades the world and at the same time remains outside it. Hence His infinite being is not completely exhausted within the world nor limited by the world, being outside it. Moreover, this theory recognises that there is an intimate and organic relation between God and the world, and God eternally expresses Himself and realises His essential nature in and through the world-process. In theism an inseparable relation between God and the world is recognised, and the real nature of one apart from the other cannot be conceived. The existence of God and the existence of the world are thought to be correlative; the creation and preservation of the world are not possible without God; again, God can not be an active and living conscious Self without creating the world. Hence as God is necessary to the world, the world also is necessary to God, being His necessary self-expression in and through which He eternally realises His concrete nature.

Martineau and Hegel are the main advocates of theism; but there is a difference between their views. According to the theism of Martineau, God is both immanent and transcendent in relation to the physical world or Nature, but He is completely transcendent to the finite selves or human beings, He does not at all reside within them. After creating the selves or men, and endowing them with free wills or volitions, God has kept them quite distinct and separate from Himself and does not interfere with their independent existence and activities. So the selves or men who are invested with freedom of wills are not at all the passive instruments of God, but they move on their own initiative, act according to their own needs or purposes and work out their own destiny.

Martineau holds that God is both inside and outside the external material world ; so the power which is revealed in Nature or the material world is only a part of the divine energy, His infinite possibility is not completely exhausted in the actual order of space and time in the material world, but remains even outside it. But, in Martineau's view, if God be immanent in the selves, or men, then the independent existence and free wills of the selves or men will be hampered ; moreover, the sins committed by the finite selves will defile the Holy God ; so God voluntarily reduced His infinitude and made Himself limited and has been residing entirely outside the finite selves or human beings without being at all immanent in them, so that the freedom of the finite individual selves may be saved. Of course, though God does not bear any internal or organic relation to the finite selves, yet He is not actually indifferent to their interests and actions ; indeed, He is the perfect form of the selves' moral ideals and the different selves of the world proceed along the paths of their respective duties by pursuing the supreme purpose and design of the Divine Being. In the words of Martineau, God is 'the cause of all our possibilities without being responsible for our actualities.' "Theism is in no way committed to the doctrine of God external to the world, but is at liberty to regard all the cosmical forces as varieties of the method assumed by his conscious causality, and the whole of Nature is the evolution of his thought." "The whole external universe we unreservedly surrender to the Indwelling Will, of which it is the organized expression." But, however, "the voluntary nature of moral beings must be saved from pantheistic absorption, and be left standing as, within its sphere, a free cause other than the Divine, yet homogeneus with it." This in brief, is the account of theism given by Martineau.

On the other hand, according to the theism of Hegel, God is immanent and transcendent in relation to both the world and the finite selves or men ; both the world and the finite selves are the self-expressions of God, but His existence and power being infinite and eternal, He is not exhausted within the limit of the world and selves through which He reveals Himself, He even transcends them and resides in His own perfect, eternal and infinite nature. In one word, God is immanent in both the world and selves and at the same time is also transcendent to them. This kind of theism as advocated by Hegel is known as **Pan-en-theism**, because, according to this view, God includes and comprehends both the world and selves within His own infinite and perfect existence. *All is in God* (*Pan = all, en = in, theos = God*).

If we compare the views of Martineau and Hegel, we find that the theism of Martineau has certain defects, while the theism advocated by Hegel is free from the defects and as such it is satisfactory. In Martineau's theism, God is considered as wholly transcendent or external to the selves or men ; in that case God becomes limited by them. Of course, it has been held by Martineau that such limitation is the voluntary self-limitation on the part of the divine being ; but, we should point out, that it is not possible for God who is essentially infinite and unlimited to become so limited. Secondly, the selves which are in fact finite and imperfect cannot have absolute freedom nor can exist wholly independent of, and apart from, God. In religious life the selves must be inseparably related to God ; the absolute independence or freedom on the part of the selves virtually amounts to licentiousness or lawlessness ; the wills of the finite selves must be limited by the divine will, the operation of the human wills is in fact restricted in accordance with the divine

plan and purpose. Moreover, if God do not guide and control human actions, He cannot be really called omnipotent. On the other hand, Hegel's panentheism has rightly recognised the relative freedom and independence of the finite selves as they are considered the partial and finite expressions of the Supreme divine self; though the finite selves are endowed with the power of self-determination, yet they have not been completely separated from the divine control and guidance, rather an organic and inseparable relation between God and the selves has been established so that the wills of the selves cannot go beyond the divine plan and frustrate the divine purpose. God, being immanent in the selves or human beings, order, harmony and sense of responsibility prevail in human actions, and an irresistible effort to realise the divine self is noticed in the human spirits. In short, according to Hegel's panentheism, both the world and selves or men are the objective expressions of God, and He has been realising His own self and supreme purpose in and through them. It is the essential nature of the Divine Spirit to comprehend the world and selves within its perfect and infinite self as a concrete principle of unity-in-plurality. Indeed, God is a supremely perfect and concrete Being. He is immanent in the world and finite spirits because these are His objective manifestations; again, He transcends them as their supreme ideal. The diversities of the world and spirits are evolved by God and are sustained or preserved within Him; again, God Himself as a concrete unity necessarily unfolds Himself in and through the plurality of the things and beings and realises His development, richness and fulfilment through them. "God as a dynamic reality realises His own nature by differentiating Himself into the world of things and minds, with its attributes and relations, for therein lie His self."

realisation and self-fulfilment." Hegel's panentheism may also be called concrete monotheism or concrete monism as it recognises only one fundamental reality of God who, of course, does not negate the objective contents of the universe, but who realises His concrete nature by eternally evolving out of His own infinite being the world of things and minds and giving them reality of different degrees. "The world of things and minds instead of being absorbed in the all-inclusive reality of God, enjoys relative reality, discharges its function and realises its values within the concrete reality of God."

Q. 6. Is there any distinction between God and the Absolute ?

The Absolute is a self-existent and all-comprehensive reality ; it is self-sufficient and thus it depends upon nothing outside itself. All the conditions are evolved by it from within itself, hence these are not external to it. It is the ultimate cause of the world and thus it itself is underived. It is also regarded as the all-inclusive and all consistent experience or universal principle upon which all particulars depend. When the Absolute is considered by us from the emotional point of view and adored as the ultimate source of all our values, it is identical with God holding personal relation to mankind. Thus Hegel, the chief advocate of absolute idealism, identifies the Absolute of his philosophy with the God of religion. To Hegel God who is the Supreme Person is Himself the absolute reality ; He is the highest self-conscious principle of an organic unity of the world and finite selves and the ultimate explanation of the world of experience. God as an absolute spirit comprehends the world and selves within His perfect and infinite self as a concrete principle of unity-in-plurality. Thus, according to Hegel, God and the Absolute are one and the same. In this connec-

tion Hegel differs from Spinoza. In the absolutism of Spinoza we see that God is, no doubt, the absolute substance, but his Absolute or God is an impersonal abstract reality; on the other hand, in Hegel's philosophy we find that God or the Absolute is a living, self-conscious concrete personality, and the finite world and finite spirits are the objective expressions or differentiations of the one all-inclusive Absolute or God. Whereas Spinoza's God or the Absolute substance is "conceived statically after the manner of geometrical categories, what we have in Hegel is the dynamic self-evolution of the Absolute Idea after the manner of a living spirit. In Hegelianism we have the infusion of Heracleitean flux into the very heart of Eleatic Being."

There are, however, certain schools of thought which do not admit the identity of the God of religion with the Absolute of Philosophy. Arguments denying the identity between God and the Absolute have been put forward from two very important quarters—one is represented by the modern pluralists like James, Ward, Rashdall, Mc. Taggart, Schiller and Howison; and the other is represented by the absolutists like Bradley and Bosanquet and also Sankara, the founder of the Advaita Vedanta.

The modern pluralists assert that God is finite; and the Absolute is not God alone, but a system or unity containing God and all other finite things and spirits. So God falls short of the Absolute. Thus James points out that God is 'only one of the eaches' of the distributive world; and the Absolute is the wider cosmic whole of which God is a portion. Thus, according to the pluralists, the Absolute is a logical principle of impersonal unity, while God is a concrete but finite personality. In the hands of the pluralists God becomes

so finite and personal that He is degraded to the human level and is subjected to the flow and flux of time.

A sharp contrast between God and the Absolute is also emphasised in the absolutism of Bradley and Bosanquet. To Bradley the Absolute is not God. "The Absolute is neither personal nor impersonal but is a Supra-personal all-inclusive experience. The Absolute is related to nothing, because all relation implies limitation and therefore imperfection. In religion the finite wills of men stand in practical relation to God as in worship and prayer. Therefore, religion makes God imperfect by the very relation of the finite and the infinite will." Thus, according to Bradley, the Absolute of philosophy is the highest reality, and the personal God of religion is only the appearance of the Absolute to the religious consciousness. Bradley says, "For me the Absolute is not God. God for me has no meaning outside of the religious consciousness, and that essentially is practical. The Absolute for me cannot be God, because in the end the Absolute is related to nothing, and the cannot be a practical relation between it and the finite will." Bosanquet also says that the Absolute alone is the true or complete Individual. He refuses to identify it with the God of religion. Sankara also draws a distinction between Brahman (the Absolute) and Isvara (God). The Absolute, according to him, is undifferentiated Being, an abstract principle of pure consciousness, an impersonal entity devoid of attributes; while God or Isvara appears as a personal being endowed with attributes. Isvara, who holds a personal relation to the worshipper and is regarded as the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer of the world is, according to Sankara, real only from the ordinary practical standpoint, but illusory from the highest or ultimate

(*pāramārthika*) point of view. To Sankara Brahman or the Absolute alone is real.

The distinction between God and the Absolute as emphasised by the pluralists on the one hand and by the absolutists on the other is not acceptable to us. The conception of God as a finite spirit or as a mere appearance of the Absolute does not satisfy man's religious aspirations. To a worshipper God is always viewed as the absolute reality, and not as a being of lower category. In other words, God Himself is worshipped as the absolute reality, as the infinite spirit and as the perfect embodiment of the ideal values—Truth, Beauty, Goodness and the Holy. The Absolute is not an abstract reality, but a concrete principle which includes the finite and particular things of experience and at the same time goes beyond them. The Absolute is a concrete unity, an identity-in-difference, which comprehends and organizes the diverse finite experiences into a system. Thus the Absolute cannot be treated as an abstract, impersonal being, but should be regarded as a concrete, Supreme Person or God Himself. Ramanuja rightly identifies *Isvara* with *Brahma* possessed of excellent attributes. Royce, a Neo-Hegelian, also identifies God with the Absolute. He regards God as an infinite self conscious spirit with infinite knowledge, love and will. God instead of falling short of the Absolute is Himself the absolute reality. In this connection Dr. Radhakrishnan's view is worth-mentioning. According to him, the self, God and Absolute are the different aspects of the one universal spirit. "The self is the manifestation of the spirit in the human centre, through the body and mind of man. God is the spirit conceived as the reality manifested in the world at large, Absolute is the spirit conceived as the infinite possibility of

which the present world is only one actual manifestation.' (Dr. D. M. Datta : Contemporary Philosophy).

Q. 7. How is the individual self related to God or the Absolute ?

To understand the relation between God and the individual self it is necessary to explain at the outset what we mean by the self and God. The individual selves are finite persons each of whom is a relatively free and independent agent acting for his own ends and occupying a unique place in the world of objects. As for the idea of God we may say without much fear of contradiction that it is the idea of a perfect and infinite spirit who is self-existent and is the ground and reason for the existence of the world of finite things and beings and is, in this sense, the creator of the world of finite objects

According to the pluralistic idealism of Prof. Ward, Howison and others, God is to be conceived as a spirit who is distinctly real in relation to the other distinctly real finite-selves. The finite selves are eternal and self-existent centres of free activity. They are not created by God in the same way as machines are made by us or a pot is made by a potter. God is the final cause that moves other selves towards the divine end and make them freely cooperate as members of a republic for the realisation of a supreme common ideal. God is thus wholly transcendent in relation to the finite selves. He is the final cause in relation to finite spirit. On this view, therefore, God is a supreme self above otherselves who are as real and independent as God Himself. He is the head of city of free citizens. According to pluralistic idealism, the finite selves are uncreated and self-existent free beings. Each of them has an independence of his own although they are all members of a society. If it be asked how are these free and

independent persons harmonised into a society, the answer given is that it is by attraction of an ideal vision, the vision of the city of God.

But the above pluralistic view of the relation between God and finite selves is open to certain series of objections. While admitting that a self cannot be the result of efficient causation, we cannot say that finite selves are self-existent and eternal. It is by some immanent activity from within that they grow into real centres of activity.

Further, it is difficult to understand how pluralism can be consistent with the unity of the world as that is implied in its idea of a society of selves working for a common idea. If, on the other hand, we take pluralism strictly and say that the world is purely an association of independent spirits and God is only a member or the presiding member of the association, then the unity of association becomes finite and limited and ceases to be the infinite and omnipotent spirit who is the God of religion.

Spinoza, on the other hand, holds that God is immanent in both world and man. So man has no independent existence apart from God. As God is immanent in man, man is deprived of his real or substantive existence. He is nothing but illusory modes. Let us turn to the philosophy of monistic idealism or absolute idealism. The different schools of idealism agree in accepting the Hegelian conception of God as the absolute spirit who has evolved the whole world of finite things and minds from within Himself and in whom, therefore, finite selves are included as factor or organs of the divine life. Finite selves have no reality outside and independent of God. They are relatively real and free selves as included within and conditioned by God.

According to Bradley and Basanquet, finite selves have no ultimate reality and individuality. The absolute is the all-inclusive reality. The plurality of souls is an appearance due to imperfection incidental in their finitude. In the absolute, they are absorbed, transformed and finally lost. Their separate and distinct existence vanishes and they become one with the Absolute when they reach their perfection. Pringle Pattison thinks that this view is inconsistent with our greater experience. Our deepest religious experience and our highest moral and aesthetic sentiments bear unmistakable testimony to our true reality and distinct individuality as finite agents or free persons. Even in the feelings of unity with God or the Absolute there is embodied a recognition of ourselves, as distinct selves who desire and enjoy the feelings of one-ness with God.

Prof. Royce offers the following solutions of the above difficulty. According to him, the real ego of man is the totality of his experiences in so far as he consciously views them as, in their meaning, the struggling but never completed, expression of his coherent idea of life. The ego is an individual only in relation to its consciously selected unique purpose. But at the same time its individuality is not lost in the absolute divine purpose since the uniqueness that is consisting of the individual self is itself a portion of the divine purpose. Moreover, the individual is also free because the uniqueness constituting his nature is determined by nothing in the absolute purpose except this uniqueness itself and also because the individual's selected purpose is determined neither by the contents of his experience nor by the necessity of his thought. The individual is thus free in the freedom whereby God selects his unique purpose that constitutes the individuality of this individual. Our very existence

is the embodiment of the divine freedom. We are free with identically the same freedom as is God's freedom. Our freely chosen purpose which is our self is God's purely chosen purpose. We are each an individual as representing a unique purpose. The absolute purpose is thus a unity of many purposes and each purpose within it represents a distinct individual. Hence finite selves do not lose their reality and freedom even when included within God or the Absolute. The Absolute includes within itself all finite selves each of which 'is striving to realise a purpose which is a fraction of the absolute purpose'.

FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY

Q. 1. Is the human will free ? How is the conception of human freedom consistent with divine fore-knowledge or omniscience ?

Or,

“Finite beings are ruled by necessity.” Give a critical exposition of this view.

Or,

How is the concept of human freedom reconcilable with the idea of causality ?

There is a long-drawn controversy regarding the problem human freedom. Is human will free or is it thoroughly determined by external circumstances ? Those who uphold human freedom maintain that human actions are not completely determined by external conditions, but are determined by his own self or character and regulated by his own choice. On the other hand, those who deny human freedom maintain that man is a passive creature of external circumstances, his actions are thoroughly determined by his own organic conditions and physical and social environment in which he lives, moves and has his being. Hence there are two opposite theories which are explained below :—

(1) Necessitarianism or Determinism :—According to this theory, human will is not free ; man has no freedom at all. D' Arcy has very clearly explained the theory of necessitarianism or determinism in the following words :—“The Determinist holds that in every case volition is determined by the strongest motive. In most cases the man yields at once,

because there is just one motive influencing him at the time. But sometimes there is a conflict. Opposing motives meet in his mind, and whichever motive is strongest prevails and, consequently, determines the action. But, in no case, according to this theory, can the man be said to be self-determined. The mind is regarded as a field whereon motives of many sorts contend and decide. Action always follows, and must follow, the strongest motive; just as the physical effect always follows, and must follow, the physical cause. The Determinist goes further still and refers all motives to facts and events which he regards as independent of the will. He makes the decisions of the self arise ultimately by physical causation out of the not-self. Motives, according to this theory, originate from the interaction of character and circumstances. Any one who knew a man's character and circumstances accurately, could foretell his conduct with unerring precision. Character alters, of course, during life, but it alters according to necessary laws. It must be traced ultimately to circumstances, the constitution of the man's bodily organism, the things and events he has seen and experienced, and certain mental predispositions which are his by heredity." Thus man is always determined by things and events which are external to his own self. Now, the modern determinists, in support of their view, refer to (a) the law of causation and (b) the possibility of fore-knowledge.

(a) As every event must have a cause, so every human action must be due to some antecedent cause. In that case human action is not free, but is determined by some antecedent cause. In the language of Hume, "Necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently liberty, by removing necessity, removes all causes, and is the very same thing with chance....Our actions have a constant union with

our motives, tempers, and circumstances." Hence liberty-theory cannot stand.

b) It is possible to predict the future actions of man. This possibility of fore-knowledge of human actions implies pre-determination. We can foresee human actions, because they are determined by antecedent causes (antecedent causes being known, future actions of man can easily be foreseen). Moreover, God who is the omniscient spirit and all-conscious governor of human beings can foresee all actions of man and thus can determine them beforehand. So human will and action cannot be free.

(2) **The Theory of Free-Will, Liberty of Self-determination.**—According to this theory, human will is free. Though man is influenced by external physical and conditions, yet he has the power of reacting upon them and can determine the direction and strength of his own desires and motives by the exercise of his own reason. Man is not the passive product of circumstances, but is an active rational being who can make free choice between alternative courses of actions. Secondly, freedom of will does not mean that man should discharge his actions without any cause. In fact, his action is caused and determined by his own self and character. Our self-consciousness confirms that our self determines our actions, and we are not entirely determined by things which are outside our control. We are clearly conscious in every action that we are free to do it or not to do it. Lastly, the fact that future actions of man can be foreknown does not imply that these actions are already pre-determined. We can predict the actions of free agents if we know their motives and circumstances. It is a common occurrence that different persons choose and act similarly under the same circumstances. From this we should not say that they have no

freedom of will. "That different persons act in the same way when they have the same reason for doing so, is not inconsistent with their acting freely." Even divine foreknowledge of human actions does not disprove human freedom. Our belief that God foresees human actions does not imply that He determines beforehand how men shall act. God does not infer the future from the past; to Him the past, the present and the future are all present immediately and intuitively in 'one eternal Now.' Divine consciousness does not involve any process of time-series; the distinction of prior and posterior or before and after is not applicable to God; so divine foreknowledge does not indicate any pre-determination. Leibnitz rightly remarked, "God foresaw the sin, but He did not force the man to commit it." Hence foreknowledge does not destroy freedom. Again, some thinkers hold that God has foreknowledge of the general outline or possibilities of human actions, and not of the actual details of human actions. Moreover, man who is a finite reproduction of God partakes of the freedom of God and thus exercises his power of self-determination and self-regulation in his finite and limited sphere of existence.

A comparative study of the two opposite theories explained above, shows that the theory of free-will or self-determination is more satisfactory. Though man is not absolutely free, yet he has relative freedom. Man can adapt his desires and determine the course of his actions by freely exercising his power of rational self-determination with a view to realising his own highest good.

Q. 2. Are there any grounds for believing in the immortality of soul?

Or,

What reasons are there for thinking that the human

mind continues to exist after the dissolution of the physical organism ?

There is a good deal of controversy with regard to the question of the immortality of soul. We cannot verify in our experience our belief in the immortality of soul. Our idea of self-realization and of evolving personality makes us cherish the faith that we shall survive our death i.e. the disintegration of the body and enter into new systems of relations in order to fulfil our functions as a factor of the world-plan.

Though there is no empirical proof or evidence for our belief in the immortality of soul, the Society for Psychical Research has tried to demonstrate the belief in immortality scientifically. The spiritistic phenomena like 'mediumistic trance', 'automatic writing', 'messages' coming from spirits, etc. claim to demonstrate the continuation of soul after death. But, in our view, the empirical evidences furnished by the psychic research society have not yet been able to establish the continued immortality of soul.

Plato and others have advanced some metaphysical arguments for the immortality of soul. According to Plato, the soul cannot be decomposed, because it is simple and indivisible. Again, reason which is essentially a divine element is the essence of the soul. So the soul which has a divine element as its essence is not perishable. Moreover, the soul had existed in the eternal world of ideas before it entered the body. Hence after death it will pass to the eternal world of ideas again. According to Aristotle, soul has passive and active intellect; the passive intellect is perishable as it depends upon the body, but the active

intellect, being absolutely spiritual, is immortal and becomes identical with God. Berkely follows Plato and holds that the soul is immortal, because it is simple, indivisible and incorporeal. Leibnitz in similar manner maintains that the soul is immortal, because it is spiritual.

Martineau discusses the problem of immortality of soul by considering death in its three different aspects :—

- (1) Death in its physiological aspect,
- (2) Death in its metaphysical aspect,
- (3) Death in its moral aspect.

(1) **Death in its physiological aspect :—**“Death, in its physiological aspect, is simply a case of transformation of energy. On death, the body is decomposed into its elements, and the vital forces of the organism are dissipated. But these forces, according to the Law of Conservation of Energy, are not totally lost. Now, the Law of Conservation of Energy either includes mental energy or excludes it. If it applies to physical energy only, then the mind or soul is independent of matter, and therefore may continue after death. The soul is not affected by the dissolution of the body. If, on the other hand, the law applies to physical as well as mental energy, then mental energy is not absolutely lost after death, but continues to exist in some form or other, just as physical energy is not lost. Thus immortality of the soul is not inconsistent with the Law of Conservation of Energy.” (Dr. J. N. Sinha : Introduction to Philosophy).

(2) **Death in its metaphysical aspect :—**The metaphysical interpretation of death presses upon us the questions—What is it that survives the perishable organism? If we call it the soul, what is the soul, what is the idea of it?

The ancient philosophers regarded the soul as a subtle material thing which passes out of the body at death. To them soul was a mere visible ghost. But the modern conception of the soul is based upon the ultimate distinction between the subject and the object. The self is conceived as the conscious subject which remains essentially the same in the midst of perpetual changes in the object of consciousness. So the soul or self which is a principle of unity and continuity underlying the changing states and process is itself indestructible and has eternal scope of realising itself as an identical principle.

(3) Death in its moral aspects :—In this connection Martineau refers to the 'vaticinations' or indications that there is after-life for which the present life is a mere preparation. Martineau here speaks of (a) *Vaticinations of the intellect*, (b) *Vaticinations of the conscience* and (c) *Vaticinations in suspense*.

(a) Vaticinations of the intellect :—Though human intellect is limited by space and time, yet the intellect has a tendency to develop its power to gradually transcend the limitations of space and time. But, as the aspiration of the intellect cannot be fully satisfied in the present life, we may reasonably believe in future life after death when the intellect will be able to overcome the bounds of space and time completely and attain its full development.

(b) Vaticinations of the conscience :—Our conscience indicates that we should continue our existence even after death, because our self will require infinite time to realize the ideal of perfection. Thus the present life is a mere preparation for a future life when we can attain higher position in the progressive scale of moral excellence. Continuous progress towards perfection presupposes the continued existence of the

soul. Hence we are to believe in an after-life in which we may make further progress towards perfection.

^d(c) **Vaticinations in suspense :—**An after-life is also implied in our consciousness of duty and responsibility. We find that in this life the vicious and guilty persons are not sufficiently punished, and the virtuous and dutiful persons are seldom happy. So we have to assume an after-life where justice will be maintained by causing a perfect coincidence of virtue with happiness and of vice with suffering.

THEORIES OF TRUTH

Q. 1 Distinguish between nature of truth and test of truth.

The nature of truth refers to what constitutes truth, i.e. what makes a judgment true. The test or criterion of truth, on the other hand, refers to how we come to know that our judgment is true, i. e., it refers to the process or way of our measuring or appreciating the truth of a judgment. So there appears a distinction between the nature of truth and the test of truth. How truth is constituted and how it is tested or known—these two propositions appear to be different from each other, because a judgment is already true or false, no matter whether we test and know it or not. In this connection the realists like Russell points out that a judgment becomes true when it corresponds to reality, though later on we may test its truth by some other means or ways like self-evidence, coherence or practical success. A judgment acquires truth or falsity by its agreement or disagreement with reality ; on the other hand, when we know that the judgment is self-evident or it does not contradict our previous stock of knowledge, but coheres with it or it works satisfactorily in practice, then the truth becomes tested. So, according to the realists, truth can exist even if it is not known or tested as such.

There is, however, another school of thought known as pragmatic school which holds that there is no distinction between the nature of truth and the test or criterion of truth, because the nature of truth lies in the test of it.

A judgment, according to the pragmatists, is at first neither true or false ; it is only when the judgment is tested or verified in practice that it acquires the nature of truth or falsity ; when the judgment is known to work successfully in practice, it becomes true ; when it leads to unsuccess in practise, it becomes false. So the truth or falsity of a judgment arises only when it is verified in practice.

We should point out in this connection that the pragmatic account of the nature of truth which lies in its verification in practice is not acceptable to us. Again the realistic view that the nature of truth is different from the test of truth is also objectionable, because it is not proper to think that we are to test truth by certain criterion which is altogether different from its nature. In fact, truth is its own criterion ; truth is inseparable from its valuation.

Q. 2. Give a critical account of the different theories of truth.

The main theories of truth are the following :—

The Intuitionst or Self-evidence Theory :—According to this theory, truth and error are self-evident and immediately apprehended. Truth is intrinsic to one kind of knowledge i. e. some cases of knowledge are intrinsically true and are directly known by us ; again, falsity is intrinsic to a different kind of experience and such erroneous experiences also are directly known by us. "Among modern intuitionists, Lossky tries to show that truth and falsity are known through an immediate consciousness of their objectivity and subjectivity respectively. For him, truth is the objective and falsity the subjective appearance of an object, and the one is known as much directly as the other. The appearance of a conch-shell as white is

objective and so true, while its appearance as yellow is subjective and, therefore false, and we have an immediate consciousness of their objectivity and subjectivity, and so of their truth and falsity respectively." (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee : *The Problems of Philosophy*)

Criticism :—If truth and falsity exist by their own rights and can be apprehended as self-evident in our immediate consciousness, then doubt or error or contradiction between the experiences, which actually occurs in the sphere of knowledge cannot be explained. If truth and falsity be directly apprehended, then why should there be any conflict between our experiences or difference of opinions between two persons? We, of course, admit that truth or error is self-evident and immediately apprehended only in the sphere of our self-consciousness, but not in the case of our knowledge of objects other than the self.

(2) **The Coherence Theory** :—According to this theory, a judgment is true when it is consistent with other relevant judgments. Our intellect constructs a coherent system of knowledge in which all experiences are united into one organised whole; so no judgment can stand isolated from other judgments or beliefs already gained. Now, if a judgment is coherent with the system of knowledge or beliefs already established, it will be regarded as true; on the other hand, if it contradicts the established system of knowledge, it will be rejected as false or erroneous.

The coherence theory of truth is advocated by the Hegelians, according to whom no fact can exist independent of experience or thought. So they reject the view of the realists that truth lies in the correspondence of judgment or thought to the fact existing in the world independent of experience or thought. The Hegelians i.e.

the absolute idealists maintain that there can be no self-existent facts, they are, indeed, constructed by the mind as the objects of its knowledge. In this connection Joachim points out that experience or knowledge is not a relation between the mental and the non-mental ; both the factors are spiritual ; so there is nothing non-mental. Hence truth, instead of being a case of the correspondence of our idea with an extra-mental fact, is rather a case of coherence of two sets of ideas both belonging to the system of experience. "This experience, however, is not the possession of any particular person. It is a universal experience which includes all particular experiences. In short, Joachim, as an absolute idealist, holds that subjects and objects, ideas and facts all form parts of an absolute whole whose nature is spiritual. This Absolute is a self-realizing and self-fulfilling system. Coherence is the mark of this system in so far as this system is a dynamic synthesis or a unity that maintains itself by reconciling all its diverse moments or elements. Coherence as possessed by this absolute system of experience is the ultimate nature of truth—it is truth par excellence, or the ideal truth." (Dr D. M. Dutta : Contemporary Philosophy)

It is not possible for man to fully realise the ideal of absolute truth. But whatever we know has some truths ; even our errors have partial truths. "In general every error contains some truth, since it has a content which in some sense belongs to the universe. And on the other side all truths are in varying degrees erroneous." (Bradley). Human truths and errors are alike partially false, so the distinction between truth and error is one of degree. An error is further removed from the absolute than a truth. The relative degrees of truth are measured by reference to the ideal of absolute truth ; a knowledge which is more coherent and comprehensive has a greater degree of truth than

a knowledge which is less coherent and comprehensive. In other words, our judgments have more truths and less errors according as they are more complete and more comprehensive. On the other hand, our judgments have less truths and more errors according as they are less complete and less comprehensive. Thus truths have degrees in proportion to the degrees of coherence and comprehensiveness that our judgments may possess.

Criticism :—The coherence theory holds that truth lies in the consistency, harmony or coherence amongst the different parts of the system of our experience ; but mere self-consistency and freedom from contradiction cannot constitute truth ; what is true must be consistent with fact ; this aspect of correspondence of ideas with facts is ignored in the coherence theory. Again, the coherence theory cannot explain the real distinction between truth and error as it recognises every case of experience as partially true and partially false.

(3) The Pragmatic Theory :—According to this theory, a judgment is true, because it works satisfactorily in practice. The pragmatists like James, Dewey and others hold that the nature of truth lies in its verification in practice. A judgment, according to the pragmatists, is at first neither true nor false ; it is only when the judgment is tested or verified in practice that it acquires the nature of truth or falsity ; when the judgment is known to work satisfactorily in practice i.e. when it proves useful or expedient in practical experience, it becomes true ; on the other hand, when it leads to unsucccess in practice, it becomes false. So the truth or falsity of a judgment arises only when it is verified in practice. In other words, the nature of truth and error is determined by the practical results or consequences. Truth is relative to human purpose and valuation ; it is

man-made. Truth emerges only when a belief is found to be sound, workable and useful in practice. James expresses his pragmatic view by saying, "The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth **happens** to an idea. It **becomes** true, is **made** true by events..... Truth is **made** just as health, wealth and strength are made in the course of experience." "This means that the truth of an idea is constituted by its verifiability, and its verifiability means its ability to guide us prosperously through experience. That is, if by following an idea we can obtain certain experiences which for practical life are useful and valuable, then the idea becomes true; if not, it turns out false. True ideas thus possess a practical value for us and we should have them for their practical value." (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee : The Problems of Philosophy)

Criticism :—The pragmatic theory is not satisfactory for the simple reason that it regards the nature and criterion of truth as consisting in conative satisfaction or utility and thus reduces truth to a personal and private affair instead of recognising an objective and universal standard to which truth must conform. Moreover, pragmatism wrongly holds that a judgment is true because it is useful. We can point out from our common experience that true judgments are not always useful, and even false judgments may sometimes be useful for certain purposes. Properly speaking, the nature of truth lies in the correspondence of our ideas with facts, no matter whether such correspondence are known by us or not. A judgment becomes true by virtue of its correspondence with fact, though later on we may test its truth by some other means including practical success or utility.

(4) **The Correspondence Theory** :—The correspondence theory of truth which is advocated by the realists in

various forms holds that a judgment is true if it agrees with or corresponds to a fact ; and it is false if it fails to do so

Popular or naive realism holds that truth lies in a direct correspondence between our consciousness and reality, i. e. in knowledge the reality is directly revealed in our consciousness. But if the real nature of objects be directly revealed in consciousness, then this theory cannot explain false appearance, illusion, dream, etc.

Neo-realism has revived the theory of popular or common-sense realism in a modified form and holds that truth lies in the direct correspondence between knowledge and its objects. The neo-realists show that in knowledge there is a numerical or structural identity between its content and the object known, so truth which is a correspondence of knowledge with object involves a structural identity between the order and arrangement of the parts of the physical object and those of the content of knowledge. But though the neo-realistic view of correspondence is an improvement on the theory of popular realism, we cannot admit that the structural identity between the contents of knowledge and the objects of knowledge is universally present ; in fact, such structural identity can be at best present in visual and tactual images, and not in other cases of knowledge. Moreover, the neo-realists by making all the facts of perception including illusions objective cannot satisfactorily explain the distinction between truth and error.

In order to overcome the difficulties as involved in the above theory another modern realistic school known as critical realism has revived in a modified form the copy theory of ideas as advocated by John Locke. According to Locke, the things of the external world cannot be directly known by the mind, but are known through the medium of

ideas. When the ideas exactly correspond to objects, i. e. when the ideas exactly copy or resemble objects, then our knowledge is true. But the difficulty in Locke's view is—how is it possible to know whether or not our ideas correspond to the objects which are external to the mind? We cannot know the correspondence between the ideas in our minds and the facts outside. So the modern critical realists modify Locke's view by holding that in our act of knowledge the objects are presented to the mind through the medium of sense-data which are partly of the nature of mind and partly of the nature of the objects and intervene, between the mind and the objects. These sense-data, according to the critical realists, are non-physical, logical entities called character-complexes or essences. Thus, according to critical realism, knowledge is true when the character-complexes are the real characters of the physical objects. But our objection to this view is that we cannot clearly understand how the character-complexes which are non-physical can partake of the characters of the physical objects and become identical with them.

The correspondence theory of truth as advocated by Bertrand Russell, a modern realist, deserves special mention. "According to him, truth is to be defined by correspondence to fact, and not to experience. A proposition is true when it corresponds with some real occurrence or fact. If we know the fact to which truth corresponds, i. e. if the proposition is suitably related to some experience, then we are said to **know** the proposition **as true**. But a proposition may be true without our knowing it as true. The proposition 'it is raining' is true if it is actually raining. It may be that I am sleeping at the time and do not realize that it is raining. But that would not

make the proposition 'it is raining' any less true. If I wake up and look out of the window of my room I would know that the proposition 'it is raining' is true. It follows that truth as a character of propositions depends on their correspondence to some real facts and that the knowledge of truth depends on its verification by experience." (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee : The Problems of Philosophy). This view of the correspondence idea of truth as expressed by Russell is known as the 'logical' theory of correspondence. This may be accepted as the satisfactory theory of the nature of truth, though with regard to the test of truth we may rely on coherence and pragmatic theories. The truth of self-consciousness, however, is self-evident ; knowledge of the self is, by itself, known to be true and does not require any extraneous test.

Q 3. Can there be degrees of truth ?

The theory of degrees of truth and reality is held by some Hegelians like Bradley and Bosanquet. "All finites, in the Hegelian view, are expressions of the Absolute Reality in different ways, and all of them are fragmentary in nature and, therefore, imperfect. But in spite of their imperfections, all are not equally imperfect. Hegel himself, we know, distinguished between the higher and the lower categories, on the criterion that the higher is more concrete, more complete or inclusive, more harmonious, whereas the lower is more abstract, less complete and less harmonious. So Hegel arranged the categories of logic, nature and spirit in the ascending order of perfection. (Dr. D. M. Datta : Contemporary Philosophy)

This aspect of Hegel's philosophy has influenced Bradley who regards all finites as appearances of reality. As the finites are mere appearances, so they are imperfect. But the different finites possess different degrees of imper-

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fections and as such different degrees of truth and reality. Bradley says, "Of two given appearances the one more wide, or 'more harmonious, is more real. It approaches nearer to a single, all containing individuality. To remedy its imperfections, in other words, we should have to make a smaller alteration. The truth and the fact, which, to be converted in the Absolute, would require less rearrangement and addition, is more real and truer. And this is what we mean by degrees of reality and truth." In similar manner Bosanquet also says that whatever possesses the greater degrees of individuality or coherence is relatively more real.

But the Hegelians point out that the appearances or imperfect things alone admit of degrees of truth and reality ; and what is perfect has no degrees, it is absolutely true or real. In the words of Bradley, "The Absolute, considered as such, has of course no degrees ; for it is perfect, and there can be no more or less in perfection. Such predicates belong to, and have a meaning only in, the world of appearance." Thus, according to the Hegelians, there is only one system of truth which is the organised unity of all experiences in one self-maintaining and all-inclusive whole, and this organised, all-coherent and all-inclusive whole is nothing other than Absolute Experience. But human knowledge can attain different degrees of truth by forming more or less coherent and comprehensive wholes. It is not possible for man to fully realise the ideal of absolute truth. But whatever we know has some truth ; even our errors have partial truths. "In general every error contains some truth, since it has a content which in some sense belongs to the universe. And on the other side all truths are in varying degrees erroneous." (Bradley). Human truths and errors are alike partially true and parti-

ally false, so the distinction between truth and error is one of degree. An error is further removed from the 'absolute' than a truth. The relative degrees of truth are measured by reference to the ideal of absolute truth; a knowledge which is more coherent and comprehensive has a greater degree of truth than a knowledge which is less coherent and comprehensive. In other words, our judgments have more truths and less errors according as they are more complete and more comprehensive. On the other hand, our judgments have less truths and more errors according as they are less complete and less comprehensive. Thus truths have degrees in proportion to the degrees of coherence and comprehensiveness that our judgments may possess.

Criticism :—We cannot understand how the Absolute which is, according to Bradley, a non-relational reality and which has no degrees can contain relational wholes like finite things and selves and embrace degrees of truth. If the Absolute be no-relational, then it would be more reasonable to hold that the finite things and selves are not only appearances but also negated in the Absolute and in that case the degrees of truth cannot be admitted. Again, if human judgments have partial truths and at the same time partial errors, then the real distinction between truth and error remains unexplained.

RELATION

Q. 1. What is the nature of Relation ? Is it external or internal ?

A relation always presupposes at least two things between which it holds. A relation does not exist in the same sense in which a substance or a quality exists. A thing or a quality exists in space and can be perceived by our senses, but a relation which holds between two things or between a substance and its quality does not exist in space nor can be perceived by our senses. Bertrand Russell says, "Suppose that I am in my room. I exist, and my room exists, but does 'in' exist ? Yet obviously the word 'in' has a meaning ; it denotes a relation which holds between me and my room." We may provisionally describe a relation as the togetherness of two or more things in one situation. Professor Alexander says, "When a relation relates certain terms, it makes a connected whole of those terms. The relation may be described as the whole situation into which its terms enter in virtue of that relation." In one word, a relation is a form of order among things which belong to some whole or system.

Now, with regard to the nature of relations there have been two theories—(1) **the theory of external relations** and **the theory of internal relations**. According to the theory of external relations, all relations are external to the terms which are not modified by the relations ; so the terms which are related remain exactly what they were and may again be out of the relations. On the other hand, according to the theory of internal relations, the relations modify or determine the very nature of the terms

related ; 'every relation essentially penetrates the being of its terms, and, in this sense, is intrinsical ; so the terms and relations are inseparable correlatives, and cannot be conceived in isolation from each other.

(1) **The theory of external relations :—**This theory is advocated by the realistic thinkers who say that the terms related have their entities independent of the relations and thus the nature of the terms is not at all affected or modified by the relations. Relations among things are merely connective links which accidentally fall between previously existing things. Thus, according to the theory of external relations, (a) the terms related are essentially independent of, and conceived apart from, any relation, (b) relations are merely accidental links, and so the terms may but need not enter into the relations, and (c) the terms related maintain their own essential nature which is not in the least altered by the relation, and so remain the same when they enter into and pass out of the relations. When a thread is taken out of a cloth, it does not cease to be thread, nor does it become another thread. Hence the relations fall outside the things and are only added to them.

The doctrine of external relations logically leads to the pluralistic view that the objects of the world are many independent realities irreducible to one single principle, because relations do not affect the independent nature of things. James says, "Things are with one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or dominates over everything."

Criticism :—Though our ordinary experience corroborates that there are various sorts of discontinuities among the objects of the world and their connections are

in many cases mere conjunctions which are purely accidental and so external, yet it may be shown on deep analysis that the objects of the world, instead of being independent and isolated realities, are rather inter-dependent parts of one absolute reality within which things are internally related to one another, and everything is dependent upon its relations to other things and to the supreme reality which relates all objects into a whole system. The theory of external relations cannot satisfactorily explain the cases of causal connection, the relation between substance and its qualities, and knowledge-relation. The cause and the effect are meaningless apart from their mutual relation, the cause ceases to be a cause apart from its relation to the effect, and the effect can not be characterised as an effect without its necessary relation to the cause. Again, there is an inseparable relation between a substance and its qualities, neither of which can be conceived apart from the necessary relation with the other ; qualities cannot exist independent of substance, and substance cannot exist without manifesting itself in and through its qualities. Similarly, the organism and its parts cannot be conceived apart from each other. Lastly, in the case of knowledge-relation the object cannot be externally related to the knowing mind, it is rather constituted by the knowing of it.

(2) **The theory of internal relations** :—This theory is advocated by the idealistic thinkers who say that the relations among things are not merely connecting links which accidentally falls between previously existing things. On the other hand, things are what they are because of their relations to a relational system in which they are inter-related as its constituent members. According to the theory of internal relations, the relations deter-

mine the very nature of things related and so all relations are internal. Bradley observes that if relations and terms could exist external to each other and thus independent of each other, then we would conceive some other relation which will connect relations with terms, and so on ad infinitum ; we can avoid this infinite regress if the relations are conceived as being internal to the terms. Joachim also argues in similar manner and shows the meaninglessness of external relations by saying, "A relation, which really falls between two independent entities is.....a third independent...entity which in no intelligible sense relates the first two.....All relations are internal in the sense that they qualify or modify or make a difference to the terms between which they hold, and that no terms are independent of any of the relations in which they stand to other terms."

The theory of internal relations is an aspect of the Hegelian theory that the universe is an organic whole in which all things are united in an inter-related system ; so a thing would not be what it is apart from its relation to the other things as well as to the whole system. Thus the theory of internal relations logically leads to the monistic view that the things, instead of having independent and separate existence, are rather the finite modes of one absolute reality in which they are all interrelated. "On the theory of internal relations, things cannot exist apart from their relations to one another. The nature and existence of every object depend on its relations to all other objects. The objects of the world, including physical things and conscious minds, are what they are because of their necessary relations to one another. But if they are thus related internally, that must be because there is a higher unity or larger whole within which they are all

contained as parts. This unity or whole must be one, 'universal and all-inclusive.' (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee : The Problems of Philosophy)

Criticism .—Though we admit that the universe is an organic whole in which things are interrelated and united in one whole system and though the relations between cause and effect, between substance and its qualities, and between the knowing mind and its objects, are regarded as internal and inseparable, yet, in our view, all relations in the world of experience are not internal. Some relations are internal, and others are external to the terms related. In this connection we may make mention of the Nyaya-Vaisesika view which rightly recognises two kinds of relations—samyoga or accidental conjunction (which is an external relation) and samavaya or necessary connection (which is an internal relation). The objects which are conjoined had a separate existence prior to conjunction and also may be separated from one another without their existence and nature being destroyed. On the contrary, the members related by samavaya are inseparably connected. "Two things in the relation of samavaya cannot be separated without at least one of them being destroyed. Samyoga takes place between two things of the same nature which exist disconnectedly and are for a time brought into conjunction. It is external relation, while samavaya is internal relation. In Samyoga two different are joined together without forming a real whole which enters into each. Samavaya is a real coherence." (Dr. S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy),

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY
MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY—PASS

THIRD PAPER—

Group B—Western Philosophy

1. Discuss the relative merits of Criticism and Dialectic as methods of philosophy. (Pages 34—37, 37—39)
2. Explain the relations between science and philosophy and also the relation of philosophy to Epistemology. (Pages 8—11, 13—16)
3. Analyse the concept of time and try to determine whether it is objectively real or merely ideal. (Pages 96—97, 99—103)
4. Is not Idealism necessarily subjective? Distinguish clearly between Objective Idealism and Realism. (Pages 81—84)
5. Explain your idea of God and try to show how we come to know anything about Him. (Pages 197—199)

THIRD PAPER—

1. What is Philosophy? How is it related to Science? (Pages 1—3, 8—11)
2. What is judgment? What are its main characteristics? (Pages 43—44, 46—49)
3. Explain and examine the empirical theory of the origin of knowledge. (Pages 63—68)
4. What is Idealism? Distinguish between subjective and objective idealism. (Pages 77, 81—84)
5. Explain the Deistic and the Theistic theories of God? Which of them do you prefer, and why? (Pages 199—200, 202—204)

BURDWAN-UNIVERSITY—

1. What is the exact task of Metaphysics and what of Epistemology ? (Pages 12, 13—14)'
2. (a) Distinguish between Judgment and Proposition.
(b) How are Judgment and Inference related to one another ? (Pages 43, 52—53)
3. What part do reason and sense-experience play in the Formation of Knowledge ? What exactly do you ^{mean} by the word reason in this context ? (Pages 73— 6)
4. Elucidate the doctrine *Esse est Percipi* and examine the arguments that are usually forward in its defence.
(Pages 84—89)
5. What are the different types of Idealism ? (Pages 81—84)
6. Give a critical estimate of Hume's view of causation.
(Pages 110—112)

B. U.

1. What is Epistemology ? Explain the relation of Epistemology to Philosophy. (See Page 13—16)
2. Philosophy is the synthesis of the Science. Discuss.
(See Page 8—11)
3. What are the characteristics feature of judgment ? How far is it correct to say that the distinction between Judgment and Inference is never absolutes ? (See Pages 46—49)
4. How are the Primary qualities distinguished from Secondary qualitiss. Is the distinction tenable. (See Page 79—82)
5. Analyse the concept of space and explain the view that space is an apriori form of Institution. (See Page 95, 98—99)
6. Distinguish between a Machine and an organism. Examine in this connection, the mechanic Explanation of the origin and nature of life. (See Page 137—139, 140—143)
7. Analyse the theory of Evolution. Is it Compriatible with Teleology ? (See Page)
8. Why are Truth, Beauty, and Goodness called ultimate values. Are values projections of the human mind or do they possess objectivity ? (See Page 191—192, 193—196)

PHILOSOPHY HONOURS (C. U.)

FOURTH PAPER

Group B

1. What is Metaphysics? How is it related to Logic on the one hand and to esistemology on the other?

(Pages 12, 17—19, 13—16)

2. Bring out the exact point at issue between Rationalism and Empiricism, and show how criticism seeks to reconcile the two theories.

(Page 56—62)

3. Does truth consist in the correspondence of knowledge with reality? Discuss fully.

(Page 238—240)

4. Analyse the notion of substance, can you defend it against its modern critics?

(Page 104—109)

5. Bring out the main points at issue between Mechanism and vitalism, and give a critical estimate of the controversy.

(Page 140—145)

6. Explain the concept of value, are values subjective or objective? Discuss.

(Pages 191—192, 193—196)

FOURTH PAPER

Group B— (C. U.)

1. Is metaphysics possible? Discuss the question with special reference to kant and logical positivists.

(Page 12—13)

2. Elucidate the strament that modern Physics has dematerialised matter.

(Page 131—136)

3. State and examine the pragmatist theory of truth.

(Page 237—238)

4. Analyse the concept of causality. Does it involve the idea of necessary connection?

(Page 109—114)

5. Clearly state the precise points at issue between realism and idealism. Attempt a comparative and critical estimate of their merits and demerits.

(P 77—84)

6. Analyse the Concepts of Appearance and Reality. Are the degrees of reality?

(Page 240—242)